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THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

ISLAMIC POLITICAL CULTURE AND AUTHORITARIAN-MILITARY RULE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NATURE OF RULE IN PAKISTAN

by

ASHRAFUL HASAN

(C)

A THESIS

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Date: May 5, 1989

Abstract

This study, presented in five chapters, examines the political culture of Islam in the context of Pakistan and attempts to relate it to the nature of rule in Pakistan. The first chapter provides the setting for the study by outlining the theoretical framework and by explaining the terms and concepts which are basic to this study. The relationship between religion, political culture and the nature of rule is set out in this chapter and the reasons underlying a two-step approach to studying political culture are also explained in detail.

The findings of the study are examined in the subsequent three chapters. In the case of the findings pertaining to doctrinaire Islam, as outlined in chapter 2, a primarily authoritarian perspective, based on the premise of the military's pre-eminence in Muslim society during Muhammad's lifetime and under the Rashidun caliphs, emerges. However, rudimentary elements of republicanism were also noted to be part of the fundamental framework of Islam.

In the third chapter, the manner in which the authoritarian-military attributes of doctrinaire Islam found expression and meaning in the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent is analysed. The process of cultural continuity and change, which occurred due to the inputs originating from the subcontinent and the period of British rule in the region, is also discussed in this chapter.

An examination of the nature of rule in Pakistan in the post-independence period comprises the major thrust of the discussion in chapter 4. The pendulum-like oscillation which Pakistan experienced between authoritarian-military and authoritarian-civilian rule is explained and analysed in this chapter within the overall framework of the study.

The thesis concludes with an assessment and further integration of the major findings. An effort is also made in the concluding chapter to deal with the question of what lies ahead in Pakistan's political future and the issues which the political leadership will have to reckon with in order to ensure the future viability of Pakistan as an independent sovereign state.

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I would like to express my gratitude to Professor S.M.M. Qureshi for supervising this thesis and for his many useful comments and suggestions. His knowledge of Pakistani politics helped immensely in conducting the research and analysing the findings. In addition, his encouragement made the completion of this study possible. I am also indebted to Professor Juris Lejnieks for his scholarly comments on my thesis and for the advice provided to me at every stage of my studies here at the University of Alberta. My thanks and sense of gratitude also go to Professor F.C. Engelmann for his academic advice on my thesis work. The comments provided by Dr. E. Waugh of the Department of Religious Studies, University of Alberta and by Professor C. Adams of the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University assisted me in enhancing my appreciation and understanding of Islam. I am thankful to both of them for their academic advice and comments.

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Glossary of Terms

al-hamdulillah	- Muslim expression of gratitude/thanks to God.
al-maghazi	- military expeditions.
al-Rahman	- Merciful (phrase used by Muslims to refer to God).
ahkam	- ordinances; laws.
amir al-muminin	- commander of the faithful.
bakshi	- bestower (title used during Mughal period to refer to the army paymaster).
baya	- the act by which the authority of one is recognised by others in traditional Arab society; offering of allegiance.
biradari	- group unity/solidarity.
bismilla hir Rahman nir Rahim	- In the name of God, the Beneficient, the Merciful.
chowdhri	- village chieftan or headman.
dar-al-harb	- world of war (i.e. the non-Muslim world).
dar-al-Islam	- world of Islam.
darshan	- viewing for public veneration.
din	- way of life.
Din-i Ilahi	- Divine Faith, as introduced by Akbar.
diwan-i-aam	- public court.
dupatta	- scarf used by Muslim women for maintaining a modest image.
farz	- mandatory.
hadith	- tradition of what Prophet Muhammad said or did.
hakim	- person who governs or gives orders.
hari	- peasant.
ijma	- popular consensus.
ijtihad	- exertion of human reasoning to ascertain a rule of sharia.
imam	- a religious leader/leader of public prayer.
jagir	- landholding.
jihad	- literally, the utmost effort in the path of God; holy war.
jizya	- poll-tax levied upon non-Muslims residing in territories governed by Muslims.

kammi	- village craftsmen/ peasants.
kapra	- clothing.
khan	- tribal chief.
khutba	- sermon delivered in the mosque.
madressa	- mosque school.
majlis-i-shura	- consultative council.
makan	- house/shelter.
mansabs	- ranks of employment as introduced by Mughals.
mazhar	- infallibility.
mullah	- religious functionary, normally affiliated with mosque.
musawat-i-Muhammadi	- egalitarianism and equality, as preached by Muhammad.
nasir-i amir al-muminin	- helper of the commander of faithful.
pir	- spiritual guide or mentor.
rajah	- monarch.
Rasul	- Prophet.
rais	- feudal lord.
roti	- bread (phrase commonly used in Urdu to refer to food).
sardar	- tribal chief in Pakistan.
sharia	- divine laws of Islam.
shura	- consultation.
sunnah	- Muhammad's practices.
sura	- a row or series (term used for referring to the chapters of the Quran).
umma	- community of Muslim believers.
ulema	- scholar in Islam.
yamin al-khilafat	- right hand of the caliphate.
wadera	- Sindhi feudal lords.
zakat	- alms for the needy, as provided for in Islam.
zamindar	- landlord.
zimmi	- person of subject status; non-Muslim inhabitant of Islamic country.

I. Introduction

> Islam is a political culture: it often provides the form and the vocabulary of political action.[1]
>
> E. Mortimer

Islam is the world's youngest universal faith, and, in contemporary times, states having a predominantly Muslim population exist in different parts of the world.[2] These states vary considerably from each other in social customs, level of economic development, etc. However, most of them share a common characteristic at the political level, viz. authoritarian or military regimes.[3]

This study focuses on the phenomenon of authoritarian-military rule in the context of Pakistan - a

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[1] E. Mortimer, Faith and Power: The Politics of Islam (London: Faber & Faber, 1982), p.407.

[2] It should be noted that Islam has the second largest number of followers in the world (with Christianity having the largest). The Muslim population of the world, as a percentage of total world population is approximately 26%. 68% of the Muslim population of the world reside in Asia.

[3] For a summary account of the Muslim states which have experienced authoritarian (or military) regimes, see M. Halpern, The Politics of Social Change in the Middle East and North Africa (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), p.251. Saleem Qureshi, in examining the role of the military in Muslim states, observes that an "overall view of the Muslim states shows that soldiers have governed a majority of the Middle Eastern (Muslim) countries almost continuously for at least a millenium." Elaborating on this, Qureshi comments that in 1980 "half of the Muslim states are directly ruled by the military, and in the rest the military is the ultimate power." For details, see S.M.M. Qureshi, "Military in the Polity of Islam: Religion as a Basis for Civil-Military Interaction," International Political Science Review, 2, 3 (1981), pp.271-282.

predominantly Muslim populated country - and attempts to provide an understanding of Pakistani politics by systematically examining the norms, practices and cultural assumptions which emerge from the religious realm of Islam. In other words, Islamic political culture will serve as the explanatory variable in this study, and in identifying its principal characteristics, two distinct levels of analysis will be employed. The first level, viz. the doctrinaire level will deal with those norms and assumptions which are fundamental to the religion of Islam, and are manifest not only in the context of Muslim society in Pakistan, but in the Islamic world in general. Our second level, viz. "the practical religion of the converted" level pertains principally to the manner in which the message of doctrinaire Islam found expression and meaning amongst Muslims in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.

In this chapter, I have, in defining the research problem and in outlining the research methods, discussed at length the theoretical underpinnings of the two-step approach (as mentioned above), and attempted to explain the reasons underlying the adoption of such an approach for this study. The manner in which these two levels will be operationalised has also been dealt with in this chapter. Furthermore, conceptual terms which are basic to the research problem, such as "political culture," "religion" and "authoritarian-military rule" have been explained, and the political culture attributes contributing to

authoritarian-military rule have been analysed and outlined in detail.

The idea that national characteristics, cultural factors or religious norms influence and affect political trends within a given polity existed even before political scientists actually employed conceptual terms such as "political culture" and "authoritarian-military" rule. Montesquieu, for example, is known to have claimed that since Christianity "forbids the plurality of wives, its princes ... have more humanity ... and [this] has hindered despotic power from being established in Ethiopia."[4] The implicit assumption regarding the existence of a relationship between the socio-cultural norms of a given political community and its form of government, as noted in Montesquieu's statement, is also reflected in the rigid and reactionary pronouncement of Hegel that "the entire nature of the [Negro] race is such as to preclude the existence of any ... political constitution."[5]

The above mentioned statements, though suggestive of a recognition of the relationship between the cultural norms and the politics of a certain community, fail to provide any clearly outlined theoretical perspective in this regard. In the following section, I have, as a first step in formulating appropriate research methods for conducting this study, outlined some important theoretical issues which are

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[4]D.D. Laitin, "Religion, Political Culture and the Weberian Approach," World Politics, XXX, 4 (July, 1978), p.563.
[5]Ibid.

pertinent to this study on Islamic political culture and authoritarian-military rule in Pakistan.

A. Political Culture, Religion and Authoritarian-Military Rule: Some Theoretical Considerations

Political Culture and Religion: A Complex Relationship

"Political culture" refers to the cultural assumptions and norms which are prevalent within a given political community. These norms and assumptions colour the perceptions of the community members, influence their orientations and political preferences and also serve to define the goals of political life.[1] Put more succinctly, they provide a set of conceptual lenses which are employed by the community members to view the empirical world around them and to define the desireability or undesireability of particular forms of political behaviour. Thus, for instance, while the employment of violence and coercive instruments of power to reckon with opposition groups might be acceptable or even endorsed in a given political culture, those belonging to another political culture could, on account of a different set of cultural assumptions, consider this as being a culpable act.

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[1]For some discussion on the concept of political culture, see G.A. Almond, G.B. Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach (Boston & Toronto: Little, Brown, 1966), p.50; and S. Verba, "Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture," in Political Culture and Political Development, eds. L.W. Pye, S. V[illegible] (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 196[illegible] p.513.

Political attitudes and expectations of a given political community are, as the above analysis suggests, intricately linked to the norms of its political culture. Basic to the political culture approach to the study of politics is the premise that norms and cultural assumptions which are similar across different classes and groups within a given political community (but which differ from one political community to the other), lead to similar political attitudes, expectations and actions.[7] Furthermore, political culture studies are intended to provide an understanding of the overall predispositions of a given community and to outline the broad parameters within which it operates - rather than explain the specifics, for instance, of governmental policy positions in particular situations. In this sense, analyses based on the political culture approach are permissive rather than deterministic in nature.[8] The "permissive" nature of political culture explanations can be better comprehended by a reference to the nature of themes and cultural attributes which commonly constitute a political culture study. Issues such as the question of trust or distrust of authority figures and one's community members, the manner in which dissent is dealt with, the imagery vis-à-vis the role and responsibility of the individual in society and other such broad areas of

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[7] For details, see Laitin, op.cit., p.563.
[8] Such a view is expressed in D.J. Elkins, R.E.B. Simeon, "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" Comparative Politics, 10, 2 (January, 1979), pp.13-33.

investigation generally comprise a political culture study.' To the extent that the subject matter of a political culture study is in itself broadly formulated and somewhat open-ended in nature, the conclusions which are derived from such a study are also equally open-ended and "permissive" (rather than "deterministic") in style and content.

It should also be noted that the political culture approach stresses upon the sociological perspective to understanding political phenomena and emphasizes the need to examine the norms and practices which have historically existed within a polity. This is clear from Lucian Pye's discussion on political culture, in which it is suggested that "politics is ... deeply rooted in the native genius of people...."[10] Elaborating on this, Pye explains that, "the attitudes, sentiments and cognitions that ... govern political behaviour are not random congeries but represent coherent patterns.... Each generation must receive its politics from the previous one, each must react against that process to find its own politics...."[11]

Religious norms and customs comprise an integral part of the history and traditions of a given political community and contribute thus to the shaping of its political culture. The symbols and assumptions which constitute the political culture of a given community could, in fact, originate from

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'For a discussion on this, see Verba, "Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture," in Pye and Verba, op.cit., p.521.

'°L.W. Pye, "Introduction: Political Culture and Political Development," in Pye and Verba, op.cit., p.3.

''Ibid., p.7.

the religious realm. Also, as a subset of the overall concept of political culture, religious norms could, on the one hand, play an important role in shaping the long lasting moods and motivations within a given community, and, on the other hand, provide the moral yardstick for measuring particular actions and forms of behaviour.'[12]

The precise nature of relationship between religion and culture is summed up succinctly by Tillich in the statement that "in the cultural act, ... the religious is substantial; in the religious act, the cultural is formal."'[13] Tillich's analysis suggests that religion and culture provide complementary expressions of meaning - the former through import, and the latter through form. In addition, it indicates that religion and culture cannot be spoken of in the absence of one another. Thus, while for analytical purposes, religion and culture may be mentioned separately, religion, in itself, represents a form of cultural system - conveying meaning and shaping the long-lasting moods and motivations of the members of a given community.

Our above mentioned observations regarding the relationship between religion and political culture are especially true in the case of the believers in the Islamic faith. Muslims regard Islam not merely as a religion, but as

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'[12]Such a view is also reflected in Geertz's definition of religion. See J.H. Morgan, "Clifford Geertz: An Interfacting. of Anthropology and Religious Study," in Understanding Religion and Culture: Anthropological And Theological Perspectives, ed. J.H. Morgan (Washington: University Press of America, 1979), p.2.

'[13] Paul Tillich, What is Religion? (New York: Harper Torchbook, 1969), p.60.

a din or "way of life." In other words, the relevance of Islam is perceived by Muslims as extending far beyond issues pertaining to purely the religious realm. Guidelines regarding the various dimensions of human existence on this universe, insights into the life hereafter and other such broad philosophical issues are believed to be incorporated within the meaning and message of Islam. In the absence of any clear demarcation between the temporal and spiritual domains in Muslim society, the Muslim mind also seeks instructions pertaining to one's individual, family and community life from within the realm of religion. Such a holistic approach makes it conducive for beliefs which originate from the religious domain to influence and affect the socio-political life of Muslim communities.

Political Culture and Authoritarian-Military Rule: A Framework for Analysis

The theoretical framework for conducting this study on Islamic political culture and authoritarian-military rule in Pakistan revolves primarily around three principal issue areas, viz.

1. Authority and the individual self;
2. "Ingroup-outgroup" imagery[1] of the environment; and
3. Role and relevance of coercive instruments of power/the military in the polity.

As an introduction to our discussion, it would be useful to

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[1] The phrase "we-they mentality" has also been used in our study to suggest a similar meaning as this.

comment briefly on the nature of authoritarian rule'[8] itself. Authoritarian polities are generally characterised by a predominant influence of a single individual or a small group within the polity. While political elites, in democratic and authoritarian systems alike, represent a small percentage of the total population, the distinctive feature of authoritarianism is the unidirectional flow of power and influence (in contrast to the two-way flow in democratic polities) which is noted in such polities and which serves to provide a near-total control of the populace by those at the helm of state affairs. Such a top-heavy type of polity goes hand in hand with a mind-set of the masses which reflects a low sense of self esteem, and thereby inhibits, on the one hand, an assertion of the individual self in the affairs of state and society, and, on the other hand, promotes passivity in the polity. A manifestation of passivity, as often noted in cultures which are prone to authoritarianism, is in the form of fatalistic tendencies and a popular reliance on the "invisible hands of destiny" (rather than on the capabilities of the self) to structure and shape one's future. A mind frame such as this is also commonly associated with a dependence on an external coordinating agency or source of authority for guidance and support. This dimension of the authoritarian-prone polity has received some reference in past studies on authoritarianism. For instance, in The Authoritarian

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[8]The military's role in authoritarian-type systems has been outlined in subsequent paragraphs of this section.

Personality''[4] it is suggested that a "weak ego"''[5] is basic to the psyche of any nation which is prone to succumb to authoritarian rule. Elaborating on this theme, it is mentioned that a weak ego is characterised by a basic inability of the individual self to establish a consistent and enduring set of norms and value standards - thereby making it necessary for such a personality to seek some organising and coordinating agency outside itself. Furthermore, on account of the near total dependence of the individual self upon the external coordinating agency, the relationship between the two parties is of a patron-client nature - whereby the external coordinating agency, serving as the patron, commands total obedience and loyalty of the client.''[6]

Clearly thus, a cultural theme intricately related to authoritarianism is the excessive importance attached to obedience and loyalty to sources of authority. According to Adorno et al., "obedience and loyalty are the first requirements...."''[7] within an authoritarian culture. Uncritical obedience towards authority figures such as, for example, the father and other elders is considered as being mandatory, and, in keeping with such a cultural emphasis, blind submission also comprises an integral component of the

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''[4]T.W. Adorno et al., The Authoritarian Personality (New York, Evanston, London: Harper and Row, 1950).
''[5]Ibid., p.235. In this study, the term "weak ego" has often been used synonymously to the concept of a low sense of self esteem referred to earlier in this paragraph.
''[6]Ibid., pp.234-235.
''[7]Ibid., p.149.

authoritarian-prone polity. It should be noted in this context that while a certain degree of deference, in the form of respect for valid sources of authority, exists in any culture or society, submissiveness, as existing in authoritarian-prone polities, goes beyond basic deference and respect, and reflects a general sense of popular resignation and servility vis-à-vis the dictates of authority figures.[20]

The "authority-centred" perspective, as outlined above, is also reflected in the cultural premise of authoritarian societies that power and authority, in the final analysis, resides within the confines of one single entity. A pluralistic conception of authority, in other words, is uncommon to an authoritarian-prone polity. Thus, while various political entities of prominence may continue to prevail at lower levels in the form of, for instance, regional rajas (monarchs) and kings, their authority is nonetheless considered to be derived from a single and supreme sovereign. The infinite powers and abilities of this ultimate authority source is also much emphasized - engendering thereby a sense of awe and helplessness in the mass mind and causing a further accentuation of the passivity of the populace at large.

Additional insights regarding the relationship between the passivity of the populace and authoritarianism is available from research studies dealing with the political

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[20]A similar view is expressed in ibid.

culture of democracy. In this context, Almond and Verba's study The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations[21] is worth taking note of. The authors propose three principal culture types, viz. the parochial, subject and participant cultures.[22] A parochial political culture is defined by the authors as being pre-political in nature. Individuals belonging to such a culture are characterised as being principally apolitical or parochial in outlook. Tribal societies, for instance, often reflect the cultural attributes of a parochial type of polity. The inhabitants of such societies commonly manifest a distinct inability to relate to the relevance of societal structures, authority sources and polities beyond their immediate family, tribe or clan. Furthermore, it is not uncommon for polities manifesting a parochial type of orientation to be not only unaware - but also unconcerned about anything beyond matters pertaining to the immediate kinship group. In this sense, these polities are somewhat myopic in their world-view and perspective.

The subject political culture, as outlined in The Civic Culture, is distinct from the parochial type in terms of a general awareness amongst the populace regarding the socio-political setting which exists beyond their immediate familial ties and kinship affiliations. The individual members in this case, in addition to being cognisant of the

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[21] G.A. Almond, S. Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Boston, Toronto: Little Brown, 1965).

[22] Ibid., pp.16-18.

broader political setting in which they exist, also comprehend to a certain degree the manner in which the political structures affect them, and may even accept the legitimacy of these structures. The individual's role, however, is principally a passive one, and is confined primarily to obeying decisions made by the political leaders.

In contrast to the culture types identified above, the participant political culture provides for an explicit and distinct political role for the individual member. The input from the masses is, in fact, actively promoted. In this manner, the populace is accorded a high profile status and is considered as being vital for the successful management of the polity. A participant political culture, in other words, operates on the premise that the populace, in the final analysis, should be the master's of their own destiny, and should have a direct hand in the shaping of this destiny.

The culture of democracy, as explained by Almond and Verba, is a mixture of the parochial, subject and participatory types. In elaborating upon this perspective, it is suggested that excessive amounts of either the participatory, parochial or subject mentality in the culture of a given polity would be detrimental to the sustenance of democracy. For instance, an excessive amount of a "subject" or non-participatory orientation within a given culture would inevitably undermine the extent of public control of

the government - thereby creating conditions favourable to the establishment of a top-heavy or authoritarian type of government. Similarly, excessive doses of parochialism would cripple not only democracy, but any society, due to the lack of an adequate sense of community amongst the constituent members. This is witnessed clearly in many developing polities which, long after having attained statehood, continue to be plagued by their failure to attain nationhood due to the intense parochial instincts of particular subgroups within these polities. Along similar lines, popular participation also needs to operate in accordance with certain general accepted guidelines, limits and laws.[23] Thus, although democratic societies promote mass participation, certain institutional controls on the populace continue to be in place,[24] and participation is structured primarily around the ballot box. The mandate of the masses is sought mainly once in several years through the electoral process, and while the principle of representative government continues at all times as the overriding political reality, such an ethos and objective is attained by incorporating directly, not the populace at large, but rather their elected representatives (members of parliament, for example) in the political decision-making process. In this manner, anarchy and lawlessness arising out of unbridled participation is prevented from undermining the

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[23] Ibid., pp.11-26.

[24] Similar views are expressed in S.P. Huntington, "Political Development and Political Decay," World Politics, XVII, 3 (April, 1965), p.409.

viability of democratic societies, and at the same time, the concept of popular participation is sustained.

The concept of a "mixed nature" - as being the "magic" of democracy - reflects itself also in the idea, as proposed by the authors, that democratic cultures are pre-eminently allegiant participatory in nature.[25] The allegiant component of a democratic culture serves to promote within the mass populace a general sense of identification with and loyalty towards the political system and also vis-à-vis those who have assumed political power via the popularly accepted means provided within the institutional framework of the political system in question. Furthermore, it generates within the political culture a sentiment of popular trust and a willingness to permit those in positions of political authority to administer the affairs of state and to decide on issues which have ramifications for the populace at large. However, in keeping with the fundamental premise that a mix or balance is imperative to sustain democracy, such allegiance and loyalty does not translate itself in the form of mass complacency and unquestioning faith vis-à-vis political authority, and coexists alongside the participatory dimension of democratic cultures - and permits thus a form of political accountability and public control of those in positions of power and authority. This, however, is not the case in authoritarian type cultures which, akin to democratic cultures, endorse loyalty and allegiance but,

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[25]Almond and Verba, op.cit., p.30.

on account of the low sense of self esteem of the masses and the overemphasis on obedience, do not sufficiently reflect themes supportive of a participatory role of the populace and the idea of political accountability. It would thus not be inaccurate to suggest that, in sharp contrast to the allegiant participatory nature of a democratic culture and society, the authoritarian-prone polity, in its perfect state, manifests cultural attributes which are principally allegiant-subject in nature.[24]

The second principal issue area pertaining to authoritarian-military cultures, viz. the "ingroup-outgroup" imagery of the environment, can be explained and understood in the context of what has already been mentioned so far. The above discussion on the relationship between authority figures and the individual self highlighted the importance attached within authoritarian-type cultures to obedience, conformism and compliance. Such a cultural emphasis promotes, on the one hand, the idea of a tightly knit community ("ingroup") based on a set of strictly enforced guidelines and rules, and, on the other hand, reflects itself in the form of disdain, hostility and suspicion vis-à-vis those who do not conform to these guidelines or alternatively fail to meet the criteria established by the "ingroup." Dissenters are thus routinely relegated to an

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[24]In less than "ideal" circumstances, when allegiance of the masses may not be attainable, a subject orientation is nonetheless "enforced" by the use of sheer coercion and brute force. Such a proclivity within authoritarian-type cultures is clear from our following discussion on the manner in which dissenters are dealt with.

"outgroup" status, treated as second-class members of society and denied positions of political power and authority. Discriminatory practices of this sort are justified within authoritarian cultures on the grounds that the "outgroup" is inferior in abilities and moral ethics. Furthermore, the "outgroup" is viewed as being power-hungry and threatening, and differences with the "outgroup" are perceived (and professed) as being permanent and unresolvable.

Conflict within authoritarian cultures, as our above analysis suggests, is viewed in strictly bipolar terms, and precludes thus the possibility of an accommodatory approach vis-à-vis those who do not subscribe to the mainstream views of the "ingroup." Also, maintaining the supremacy and strength of the "ingroup" is regarded by the "ingroup" members as being synonymous to keeping the "outgroup" in a perpetually subordinate position. Such a mind-frame, extant in authoritarian cultures, serves to justify repression and forcible subjugation of the "ambitious and yet inept outgroup"[27] - thus promoting intolerance and the use of violence within the polity and enhancing thereby the role and relevance of coercive instruments of power and the military. It is important, however, to be cognisant of the distinction between the authoritarian-civilian and the authoritarian-military type of polity. In an authoritarian-civilian polity, while the military is

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[27]My statement is intended to capture the perspective of the "ingroup."

employed by the civilian leaders to sustain the authoritarian-civilian system, it nonetheless remains under the control of the civilian government. In the authoritarian-military form, however, the military's role goes beyond the function of merely providing props for the authoritarian regime, and the "soldier politicians" manifest long-term political goals and serve as the ultimate source of authority.[20] The "pro-military" perspective[21] of a political culture which promotes such a "ruler-type" role for the military may be reflected in various forms. For instance, a cultural premise which manifests a traditional non-existence of any clear demarcation between the political and military domains, and permits thereby (on a horizontal scale incorporating the various affairs of state) the role of the military to transcend beyond military matters and security related issues, could justify, in the minds of the masses, a continuing involvement and prominence of the military in the political process. Similarly, cultural assumptions suggesting that, on a vertical authority structure, the military is located either at par or above the civilian sources of authority, could, in essence, have the same effect. The importance of the military in the polity could also be fostered by popular myths and cultural

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[20]For a discussion on authoritarian-civilian and authoritarian-military systems, see G.I. Mirsky, "The Role of the Military in the Sociopolitical Development of Asian and African Countries," International Political Science Review, 2, 3 (1981), pp.327-338.

[21]This term has been employed in subsequent chapters to refer to the cultural themes discussed in this paragraph.

themes which glorify the idea of waging holy wars and allude to the existence of persistent security threats from the "outgroup."

In addition to the above, a political climate and popular culture which manifests poor conditions for the stable functioning of civilian power could also contribute to a preeminence of the military in the political process. For example, the absence within a political culture of any clear and generally accepted guidelines on vital political issues such as, for instance, the question of political succession, could create conflicts of an irreconciliable nature amongst community members and consequently make the polity more dependent upon the use of force as a means of conflict resolution. Under such circumstances, the status and importance of the military in the political process could only be expected to be elevated to such a degree that it would function not only as an instrument of state policy, but rather as a vital and possibly independent actor in the political arena.

Islamic Political Culture: The Levels of Analysis Issue

In outlining some of the theoretical considerations relevant to this study on Islamic political culture, it is important to recognise the processes of continuity and change which take place in any cultural system across spatial and temporal bounds.[30] The socialisation process, in

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[30]For a discussion on this, see D.F. Eickelman, "The Study of Islam in Local Contexts," in Islam in Local Contexts

other words, which contributes to the shaping of Islamic political culture occurs in a manner whereby traits and cultural attributes originating from the strictly religious realm become modified, altered or reinforced somewhat differently in different social contexts and in different periods of history. It is thus imperative, in conducting a study of Islamic political culture, to take into consideration the factor of religion and also be cognisant of the context (spatial and temporal) within which it exists. Such an approach permits an understanding and analysis of the culture of Muslim people on its own terms and within the context of its own meaning system.[31] It also precludes the portrayal of Islamic political culture as being monolithic and identical across spatial and temporal bounds[32] to a degree which defies empirical realities.

The effort to provide a sociological definition of Islam, as is essential to a political culture study, brings us to the heart of the problem, viz. the level of analysis problem. The strictly doctrinaire approach to the study of religion focuses attention primarily on the religious doctrine in its original and most consistent form. Thus, for

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[30](cont'd) (vol. 17), ed. R.C. Martin (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1962), pp.1-16.

[31]For a discussion on this, see L. Binder, "Area Studies: A Critical Reassessment," in The Study of the Middle East: Research and Scholarship in the Humanities and Social Sciences, ed. L. Binder (New York, Sydney, Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1976), p.11.

[32]The inadvisability of such a portrayal of the Muslim world has also been mentioned by past researchers on Islam. For example, see Eickelman, "The Study of Islam in Local Contexts," in Martin, op.cit., pp.1-16.

instance, the Bible would be relied upon and delved into for understanding the political attitudes, popular perceptions and trends in the Christian world. Similarly, in the case of the community of Muslim believers, the Quran would serve as the principal basis for the researcher's analysis. Basic to this approach is the assumption that the norms incorporated at the doctrinaire level have major consequences for the organisation of political life.

While the doctrinaire level may serve as a fundamental source for hypothesizing on the implications of religious norms on political life, and thus could be regarded as an explanatory variable influencing mass attitudes and popular perceptions, a sociological perspective[33] on religion emphasizes the need to incorporate, in addition to the norms emerging from the doctrinaire level, also those characteristics and cultural traits which originate from the history and local traditions of the particular religious community which is being discussed. Details in this regard, have been outlined in the following section pertaining to the research methods which will be adopted in this study.

B. Research Method

In designing an appropriate research method for this study, the theoretical issues discussed in the earlier sections of this chapter were taken into consideration. The

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[33]The political culture approach, as mentioned earlier, emphasizes such a perspective to the study of political phenomena.

need to adopt a sociological perspective and approach, whereby Islamic political culture is not portrayed either as a "... seamless essence ... or as a plastic congeries of beliefs and practices"[30] was deemed as being a particularly important and compelling consideration which needed to be reckoned with. In addressing this concern, two distinct levels of analysis are proposed with the objective of partialling out the strictly doctrinaire dimension of Islam from the various meanings which the Islamic faith may assume in different socio-political contexts. These two levels, viz. the "doctrinaire" level and the "practical religion of the converted" level,[31] are shown in the model below:[32]


Level 1
Doctrinaire Islam
Level 2
"Practical Religion of the Converted" (incorporating customs and norms which are common to Muslims in the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent)
Socio-Cultural Realities in Place/Country of Study
ISLAMIC POLITICAL CULTURE
Authoritarian-Military Rule

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[30] Eickelman, "The Study of Islam in Local Contexts," in Martin, op.cit., pp.1-2.

[31] In this study, the "doctrinaire" level, and the "practical religion of the converted" level have also been referred to as Islam at level 1 and level 2 respectively.

[32] Source: Adapted from Laitin, op.cit., p.572.

As a first step to familiarising the reader with my model, it would be useful to provide an illustrative example to distinguish clearly between the two levels which are mentioned in the model. God's message, as incorporated in the Quran, and transmitted by Muhammad and the Rashidun caliphs, would constitute the doctrinaire level or level 1 of this study. The spread of doctrinaire Islam to regions of the world beyond Arabia and its consequent interfacing with the socio-cultural realities in these contexts would generate, at level 2, a new sociological fact, viz. "the practical religion of the converts" of, for example, Basra, Java, India, etc.[37]

Certain important characteristics which feature prominently in my two-step approach to the study of Islamic political culture deserve to be explicitly stated and discussed. Firstly, the critical importance of doctrinaire Islam as a common denominator for Islamic political culture in different Muslim societies around the world is amply clear from our illustrative portrayal of the two levels of Islam. The similarity, in other words, which may be manifest, for instance, between Muslims in Morocco and those in Malaysia, can be traced back to their common genetic origins in doctrinaire Islam. Such similarities do not, however, suggest that the cultural orientations of the two societies would necessarily be identical. Dissimilarities in

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[37]Details pertaining to the operationalisation of the two levels have been discussed in the following section of this chapter.

the Islamic political culture of two different Muslim communities could occur, as is apparent from our model, on account of the inputs originating at level 2 and which impact upon and influence the composite product, viz. Islamic political culture. In addition to the above, it is important to note that while the concept of Islamic political culture, as shown in the configurative illustration, is a composite of both doctrinaire Islam and the "practical religion of the converted," the two levels of Islam, which comprise the composite culture, coexist simultaneously, and the symbols and themes originating at each level impact directly upon Islamic political culture.[30] Thus, an analysis based solely on one level or the other would clearly be incomplete and consequently inadequate in providing a comprehensive perspective on the Muslim mind. The two-step approach, as adopted for the purposes of this study on Islamic political culture, is intended to avoid such "half-baked" analyses, and is designed to provide a rigorous framework - without divorcing the study entirely from the sociological context.[31]

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[30] My position is similar to Laitin's views on this issue. See Laitin, op.cit., pp.572-573.

[31] Binder's account of the studies on the Middle East in contemporary times suggests that these studies are "beset by subjective projections,... ideological distortion,... and religious bias...." The research method devised for this study is aimed at avoiding the shortcomings which have been referred to in Binder's critique. See Binder, "Area Studies," in Binder, op.cit., p.16.

Operationalisation of the Two Levels of Analysis

As mentioned above, both doctrinaire Islam and Islam at level 2 will be investigated in the course of this study. A comprehensive examination of the doctrinaire level was considered vital to this study because of the close attachment of the Muslim masses to the basic sources of the Islamic faith. The Quran, for instance, is popularly regarded by Muslims around the world as "the Eternal Word in book-form"[40] and "the uncreated Word of God."[41] Furthermore, it is also believed that the Koran "has established relations between the individual and the state...[and that it] has supreme ruling over every matter whether religious or temporal."[42] Such beliefs at the mass level have led Muslims around the world to seek answers to diverse problems from the Quranic text.

In addition to conducting an examination of Quranic themes, my analysis of doctrinaire Islam will also include a review of the hadith (traditions) literature pertaining to Muhammad's sayings and practices, and a discussion of the Rashidun period (632AD-661AD). Such a decision was made since a majority of Muslims in the Indian subcontinent have traditionally subscribed to Sunni orthodoxy. In contemporary

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[40]Richard Bell, Introduction to the Qur'an (Edinburg: University Press, 1963), p.37.
[41]Ibid.
[42]Such a view is expressed in the orthodox Muslim paper Al Ittihad El Masri (Cairo), and is cited in Far Eastern Economic Review, (9 February, 1979), p.25. Also see S.M.M. Qureshi, "Islam and Development: The Zia Regime in Pakistan," World Development, 8, 7/8(July/August 1980), pp.565-566.

Pakistan too, over eighty percent of the Muslims are Sunnis. These Muslims are characterised by their faith in both the Quran and also the legacy of Muhammad and the Rashidun caliphs. Thus, an incorporation of the norms and practices emerging from Muhammad's lifetime and the Rashidun era within the framework of this study was considered appropriate and warranted.[43]

In reviewing the meaning and message of Islam at level 2 of this study, the discussion will focus upon the customs and norms of contemporary Pakistani society. Also, the cultural heritage and history of Muslims in the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent will be examined in an attempt to identify whether authoritarian-military rule in Pakistan can be traced back to long-standing traditions which existed during the Mughal period in undivided India and under the Delhi Sultans, who preceded the Mughals.

The precise techniques of research which will be employed in conducting this study include a combination of quantitative methods and the more traditional historical-descriptive approach to the study of political phenomena. In examining the hadith literature, the Rashidun period and also the Indian Muslim origins of contemporary Pakistani society, the historical-descriptive approach was deemed appropriate on account of the nature of the task at

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[43]My analysis of doctrinaire Islam, based on the Quran, hadith literature and the Rashidun period, has particular relevance to the Sunni Muslims. Shia Islam represents the only important surviving sect outside Sunni orthodoxy and constitutes less than twenty percent of the total Muslim population in the world.

hand. In other words, since my interest in these areas of investigation revolves primarily around the question of observing how the basic principles of Islam, as incorporated in the Quran, were put to practice and interpreted during Muhammad's lifetime and by subsequent generations of Muslims, the historical-descriptive approach was considered as being most appropriate for attaining my research objective.

In the case of the principles enshrined in the Quran itself, an attempt was made to provide, in addition to references to particular Quranic verses which are relevant to this study, also a macro perspective of the overall message of the Quran. The macro perspective was made possible by the employment of quantitative techniques of content-analysis[1] and the use of statistical tools of analysis (such as frequency counts). Thematic content analysis, rather than symbol analysis, was chosen for this

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[1] Content analysis has been defined by Holsti as being "any technique for making inferences by objectively and systematically identifying specified characteristics of messages." See O.R. Holsti, Content Analysis for the Social Sciences and Humanities (Massachusetts:Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1969), p.14. Content analysis as a tool for political research existed in primitive form during the 1930s. Column inches or occasionally word counts were used for comparing patterns of attention given by a certain newspaper to political events over time or to contrast political interest in large metropolitan dailies with that in small town weeklies. More recent technological developments and computer programmes have furthered the utility of content analysis as a tool of research for political scientists. For a brief historical account of the development of content analysis techniques, see B.L. Smith et al., Political Research Methods: Foundations and Techniques(Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1976), pp.205-210; R.L. Merritt, Systematic Approaches to Comparative Politics (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1970), p.64.

study. Such a choice was made on the basis of an initial review of several Quranic verses. My review indicated that the Quran does not employ any distinct or consistent symbols to communicate particular messages or to express approval or disapproval of particular modes of human behaviour and actions. Under these circumstances, it was felt that a reliance on thematic analysis (rather than symbol analysis) would be better suited to effectively capture the meaning and message of the Quran.

In determining the themes which needed to be incorporated within this content-analysis study,[45] I was guided, on the one hand, by the initial review of the Quranic verses (referred to in the above paragraph) and, on the other hand, by the theoretical framework which was outlined earlier in this chapter. The initial review provided some idea regarding the types of subjects and themes which figure prominently in the Quran. A final decision on whether a particular theme should, indeed, be incorporated as part of this content-analysis study was, however, made on the basis of its relevance to the three

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[45] Verba's comments made in "Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture" provide some useful insights in this regard. In the above mentioned work, Verba suggests that norms and beliefs which constitute the political culture of a given community do not necessarily refer specifically to political objects and politics. Furthermore, the author suggests that basic or fundamental beliefs pertaining to, for instance, the question of trust in others and other such issues, though not referring to specific political objects or issues, nonetheless play "a major role in the structuring of political culture." For details, see Verba, "Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture," In Pye and Verba, op.cit., p.521.

broad issue areas mentioned in the theoretical framework pertaining to the political culture underpinnings of authoritarian-military rule. Details in this regard are mentioned in the section below.

Preparation of Code Sheet and Development of Themes

The theoretical framework for this study focused on issue areas pertaining to

a) Authority and the individual self;

b) "Ingroup-outgroup" imagery of the environment; and

c) Role and relevance of coercive instruments of power/the military in the polity.

Themes dealing with the extent and nature of coverage given to God and His Attributes were included in the code sheet with the objective of addressing the first issue area of the theoretical framework. In this context, references to God's reward and punishment, His Benevolence and Harshness, and other such dimensions of the Quranic content were considered useful for the purpose of capturing the multifaceted nature of the Quranic portrayal of God, in particular, and by implication, sources of authority, in general.[1]

In addition to the above, the inclusion in the code sheet of themes referring to God's guidance, man's status as God's slave, and God as a source of sustenance was aimed at

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[1] For details on the manner in which such subjects and other categories of themes which pertained specifically to the nature of the Quranic portrayal of God were incorporated in the code sheet, see the sample code sheet provided in Appendix A.

illustrating and exploring doctrinaire Islam's portrayal of the nature of man's relations with the Ultimate Sovereign.

Themes referring to Muhammad were also incorporated in the code sheet in order to obtain an understanding of the manner in which the supreme sovereignty of God is juxtaposed at the doctrinaire level with the concept of Muhammad's Prophethood.

In formulating the code sheet, themes dealing with obedience and disobedience vis-à-vis God's guidelines were considered useful for appraising the extent to which the Quran emphasizes a policy of unquestioning compliance towards legitimate sources of authority and for understanding the manner in which dissenters are portrayed at the doctrinaire level of Islam. Further, such themes were considered as a useful primer to the question of whether doctrinaire Islam contains an "ingroup-outgroup" imagery of the environment. Additional insights in this regard were obtained by the inclusion of a theme referring to the question of waging jihad (holy war) against non-Muslims in the code-sheet. This theme, in conjunction with the theme on the use of violence, was also intended to permit an analysis and appraisal of the third issue area mentioned in the theoretical framework, viz. the role and relevance of coercive instruments of power/the military in the polity.

The relevance of two other themes which were included in the code sheet warrants some discussion. The concept of predestination was included in the code sheet in an attempt

to analyse whether the Quran promotes fatalistic tendencies. In this manner, the question of individual self esteem, as influenced by the fundamentals of Islam, was delved into. An effort was also made to outline and appraise the overall nature of the Quranic coverage. Such a research objective was attained by adding three themes pertaining to "This World," "Other World," and "Functional Matters" within the scope of this content-analysis study. Quranic verses referring to man's existence on earth were coded under the label "This World." The category "Functional Matters" was employed to measure the frequency of Quranic verses which dealt with definite socio-political or economic issues. And, in the case of the "Other World" category, Quranic references to matters such as the life hereafter and Judgement Day served as the focus of attention in the coding process.[47]

In coding the Quranic verses, an effort was made to observe the extent and, in some instances, also the nature of coverage which was given to the various themes. In this connection, certain key concepts and specialised terms were employed in the code-sheet. These are explained below:

1. Attention: The "attention" given to a particular theme or issue implies the amount of significance attached to that particular theme or issue. The research method which was adopted relied exclusively on frequency counts as an

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[47] References to God were not included in the "Other World" category.

indicator of the intensity of attention.

2. Approval: By "approval" is meant the expression of support for or praise of a certain theme/approach. In broad terms, it is symbolic of a positive attitude towards a certain theme or issue.

3. Disapproval: By "disapproval" is meant the expression of an opinion which is unfavourable. It may take the form of a rejection of or expression of disappointment over a certain theme/issue. In broad terms, it is symbolic of a negative attitude towards a certain theme or issue.

4. Neutral: A "neutral" stance is one which does not contain any normative connotation. It is symbolic of a disengaged attitude towards a certain issue/theme.

It is hoped that by conducting a systematic examination of the Quran along the issue areas and themes which have been mentioned in this chapter, and by observing the nature of attention (approval, disapproval, neutral) which was given in the coverage, a fairly representative picture of the Quranic perspective on the various themes which are relevant to this study on authoritarian-military rule can be obtained. Furthermore, it is expected that, within the overall framework of this study, these findings would serve as a useful first step to understanding the political culture implications of Islam for authoritarian-military rule in Pakistan.

This study is organised into five chapters. Chapter 2 deals with Islamic beliefs at the doctrinaire level, and

attempts to identify those elements of doctrinaire Islam which could be considered as being supportive of authoritarian-military systems. Chapter 3 focuses more specifically upon the Islamic political culture, as modified by the traditions and norms extant in the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent. In the fourth chapter, the nature of political rule in Pakistan is analysed in light of the findings of the previous chapters. The final chapter summarises the findings of this study and explores their theoretical implications and utility.

II. Islam: The Normative Framework

In chapter 1, the components of doctrinaire Islam were identified as being the Quran, hadith pertaining to Muhammad's practices (sunnah), and the Rashidun period. I had also discussed how doctrinaire Islam provides the normative framework within which the parameters of the political culture of Islam are defined, and thereby suggested that an understanding of doctrinaire Islam was essential to a study of the political culture of Islam. In this chapter, I have, as part of my examination of the overall question regarding Islamic political culture and authoritarian-military rule, first identified the principal attributes and beliefs associated with the Quran, sunnah and the Rashidun period. Subsequently, an attempt has been made to examine the implications of these attributes and beliefs for authoritarian-military rule in Muslim polities.

A. The Quranic Vision: A Content Analysis

The Quran comprises 114 suras.[1] These suras are of varying size and contain a series of verses. In addition to the message contained in each individual verse, the contents of the Quran, considered collectively embody a "vision" - which is communicated to the believer. This vision "informs"

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[1] The literal meaning of sura is "a row or series." This term is used by Muslims to refer to the chapters of the Quran.

the whole life of Muslim society, and also provides a Muslim with a yardstick to measure the desireability or undesireability of his actions.[48] Furthermore, it serves to induce a sense of purpose, and also inspires, motivates and guides the believer in his journey through life.[49]

In presenting my findings pertaining to the Quran, an effort has been made to provide a macro perspective on the Quranic vision. In addition, reference has been made to the message contained in particular verses which were considered important for the purposes of this study. A broad overview of my findings pertaining to the Quranic content is available from Figure 1. What stands out prominently in these findings is the rather low level of coverage given to functional matters of a specifically socio-political or economic nature. Only 4.1% of the verses which were coded, as my findings indicate, referred to functional matters. In comparison with this, 39.1% pertained to various dimensions of man's existence in this world and 24.2% of the verses alluded to "Other World" issues.

The findings, as shown in Figure 2, illustrate the general thrust of the Quranic message. It is noted that while 72.9% of the Quranic verses which were coded made some reference to God, only 27.1% dealt with all other types of issues. The preponderance of Quranic verses pertaining to

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[48]Such a view is also held by W.M. Watt, What Is Islam? (London and Harlow: Longmans, Green, 1968), p.4.
[49]For a discussion on this, see C. Waddy, The Muslim Mind (London and New York: Longman, 1976), pp.11-16.

Figure 1
Relative Importance Given To
"This World" Issues, "Other World" Issues And
"Functional" Matters
(n=5736)



Figure 2
Attention Given To God And His Attributes
In Comparision With
Other Themes
(n=5736)



God's[51] reflects God's preeminent status within the Muslim belief system. It is also suggestive of the extent of importance generally attached in the Islamic faith to authority figures.

The above finding regarding the central status of God in Islam is best exemplified by the Throne Verse. According to the Throne Verse:

> Allah! There is no God save Him, the Alive, the Eternal. Neither slumber nor sleep overtaketh Him. Unto Him belongeth whatsoever is in the heavens and whatsoever is in the earth. Who is he that intercedeth with Him save by His leave? He knoweth that which is in front of them and that which is behind them, while they encompass nothing of His knowledge save what He will. His throne includeth the heavens and the earth, and He is never weary of preserving them. He is the Sublime, the Tremendous.
>
> (verse 2:55)[52]

The concept of "one God" - as incorporated in the Throne Verse - is a fundamental tenet of Islam. Quranic verses frequently reinforce the idea of a single source of authority, viz. God. A total of 9.7% of the Quranic verses which were coded referred to the idea of "faith in one God."[53] This is noted in Figure 3. In communicating God's

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[51]Fazlur Rahman indicates that the proper name of God occurs well over 2500 times in the Quran. In addition, the Quran is replete with phrases such as al-Rahman, the Merciful, etcetera, which allude to God. See F. Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur'an (Minneapolis, Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980), p.1.

[52]In referring to Quranic verses, the first number represents the sura, and the second one identifies the particular verse of that sura.

[53]The concept of Trinity employed by the Christians in their characterisation of God is rejected by Islam.

Figure 3
Nature Of Portrayal Of God's Attributes
(n=5736)



message to mankind, Muhammad never wavered from the idea of the absolute oneness of God. The possibility of the existence of more than one God is categorically denied in various Quranic verses. For instance, in verse 23:91, it is stated that "Allah hath not chosen any son, nor is there any God along with Him...."

In keeping with the general theme regarding the existence of only one God, the practice of idol worship is strongly condemned.[54] Quranic verses condemning idol worship serve as a subset of the overall Quranic condemnation of ascribing partners to Allah - in whatever form it might be. In conducting my content analysis of the Quran, it was noted that a total of 285 Quranic verses referred to the question of attributing partners to Allah. Out of this total, 94.4 percent expressed disapproval.[55] The severity of the sin associated with attributing partners to Allah is clear from the following verse:

> Lo! Allah forgiveth not that a partner should be ascribed unto Him.... Whoso ascribeth partners to Allah, he hath indeed invented a tremendous sin.
>
> (verse 4:48)

In addition to references pertaining to the concept of one God and a single source of authority, the Quran also specifically mentions God's status as the Sole Sovereign of

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[54]For example, see verse 4:51.

[55]The remaining verses referring to idol worship/attributing partners to Allah, though not endorsing the idea of idol worship, did not clearly contain any normative connotation. They were thus not included in the percentage count on Quranic verses expressing disapproval.

the entire Universe. Verse 2:115, for instance, categorically states that "unto Allah belongeth the East and the West, and whithersoever ye turn...." Figure 3 indicates that a total of 10.1% of the Quranic verses which were coded alluded to the theme of God being the ultimate Sovereign. Sovereignty in the Muslim belief system resides in God - Who occupies the elevated position of the Lawgiver for mankind and the entire universe. Within this general framework regarding the supreme and sole sovereignty of God, the Quran does make reference to the dynamics of delegation of sovereignty. This is most clearly noted in the Quranic statement that God "... givest sovereignty unto whom Thou wilt, and Thou withdrawest sovereignty from whom Thou Wilt."[5]

Figure 3 indicates that Quranic verses also portray God as being Omnipotent and Omniscient. 11.8 percent and 7.5 percent of the Quranic verses which were coded referred to God as being Omnipotent and Omniscient respectively. The import of such a characterisation of God upon the Muslim psyche can be better appreciated by observing the precise nature of words employed in the Quran to describe God's Omnipotence and Omniscience. The Throne Verse, mentioned earlier, is generally representative of the stylistic dimension of the Quranic portrayal of God. Akin to the Throne verse, other Quranic verses also employ a wealth of imagery in describing God's Omnipotence and Omniscience.

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[5]Verse 3:26.

Verse 58:7, for instance, states:

> Hast thou not seen that Allah knoweth all that is in the heavens and all that is in the earth? There is no secret conference of three but He is their fourth, nor of five but He is their sixth, nor of less than that or more but He is with them wheresoever they may be; .... Lo! Allah is Knower of all things.
>
> (verse 58:7)

Quranic verses dealing with the creation of man also impress upon the Muslim mind the power and limitless capabilities of God. Two instances of the manner in which the Quran portrays the "miracle" of God's creativity and prowess are mentioned below:

> Verily We created man from a product of wet earth;
> Then placed him as a drop (of seed) in a safe lodging;
> Then fashioned We the drop a clot, then fashioned We the clot a little lump, then fashioned We the little lump bones, then clothed the bones with flesh, and then produced it as another creation. So blessed be Allah, the Best of Creators!
>
> (verse 23:12-14)

> And verily We created the heavens and the earth, and all that is between them, in six Days, and naught of weariness touched Us.[57]
>
> (verse 50:38)

The personification of God as the Final Arbiter is another important element of the Quranic portrayal of God. As noted in Figure 3, 5.2 percent of the Quranic verses which were coded referred to God as the Final Arbiter.

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[57]Also, see verse 7:54.

Quranic references to the Day of Judgement also emphasize the passivity of man's role and his inability to alter his fate. In Verse 41, for instance, it is mentioned that, on Judgement Day, one's own eyes and ears will testify against oneself.[58] Furthermore, as seen in Figure 4, 11.6% of the Quranic verses which were coded referred to God's reward, in comparison with a somewhat higher percentage (15.8%) dealing with the punishment of God. In addition to the greater frequency of Quranic references to God's punishment, a great wealth of imagery is employed to portray Hell - the abode of the defiant and the disobedient. References to "Fire," "an awful doom," and other such phrases abound in the Quranic characterisation of God's punishment.[59]

As the Final Judge of man's actions, God's punishment for man's wrongdoings clearly received greater attention in the Quran vis-à-vis God's rewards. Such an observation might lead one to conclude that the portrayal of God in Islam - at the doctrinaire level - is that of a harsh and severe entity. This is, however, not the case. In Figure 5, it is seen that while 20.4% of the verses which were coded portrayed God as being harsh and severe, a sizeably larger percentage (46.3%) emphasized God's benevolence, kindness and mercy. Quranic verses frequently reinforce the idea that "Allah is Forgiving and Merciful."[60] Also, the Quran clarifies that:

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[58]Verse 41:20.
[59]For example, see verse 39:47 and verse 41:19.
[60]For example, see verse 9:102 and verse 60:12.

Figure 4
References To God's Reward And Punishment
(n=5736)



Figure 5
Nature Of Portrayal Of God
(n=5736)



> If ye avoid the great (things) which ye are forbidden, We will remit from you your evil deeds and make you enter at a noble gate.
>
> (verse 4:31)

The spirit of forgiveness and the willingness of God to accommodate for man's foibles is more than amply manifest in the above mentioned verse. It is also suggestive of the extent to which man is dependent on God's mercy and grace. My findings, as shown in figure 6, "reveal" the reality of man's dependent status - as portrayed in the Quran. 29.1% of the Quranic verses which were coded referred to God's guidance. In verse 2:120, it is mentioned that Allah himself is guidance. God's guidance to man is communicated via the medium of Prophets. In conducting the content analysis of the Quran, it was noted, however, that only 7.7 percent of the Quranic verses referred to the Prophet Muhammad. Such an observation reaffirms my earlier finding regarding the supreme and central status of God.[1] The employment by Western analysts of terms such as "Muhammadans" to characterise followers of the Islamic faith is thus somewhat misleading and portrays an image regarding the role of Muhammad - which is not sufficiently supported by the above mentioned findings. The Quran, in stating unequivocally that Prophets are mere mortals who have been assigned by God to convey God's message to other humans,[2] reinforces the

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[1] As mentioned earlier, 72.9% of the Quranic verses which were coded made some reference to God.
[2] For example, see verse 73:144.

Figure 6
Nature Of Man's Relations With God
(n=5736)



centrality of God as the ultimate source of guidance.

Other Quranic verses emphasize that without God's guidance, man does not stand a chance of survival. In verse 13:33, for instance, it is mentioned that "he whom Allah sendeth astray, for him there is no guide." The preeminence of Quranic verses referring to God's guidance is suggestive of the nature of the Muslim frame of reference and the dependence of the Muslim mind on an external source (viz. God) for guidance and inspiration.

In keeping with the emphasis on the importance of God's guidance, the Quran also reinforces the idea of God as the sole "provider." Figure 6 indicates that 5.3 percent of the Quranic verses which were coded specifically mention God as being a source of sustenance. The following Quranic verse is representive of the manner in which God - as a sustenance source - is portrayed in the Quran:

> ... And Thou bringest forth the dead from the living. And Thou givest sustenance to whom Thou choosest, without stint.
>
> (verse 3:27)

Similarly, in verse 7:200, man is advised to "seek refuge in Allah" to protect against Satan's evil motives and acts. The above personification of man's relations with God corroborates with our earlier observations and reflects man's total dependence upon God - for his very survival and existence. And this state of man's total dependence upon God

is true for every single individual, regardless of his status or position in this world.

Themes portraying man as being God's slave are also present in the Quranic text. Figure 6 indicates that 1% of the Quranic verses coded by me portrayed man as being God's slave. While references such as these do not clearly constitute a high proportion of the Quranic verses which were coded, they nonetheless provide an additional dimension to the overall picture of man's subject status vis-à-vis God.

In light of the above discussion pertaining to the nature of relationship existing between man and God, the findings, as shown in Figure 7, come as no surprise. A distinct pattern of strong endorsement of obedience and a pronounced disapproval of disobedience is noted. A believer in the Muslim faith is expected not only to obey God, but also to submit unconditionally to God's sovereignty. In keeping with the overall emphasis on obedience and submission vis-à-vis God, it is mandatory (farz) for a Muslim to pray five times a day - either in congregation or individually. Particular postures of standing, bowing and prostration - which are adopted during the process of praying[43] - are symbolic of the Muslim reverence and submission to the authority of God. Islamic history is also replete with anecdotes such as Ibrahim's willingness to

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[43]For a discussion on this, see G.H. Bousquet, J. Schacht, eds., Selected Works of C. Snouck Hurgronge (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1957), p.10.

Figure 7
Obedience And Disobedience In Quranic Ayats
(n=5736)



sacrifice his son in accordance with God's commands. The Muslim festivity of Eid-ul-Azha and the slaying of a sacrifical animal in the name of God symbolises this historic event in Muslim history and serves as a constant reminder to twentieth-century Muslims of the importance of submitting to God's will.

The endorsement of an attitude of deference, as verse 4:59 indicates, is not restricted only to the authority of God. Muslims are advised to "obey Allah, and obey the messenger and those ... who are in authority...." Such a Quranic emphasis on obedience, however, coexists alongside occasional verses recommending a consultative approach to decision-making. Verse 3:159, for instance, advises the Prophet to "... consult with them upon the conduct of affairs."[44] Details pertaining to the scope and limits of such consultation are, however, not mentioned specifically in the Quranic text.

Reference to the employment of violence was also noted in my findings pertaining to the Quran, and a comprehensive picture on this is available from Figures 8 and 9. Out of a total of 4.6% of Quranic verses referring to the use of violence, a sizeable majority of them endorsed the use of violence. While the gross number of verses referring to the use of violence is not very high, this nonetheless indicates that an endorsement of the use of violence - as a means of conflict resolution - is something not uncommon to the

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[44]Verse 42:38 contains a similar message.

Figure 8
Attention Given To Jihad /Military In Politics And
The Use Of Violence
(n=5736)



Figure 9
Nature Of Attention Given To
Jihad/Military In Politics And
The Use Of Violence
(n=5736)



scriptural framework in Islam. Also, under certain circumstances, the slaying of idolaters and disbelievers[15] is categorically endorsed. For example, verse 4:91 states that if disbelievers "...keep not aloof from you nor offer you peace nor hold their hands, then take them and kill them wherever ye find them. Against such We have given you clear warrant."

As part of the overall Quranic formula pertaining to the treatment of non-Muslims, Muslims are advised to wage war[16] for Allah's cause. My findings, as outlined in Figures 8 and 9, indicate that, although the Quran does not dwell heavily on this subject, the idea of waging a holy war is generally endorsed. Verse 2:216 clearly states that "warfare is ordained ... " upon Muslims. Furthermore, the Quran clarifies that "whoso fighteth in the way of Allah, be he slain or be he victorious, on him We shall bestow a vast reward."[17]

While violence and the slaying of another human being is endorsed by the Quran under specified circumstances, the Quran also states that "... whosoever killeth a human being..., it shall be as if he had killed all mankind, and whoso saveth the life of one, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind."[18] Furthermore, the slaying of a

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[15]Non-Muslims, with the exception of "The People of the Book" (Jews and Christians), constitute this group.
[16]The concept of waging war in Allah's path also figures prominently in the hadith literature and has been discussed in greater detail in a subsequent section of this chapter.
[17]Verse 4:74.
[18]Verse 5:32.

fellow believer is also prohibited. In this context, verse 4:92 categorically states that if a Muslim deliberately kills another Muslim, "his reward is hell for ever." Verses such as these, when viewed in light of the general thrust of the Quranic message regarding the employment of violence, clearly reveals the scope for much debate and dissension within the community of believers due to conflicting interpretations regarding what is endorsed or not endorsed in the scriptural framework of Islam.

Amongst the various verses discussed in this chapter, the question of predestination and whether human acts were "predetermined - predicated by God - or produced by man's free will..."[69] has possibly stirred more controversy within the Muslim community than any other issue. In Major Themes of the Qur'an,[70] Fazlur Rahman provides useful insights into the general question of predestination and Islamic beliefs. According to the author, everything in the Universe, with the exception of man, automatically obeys the laws of nature, as established by God. God's commands to nature disallow disobedience. In contrast, however, man is summoned to obey God's commands, but is not compelled to do so. Since man is "endowed with the free choice of either obeying or disobeying the command of God,"[71] he is, according to Rahman, accountable for his actions.

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[69]M. Khadduri, The Islamic Conception of Justice (Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins Press, 1984), p.23.
[70]Rahman, op.cit.
[71]Ibid., p.24.

The analysis, as presented by Fazlur Rahman, is questioned, however, by those Muslims who believe that God's will is the cause of all that happens in this world and that since both "man and his acts were created by God ... the question of human responsibility is irrelevant."[72] My findings indicate that the Quranic text does not provide any conclusive validation, at the macro level, of either of the above mentioned hypotheses. Only 0.9 percent of the total Quranic verses which were coded referred specifically to the idea of predestination. Such a low gross total of verses referring to predestination, did not permit me to conclusively establish that predestination constitutes an important component of the Quranic message.

In examining the contents of some of the verses referring to predestination, it was noted that the dynamics of change, as incorporated in the Quran, is (interestingly enough) portrayed as being contingent upon the "invisible hands of destiny." Thus, for instance, in verse 10:50, it is mentioned that "for every nation there is an appointed time." A message similar to this is contained in verse 7:34, which states that " ... every nation hath its term, and when its term cometh, they cannot put it off an hour nor yet advance (it)." Verses such as these seem to reinforce the logic underlying Fazlur Rahman's analysis, as mentioned earlier. Other verses, however, provide a somewhat different perspective. For example, in verse 13:11, it is suggested

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[72]For a discussion on this, see Khadduri, The Islamic Conception of Justice, p.23.

that "Allah changeth not the condition of a folk until they (first) change that which is in their hearts...." The message incorporated in this verse is suggestive of man's role in shaping his own destiny. The framework of God's ultimate guardianship and man's dependency on God's will is, however, not abandoned at any stage. Thus, the message, as incorporated in the first section of verse 13:11, is followed by the clarification in the same verse that "... if Allah willeth misfortune for a folk there is none that can repel it, nor have they a defender beside it."

B. The Hadith Literature and the Islamic Outlook on Life

In reviewing the hadith literature for obtaining a more comprehensive understanding on the Islamic outlook on life, I have relied mainly on Imam Bukhari's (d.870AD) compilation[73] on the principles and practices of Muhammad. Other compilations of and commentaries on the hadith literature have occasionally been referred to for purposes of elucidating upon a particular Quranic verse or issue area.

Nine volumes comprising ninety-three books on various subjects and topics constitute the totality of

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[73] M.M. Khan, trans., The Translation of the Meanings of Sahih-Al-Bukhari: Arabic-English (Chicago: Kazi Publications, 1979). Subsequent citations from Khan's translation of the hadith literature have been referred to as Sahih-Al-Bukhari. Bukhari's compilation and the collections by Imam Muslim are both considered by Muslims as being authentic and reliable collections of Muhammad's sunnah.

Sahih-al-Bukhari.'[14] Issues such as personal hygiene, times of prayers, Muslim festivities, wills and testaments and other such matters constitute a sizeable part of the hadith literature. It is also noteworthy to mention that, akin to the Quran, the organisation of society - at the level of governmental institutions - is not discussed systematically or in any great detail in the hadith literature. Azizullah's commentary on the hadith literature arrives at a similar, but somewhat more categorical conclusion. In outlining the broad topics which have been dealt with in Sahih-Al-Bukhari, the author's analysis indicates that not a single chapter pertains specifically to the management and structure of government.'[15] Furthermore, for the most part, the hadith literature elaborates upon the Quranic vision. For instance, the Quranic imagery on the personification of God is closely replicated. God's Omnipotence and Omniscience, and man's total dependence on God's Grace and Mercy are repeatedly reinforced. Several of the hadiths in the Bukhari compilations refer to Muhammad's prayers to God in a variety of situations - ranging from asking for rain for the crops to seeking God's help in battling the disbelievers.'[16] Themes which glorify God, refer to God's mercy and advise man to

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[14] The presentation of the hadith literature was noted to be anecdotal and narrative in style. Furthermore, the various chapters are organised in a manner whereby the logical connection between the various chapters and volumes is not readily noticeable.

[15] Muhammad Azizullah, Glimpses of the Hadith (Karachi: Muhammad Azizullah, 1965), p.43.

[16] For examples, see hadith 122, Sahih-Al-Bukhari, volume 2, and hadith 289, Sahih-Al-Bukhari, volume 5.

seek refuge with Allah also figure prominently in the hadith literature. In hadith number 621 (volume 3), for example, Muhammad is reported as having stated that while the Muslim believer will be asked to confess his sins, God will eventually forgive him.'' In portraying God as a forgiving and merciful figure of authority, the Muslim believer is encouraged and advised to direct his loyalty and allegiance to none other than Allah - the Ultimate Sovereign. The emphasis on pledging unqualified loyalty to God is reflected clearly in Muhammad's statement that the greatest sin one can commit is to "set up rivals unto Allah...."''

In sharp contrast to references to God's merciful attitude vis-à-vis Muslims, the hadith literature suggests that in the case of infidels and disbelievers, they will be faced with the " ... Curse of Allah."'' Such a statement represents, akin to the Quranic message, a general condemnation of those who do not attest to the basic tenets of Islam. Muslims are encouraged to strive to extend the realm of Islam and fight for Allah's cause. In this context, volume 5 of Sahih-Al-Bukhari extensively discusses military expeditions (al-maghazi). This is suggestive of the substantial importance attached by doctrinaire Islam to the waging of war (military and otherwise) in God's path. Muhammad is reported as having stated that "... Paradise is

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''Sahih-Al-Bukhari, volume 3. Also, see hadith 159 and hadith 623 in Sahih-Al-Bukhari, volume 2.
''Hadith 611 in Sahih-Al-Bukhari, volume 9. A similar message is contained in hadith 54 of the same volume.
''Hadith 621, Sahih-Al-Bukhari, volume 3 .

under the shades of swords,"[10] and historical records testify to the fact that, in sharp contrast to other major world religions such as Christianity and Buddhism, which took a couple centuries to establish their first state,[11] Muhammad's leadership and the militarist zeal of the umma (community of believers), ensured the creation of the first Muslim state in Medina in just over a decade after Muhammad's attainment of Prophethood. The above observation, in addition to indicating clearly the long-standing importance of the military in Islamic society, also reinforces my earlier findings pertaining to the Quranic message - whereby it was concluded that violence as a means of conflict resolution is not entirely alien to Islam at the level of dogma and fundamental beliefs. Akin to the Quranic message, numerous hadiths pertaining to apostates, disbelievers and hypocrites recommend the adoption of violent methods - including the slaying of such individuals.[12] To suggest, however, that the scriptural framework of Islam, at the level of basic beliefs, unequivocally endorses the employment of violence would be an overstatement. Reference has already been made to Quranic

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[10] Hadith 73, Sahih-Al-Bukhari, volume 4.

[11] The first Christian state was established by Constantine and the first Buddhist state came into being under Asoka. See Y. Armajani, T. Ricks, Middle East: Past and Present (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1986), p.56.

[12] For examples see hadiths 794 and 795 in Sahih-Al-Bukhari, volume 8. In dealing with certain offences such as theft and adultery too, the adoption of means such as cutting the hand of the thief or stoning an adulterer to death is also recommended in the text of the hadith literature. See hadiths 781, 783, 807 in the same volume of Sahih-Al-Bukhari.

verses cautioning against the slaying of a Muslim believer. Along similar lines, the Prophet advised that "the first cases to be decided among the people (on the Day of Resurrection) will be those of bloodshed."[33] The message contained herein is intended to highlight the severity of sinfulness in committing murder or shedding the blood of another human being. On a separate occasion, the Prophet categorically stated that a Muslim believer's blood should not be shed except for murder, illegal sexual intercourse or apostasy.[34]

In dealing with non-Muslims also, the Prophet cautioned that "whoever killed a person having a treaty with the Muslims, shall not smell the smell of Paradise."[35] Muhammad's statement, as mentioned above, clearly presents the possibility of a relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims which transcends the realm of open hostility and warfare. In keeping with such a view, hadith 891 (volume 3 of Sahih-Al-Bukhari) outlines the conditions pertaining to the negotiation of peace treaties with non-Muslims. Similarly, hadith 864 of the same volume refers to negotiations and dialogue between Muhammad and the pagans on visitation rights to Mecca for performing pilgrimage.[36]

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[33] Hadith 4, Sahih-Al-Bukhari, volume 9.
[34] Hadith 17 in ibid.
[35] Hadith 391, Sahih-Al-Bukhari, volume 4.
[36] Historical records refer to the signing of the Treaty of Hudaiba (628AD) between the two sides. This treaty, in essence, represented an acknowledgement on the part of the pagan Meccans that Muhammad was the leader of a community equal to their own. Following the signing of this treaty, many Meccan notables deserted their own ranks and joined forces with Muhammad. See H.M.T. Nagel, "Some Considerations

While the above mentioned hadiths generally reinforce some of the themes already noted earlier in the discussion on the Quranic content, the Book of Ahkam'' in volume 9 of Sahih-Al-Bukhari brings one somewhat closer to comprehending issues pertaining specifically to the organisation of government and politics. The style, though anecdotal in nature, does allude to the obligations of the populace, on the one hand, and those of the rulers, on the other.

In reference to the populace, the hadith literature reiterates the Quran's emphasis on obedience as a principal responsibility of the populace. The Prophet Muhammad is reported as having stated that "he who obeys me, obeys Allah; and he who disobeys me, disobeys Allah. And he who obeys the chief, obeys me; and he who disobeys the chief, disobeys me."'' Endorsing an attitude of obedience and deference vis-à-vis God and the Prophet is extended in this hadith (as was also noted in the Quranic text) to incorporate loyalty towards the ruler in the temporal realm. Furthermore, as stated in another hadith, the Prophet advised his followers that "if somebody sees his Muslim ruler doing something he disapproves of, he should be patient...."''

''(cont'd) Concerning the Pre-Islamic and the Islamic Foundations of the Authority of the Caliphate," in Studies in the First Century of Islamic Society, ed. G.H.A. Juynboll (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1982), p.179.

''In Arabic, the term ahkam refers to ordinances and laws.

''Hadith 204, Sahih-Al-Bukhari, volume 4.

''Hadith 257, Sahih-Al-Bukhari, volume 9.

Despite the considerable emphasis placed upon obedience, the hadith literature does provide certain guidelines regarding the limits to obedience. These limits are reflected within the framework of the obligations which the political leadership are required to fulfil. Principal amongst these is the obligation of the leadership to ensure that the machinery of government is administered in accordance with the fundamentals of Islam. In hadith 258 (volume 9), the Prophet is reported as having advised that "a Muslim has to listen and obey (the order of his ruler) whether he likes it or not, as long as his orders involve not one in disobedience (to Allah); but if an act of disobedience (to Allah) is imposed one should not listen to it or obey it."**

At first glance, the message embodied in this hadith appears contradictory to Muhammad's advice to the populace to practice a policy of patience and the Quran's emphasis on obedience vis-à-vis the leaders of the Muslim community. Closer examination indicates, however, that there is no such contradiction. Obedience to God's commandments - as a general rule - is mandatory for both the rulers and the populace. Thus, disapproval of or dissatisfaction with the policies of a ruler as such is not considered in Islam as constituting sufficient grounds for disobedience. However, if the ruler himself is not fulfilling his contract with the Ultimate Sovereign (viz. God), and is disobeying God's will,

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**Hadith 203, Sahih-Al-Bukhari, volume 4 contains an identical message.

the populace is no longer held duty bound by God to obey the temporal ruler. Specific details in this regard are, however, not available either in the Quran or the hadith literature. Also, responsibility to administer the principle of political accountability in the case of a "delinquent" ruler resides, according to Islamic beliefs, with none other than the Ultimate Sovereign himself. Such a position in Islam is aptly borne out in Muhammad's statement that "any man whom Allah has given the authority of ruling some people and he does not look after them in an honest manner, will never even smell the smell of Paradise."[1] Thus, while doctrinaire Islam is not devoid of the concept of political accountability, it differs from the idea of political accountability, as incorporated in western constitutional democracy.[2]

The social contract between the rulers and the masses, as outlined in the hadith literature, also gives some credence to the idea of consultation and dialogue between the two groups. Three citations of the sayings of the Prophet from other compilations are mentioned below to substantiate our argument:

> "Never will God make my community agree on a wrong course."[3]

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[1] Hadith 264, Sahih-al-Bukhari, volume 9.

[2] Western democracies emphasize the idea of popular sovereignty and also accountability residing with the masses.

[3] Al Tirmidhi, on authority of Abdullah bin Umar, as cited in M. Asad, The Principles of State and Government in Islam, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press,

"If you two agree on a counsel, I shall not dissent from you."[32]

"Follow the largest group."[33]

Documentation referring to Muhammad's style of "consultative" decision-making is available in volume 9 of Sahih-Al-Bukhari. Reference is made to the deliberations between Muhammad and his close companions regarding the precise moment to embark on the Battle of Uhud (625AD). However, once the decision was reached, the Prophet used his privilege and prerogative as the leader to veto after-thoughts and counter-arguments which were aired by some of his companions.[34] The leader in Islam, as the above incident indicates, is more than a mere "clearing house." His role as a policy-synthesizer is structured in a manner whereby his responsibility to guide, direct and lead is not undermined. In other words, the preeminence of the political leadership is unquestionably maintained in the decision-making process.

The above interpretation regarding Muhammad's preeminence focuses primarily on the personal leadership style of Muhammad. Organisationally also, the Muslim community, as it was structured during Muhammad's lifetime, witnessed the Prophet performing the multifaceted functions associated with being the head of state, chief judge,

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[32](cont'd) 1961), p.38.
[33]Ibn Hanbal, Musnad, on authority of Abdar Rahman Ibn Ghanam, as cited in ibid., p.55.
[34]Ibn Majah, on authority of Abdullah ibn Umar, as cited in ibid., p.50.
[34]Sahih-Al-Bukhari, volume 9.

commander of the forces and also the person responsible for leading the public worship in the mosque. This is indicative of the fact that a form of centralised decision-making revolving around the leadership "bestowed" with near-absolute powers has been a prophetic sanction in the history of Islam, and originated, in fact, during Muhammad's lifetime itself. Muhammad's spiritual link with God, by virtue of being the Prophet and spokesperson of the Ultimate Sovereign, provided him with the popular legitimacy to conduct the affairs of the Muslim community singlehandedly. This form of decision-making and leadership style, however, continued in the Rashidun period also - after Muhammad's death - despite the fact that the Rashidun caliphs neither claimed nor were believed to have the status associated with being the Prophet of God. In the following section, the principal characteristics and attributes of the Rashidun period have been examined.

C. The Golden Age of Islam: The Rashidun Caliphate (632-661AD)

The period of the "Rightly Guided Caliphs" represents a first attempt by the newly emerging Muslim community to conduct its affairs in accordance with the dictates of Islam - without the direct guidance of the now departed Prophet (Rasul) of God. In this context, the question of political succession was the first important task which needed to be reckoned with. In the absence of any clear guidelines either

in the Quran or in Muhammad's pronouncements'' on the question of political succession, various groups within the Muslim community attempted to establish the legitimacy of their claims to leadership. The Medinese, for example, felt that the honour of succession should rest with them on account of their unstinted support to Muhammad and his message. The Meccans also laid claims to this Office on the grounds that they (and not the Medinese) belonged to the powerful Quraysh clan - referred to in the hadith literature as the rightful heirs to political leadership. Finally, Muhammad's daughter Fatima, according to historical accounts, also made an impassioned plea in favour of her husband Ali (who was also Muhammad's cousin).''

In attempting to deal with the crisis created on account of Muhammad's death, and in the absence of any comprehensive Islamic solution to this problem, the Muslim community fell back upon their Arab heritage for inspiration and guidance. And the solution which emerged was inevitably an Arab solution, viz. the mechanism of baya.'' Baya

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''Given Muhammad's genius for administration, researchers have often pondered on the possible reasons for his failure to have dealt with the important task of outlining a mechanism for political succession. Arnold's analysis suggests that the failing health of the Prophet in the last several years of his life may have contributed to this lapse. For details, see T.W. Arnold, The Caliphate (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), p.19.

''Armajani, Ricks, op.cit., p.46.

''The Encyclopaedia of Islam explains baya as being an Arabic term which, in a very broad sense, denotes the act by which a certain number of persons, acting individually or collectively, recognise the authority of another person. For details, see The Encyclopaedia of Islam (volume 1), p.1113. Some authors seem to suggest that, in the absence of any clear prescriptions in the Quran or the sunnah, the Muslim

represented a traditional Arab custom whereby, if the chief of the tribe died, prominent members'[00] of the tribe met in congress to decide upon the successor to political power. In the first stage (of the two-step process), the discussion was kept limited to this small group of notables. Following this, the populace at large was incorporated into the decision-making process in the form of a mass pledge of allegiance in favour of whosoever had already been selected as the leader by the extant political elite.'[0']

The manner in which the concept of baya was put into practice somewhat differed in form (though not in principle) from one caliph to the other. In the case of Abu Bakr, historical accounts suggest that the meeting of Muslim notables was characterised by a growing sense of hostility between the various claimant groups on account of their inability to agree on a mutually accepted formula. As the political temperature at the meeting kept rising, Umar (who later became the second caliph), at some stage, nominated, according to a prearranged plan, Abu Bakr'[02] as Muhammad's

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''(cont'd) community had, in fact, employed ijma ("consensus of the community") to deal with the leadership selection issue. See H.A.R. Gibb "Constitutional Organization," in Law in the Middle East (volume 1): Origins and Development of Islamic Law, eds. M. Khadduri, H.J. Liebesny (Washington, DC: The Middle East Institute, 1955), p.4.

'[00]Prominence in the tribal society of seventh century Arabia could be attained on account of one's seniority, good services to society or coercive power.

'[0']For a summary account on the concept of baya see Asad, op.cit., pp.27-28.

'[02]To Abu Bakr's credit was the fact that he was an early convert to Islam, an emigrant from Mecca (and yet not a major Quraysh shaikh - thereby making him, as a candidate, more acceptable to the Medinese) and the father of Muhammad's favorite wife Ayesha. Furthermore, Muhammad had

successor, and swore allegiance to him. At this point, other supporters of Abu Bakr followed suit, and the not-too-stolid Medinese acquiesced to this fait accompli - by also swearing allegiance.'[103]

While the first caliph, Abu Bakr was elected by a group of Muslim notables present in Medina at the time of Muhammad's death, the successor to Abu Bakr (i.e. Umar)'[104] was designated as the next caliph by Abu Bakr himself, after consulting with the elders of the community. This decision was subsequently ratified by the community at large. In the case of Usman's accession to power, the decision was first arrived at by an electoral body appointed by Umar (on his death bed) which comprised six of the most prominent companions of Muhammad.'[105] Again, the populace at large was involved only at the ratification stage. After Usman, Ali - the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad - was proclaimed caliph by a mosque congregation and the community thereupon pledged their loyalty to him.'[106]

'[103](cont'd) delegated to Abu Bakr the responsibilities of head of Muslim community during the period of his own illness (prior to his death in 632AD).

'[104]Armajani, Ricks, op.cit., p.46.

'[105]Umar was generally considered as the undisputed leader of the Meccan emigrants. Furthermore, in the two main events of Abu Bakr's reign, viz. the attempted compilation of the Quran and the Riddah Wars against apostates, Umar played a prominent role. See F.E. Peters, Allah's Commonwealth: A History of Islam in the Near East (600-1100 AD) (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1973), pp.81-84, and P.K. Hitti, Makers of Arab History (London:Macmillan, 1969), pp.22-23.

'[106]Some historical accounts seem to suggest that the story of Umar having nominated a body of electors was an invention of later times and was aimed at justifying the practices that prevailed in the Abbasid period. See Arnold, op.cit., p.21. Also, see Peters, op.cit., p.81.

'[107]Asad, op.cit., pp.27-28. Bousquet and Schacht also

The above account regarding the baya principle and the manner in which it was employed is indicative of the following:

1. The absence of any definite prescription in the Quran or the sunna led the Muslim community to seek and adopt other possible alternatives.
2. The concept of popular will and public participation did receive some recognition - but was not of critical significance.
3. Elitism - in the form of a pre-eminent role of the Muslim notables - turned out to be a decisive factor in the selection process.
4. The selection process and criteria lacked any strict institutionalised pattern - thereby varying in form from one caliph to the other.
5. No generally accepted guidelines regarding the qualifications and prerequisites for political leadership existed. The arguments presented by the various contendors (or their supporters) were principally parochial/personal in nature - and were intended at justifying the claims of one group at the expense of others.

While the first point, as mentioned above, strikes an optimistic note regarding the possibilities and prospects[10]

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[10](cont'd) provide a useful account regarding the method of political succession which was in place under the "Rightly Guided Caliphs" and the Umayyads. See Bousquet and Schacht, op.cit., pp.28-34.

[11]Factors contributing to a non-materialisation of such prospects have been mentioned in a later section of this

for the growth and further development of Muslim political institutions, the remaining observations reveal, on the one hand, the absence of a truly broad-base of political support in the mechanism for political succession, and, on the other hand, suggest the potential for future discord and dissatisfaction within the Muslim ranks.

The risks pertaining to the possible fragmentation of the Muslim community were realised almost immediately after Muhammad's death. The centrifugal tendencies which had already become manifest after Muhammad's death soon resulted in the emergence of various splinter groups and sects within the Muslim ranks. Prominent amongst these were the supporters of Ali, who, during the Rashidun period, consistently argued in favour of Ali's (the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad) rights to leadership. This group, supported by Muhammad's daughter Fatima, eventually formed the "Shiat party" or "Party of Ali." Interestingly enough, Ayesha, Muhammad's second wife (and the daughter of the first caliph Abu Bakr) offered the strongest resistance and opposition to the pro-Ali forces.'[99]

The scenario, as mentioned above, whereby the forces of Muhammad's second wife, Ayesha were vehemently opposing the supporters of Ali (backed by Muhammad's daughter Fatima) demonstrates clearly the severity of the problem caused on

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[98](cont'd) chapter.

[99]The splintering of the Muslim body polity continued and did not remain confined to the Shias. For a summary account on the major divisions within Islam, see Mortimer, op.cit., pp.39-45.

account of the succession issue. Disagreements regarding the question of succession in the Rashidun period did not, however, remain restricted to verbal debate and dissension, and the employment of violence in dealing with competing groups also became a political reality almost immediately after Muhammad's death. Armajani and Ricks' account of Abu Bakr's accession to power indicates that in the confusion, clamour and jubilation of Abu Bakr's confirmation as the caliph, Sa'd ibn-Ubada (whom the Medinese had wanted as Muhammad's successor) was beaten to death by those present at the meeting.'[109]

Abu Bakr died a natural death two years after becoming the Caliph. However, conflict and discord over the question of political succession plagued the entire Rashidun period. Furthermore, political violence also persisted as a continuing factor during the entire Rashidun period - and the remaining three caliphs all became victims of assassination plots engineered by opponents of their respective regimes.'[110]

Violence as a means of conflict resolution did not remain confined to the question of political succession, and

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[109]Armajani, Ricks, op.cit., p.46. Arnold's account on Abu Bakr's accession to power alludes to the politicking amongst the competing groups. The murder of ibn-Ubada is, however, not mentioned. For a summary account on political succession in the Rashidun period, see Arnold, op.cit., pp.19-22; Bousquet, Schacht, op.cit., pp.264-295; and Peters, op.cit., pp.77-94.

[110]Some historical accounts seem to suggest that the murder of Umar by a Persian (Christian) freed slave was prompted by a purely personal grudge. See Peters, op.cit., p.87; Hitti, Makers of Arab History, p.42.

was employed by the Rashidun caliphs in dealing with dissident and disaffected groups within the umma. Thus, for instance, Abu Bakr's caliphate witnessed military expeditions (the Riddah Wars'[1] of 632-633AD) ordered by the Caliph against groups of recent converts, who, following Muhammad's death, did not want to subscribe any longer to the Islamic faith. Abu Bakr's action represented a reliance on force and coercion to consolidate the community of Muslim believers.'[2] It also served to confirm that authority still resided in Medina. Akin to Abu Bakr's reliance on coercive methods, the fourth caliph Ali also implemented a ruthless policy of exterminating the Kharjites.'[3] Instances such as these reveal the continuing role and relevance of coercion and violence in the containment of domestic dissent in the early decades of Islam. The determination of the Rashidun caliphs to maintain the unity and integrity of the umma at any cost is also worth taking note of.

In reckoning with the non-Muslim world around them, the employment of violence and coercion was also not uncommon to the Rashidun period. In giving practical meaning to the

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'[1]The term "war" - as is commonly used for these military expeditions/skirmishes - may be somewhat of an overstatement.

'[2]Peters, op.cit., p.78.

'[3]The Kharjites surfaced during Ali's caliphate and held the view that the masses were authorised to determine the fitness of their leaders and depose them - if they felt that this was appropriate. Their views, in a sense, resembled the democratic principle of a predominant influence of the popular will within the polity (although the means which relied upon were violent in nature). Clearly, such views were not received favourably and their subscribers were crushed ruthlessly by the caliph's forces. For a brief account on the Kharjites, see Mortimer, op.cit., pp.37-45.

Quranic endorsement of jihad and Muhammad's statement that "Paradise is under the shades of swords," the early Muslim community employed their military might and prowess to conquer and subdue. Umar's period as caliph (634-644AD) and the caliphate of Usman'''⁴(644-656AD) are particularly associated with the military victories of the Muslim forces.

Khadduri's account on the concept of jihad suggests that, in addition to the military option, other alternative approaches to fulfil the obligation of striving for Allah's cause are available in Islam. In attempting to capture the true import of the word jihad, Khadduri proposes "exertion of the believer's strength" in the path of Allah as a more accurate meaning.'''⁵ Elaborating upon this, Khadduri also outlines the different types of jihad and explains how Muslim jurisprudence distinguishes between the four different ways in which a believer may fulfil this obligation, viz. "by his heart; his tongue; his hands; and by the sword."'''⁶

While Khadduri's interpretation cannot be contested on theological-juristic grounds, at the level of mass beliefs and attitudes, the early Muslims opted for the "sword" in fulfilling the obligation of jihad. In doing so, they were influenced by a number of factors. The tribal Arab heritage and the reliance on military encounters to settle scores

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'''⁴Usman belonged to the Banu Umaya clan - the traditional military wing of the Quraish. For details, regarding the military adventures of Usman and Umar, see Peters, op.cit., pp.80-88; Hitti, Makers of Arab History, pp.28-37.

'''⁵See Khadduri, The Islamic Conception of Justice, p.164.

'''⁶Ibid., pp.56-57 and pp.74-82.

with hostile tribes or even to escape the drudgery of the arid desert life deserves mention in this context.'''' Economic imperatives - in terms of filling the coffers of the state - were also clearly an incentive at the community/clan level. At the level of the individual believer, Islam guaranteed a sizeable share of the booty in this world to the jihadists,''' and also promised the pleasures of Paradise in the world hereafter.

In governing the newly acquired territories, a clear distinction was made between Muslims and non-Muslims. The non-Muslim subjects were required either to accept Islam or to pay tribute as a subject people. Available accounts pertaining to the Rashidun period, mention several treaty arrangements which were negotiated between the Muslims and their non-Muslim subjects. For instance, under Abu Bakr's caliphate, Christians residing in Najran (in central Arabia) were permitted to adhere to their religious practices and beliefs. In return, they were required to pay an annual tribute to the Muslim rulers. The Jews of Khaibar were also permitted similar terms and conditions.''''

The manifest willingness of the Rashidun caliphs to negotiate and establish terms and conditions with their

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''''Levy alludes to this in his discussion on the military in Islam. See R. Levy, The Social Structure of Islam (Cambridge: University Press, 1962), pp.407-409.

'''The Quran stipulates that four fifths of the spoils should be disbursed amongst the warriors and one-fifth goes to the state coffers. See Quran, verse 8:41.

''''W. Muir, Annals of the Early Caliphate: From the Death of Mahomet to the Omeyyad and Abbaside Dynasties (AD 632-680) (Amsterdam: Oriental Press, 1968), p.223.

non-Muslim subjects is in sharp contrast to the harsh treatment meted out to the apostates (during the Riddah Wars) and also the Kharjites.'[28] This difference brings to the forefront an important dimension of the manner in which dissent and disagreement was dealt with by the Rashidun caliphs. A policy of negotiation and deliberation with opposition groups was considered as a possible option only in circumstances as identified below:

1. The opposing groups were willing to accept their subject status.
2. The form of opposition did not in any way threaten the unity of the umma.
3. The expression of dissent did not suggest a questioning of the authority of the caliph.

The willingness of the Jews and Christians to live under the suzerainty of the Muslim caliphs and pay an annual tribute signified, in essence, an acceptance of all of the above. This could, however, not be said of the new converts who wanted to revert to their original beliefs and religious practices - thereby precipitating the Riddah wars; or the Kharjites who publicly professed opposition to the caliph's policies in his dealings with Muawiya (the governor of Syria) - thereby incurring the wrath of and military suppression by the caliph Ali.

In regards to the management style of the Rashidun caliphs, as it pertained to the mainstream community of

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'[28]This has been discussed in an earlier section of this chapter.

Muslim believers, historical accounts and Muslim folklore refer, on the one hand, to their unstinted dedication to Islam, and, on the other hand, emphasize their piety, simplicity and compassion.[121] To Abu Bakr is attributed the statement, "I wish that I were a palm tree, to yield food and then, when that was over, to be felled."[122] Similarly, Umar is commonly remembered by Muslims for his ascetic nature, his piety and his simplicity, and popular folklores highlight these dimensions of his personality by referring to the tattered clothes which were worn by the caliph.[123] Also, the compassion of the Rashidun caliphs vis-à-vis the Muslim community is documented in various anecdotal instances referring to Abu Bakr's efforts to help and give a patient hearing to the needy and poor, and Umar's refusal to eat during the famine which plagued the Muslim community in the fifth year of his caliphate.[124]

While Muslims generally consider the entire Rashidun period with much nostalgia, this era is popularly remembered by the events and achievements of Umar's caliphate. In commenting on Umar and his caliphate, Jurji Zaydan, a reputed scholar, states that "... indeed we may say that the hero of Islam was Omar Ibn al-Khattab, whose acts and

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[121]Historical records allude to Usman's(644-656AD) lavish style and nepotism. Such accounts, however, do not comprise a part of the folklore regarding the Rashidun Caliphs. See G. Eaton, Islam and the Destiny of Man (London: Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp.138-139.

[122]Ibid., p.131.

[123]D.S. Margoliouth, trans., Jurji Zaydan's History of Islamic Civilization (New Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 1978), p.38.

[124]For details, see Eaton, op.cit., pp.131-139; Muir, op.cit., pp.232-233.

judgements were of a sort rarely united in an individual."[125] Zaydan's comments aptly capture the popular Muslim sentiments vis-à-vis the period of Umar's caliphate, and reflect the reality that, in seeking guidance and inspiration from the Rashidun period, contemporary Muslims often refresh their memories of Umar's caliphate.

Historical accounts on Umar's caliphate refer to Umar's willingness to justify and explain his policies to the general Muslim populace. Furthermore, the creation of a process of consultation (shura) with leading members of the community is also commonly associated with Umar's period as caliph.[126] Instances of Umar's style of governing are also available in Kitab al Kharaj. The author Abu Yusuf provides instances of deliberations between Umar and the representatives of Medina on various issues ranging from the disposition of conquered territories to the appointment of new governors for the provinces.[127] In adopting a style of governing, as mentioned above, Umar, in essence, was manifesting his dedication to the basic tenets of Islam and their endorsement of a consultative approach in the administration of the affairs of the Muslim community. This, however, did not alter the reality of the tight controls which were kept on the reins of government by Umar. As the amir al-muminin ("commander of the faithful"), the Caliph

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[125] Margoliouth, op.cit., p.36.
[126] See Khadduri and Liebesny, op.cit., p.16.
[127] Cited by S.I. Elwan, "Constitutional Democracy and Islam: A Comparative Study" (Ph.D. dissertation, Emory University, 1971), pp.116-117.

served as the supreme war-lord and head of the civil administration - and also as the leader of the Muslims in public worship.'[128] Zaydan's comment that Umar " ... treated Muslims in a fatherly way..." and "... punished severely those who drank...."'[129] attests to this authoritarian - albeit benevolent - style of leadership. While Umar's unquestionable dedication to Islam gave him the authority and status to demand the obedience of the people and even rule by decree, if he so desired, such images of Muslim leadership and its piety have continued to linger within the inner recesses of the Muslim psyche - thereby providing a useful political resource in the twentieth century to "soldiers turned mufti" and authoritarian regimes which don the garb of religion. In the following section, I have analysed this phenomenon in light of my framework pertaining to political culture and authoritarian-military rule.

D. Islamic Political Culture and Authoritarian-Military Rule: The Doctrinaire Perspective

The three dimensional view of doctrinaire Islam, as presented in this chapter, indicates that, while no clearly defined theory of state is provided either in the Quran, sunnah or the practices of the Rashidun period, religious beliefs, cultural themes and popular practices supportive of

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'[128]Such a leadership style was generally true for the entire Rashidun period. See Arnold, op.cit., pp.39-40; Eaton, op.cit., p.132.

'[129]Reference is being made to the consumption of intoxicants. See Margoliouth, op.cit., p.38.

an authoritarian type of polity nonetheless constitute an integral part of the fundamental framework of Islam. This was manifest most clearly in the authority-centred perspective of doctrinaire Islam - revolving around the concept of a single and supreme Sovereign. God was portrayed as being Omnipotent, Omniscient and the Sole Sovereign of the Universe, and a distinct aura was associated with the imagery of God. And since God does not manifest Himself directly to the Muslim believer, His authority was automatically transferred to those who could effectively establish that they spoke the word of Allah and had been delegated authority by the Ultimate Sovereign to administer on his behalf. Such a transference of authority was facilitated by Islam's non-separation of church and state and the Muslim belief that Islam was not only a composite of religious values but a total way of life. The idea of a single and sole sovereign - as incorporated in doctrinaire Islam - thus did not remain restricted to the strictly religious realm and permeated into the realm of politics, and fostered thereby a fertile ground for the promotion of an autocratic type of leadership. Confirmation to this effect is available from my review of Muhammad's lifetime itself and the Rashidun period, and is indicative that, from the earliest of times, the Muslim leadership has occupied a pivotal and prime position in the polity of Islam. Furthermore, the Muslim world during the Prophet's lifetime and the Rashidun period was primarily partriarchal in

nature, and, notwithstanding the concept of shura, near absolute powers were wielded by Muhammad and the Rashidun caliphs. Traditionally thus, the Muslim mind has been oriented to believe that power and authority is centralised within one single source and is inclined to regard an autocratic type of leadership as being not only acceptable, but also desireable. Such an authority-centred perspective - which is primarily non-pluralistic in nature - also leads the believer to follow one guidance path, look towards one goal and recognise one leader - creating thus a cultural climate which is conducive to the establishment of authoritarian regimes based on the idea of power and authority residing with the leader - rather than the people.

Notwithstanding the emphasis on an autocratic type of polity, doctrinaire Islam portrayed a primarily positive image of authority. This was noted vividly in the case of the Quranic coverage given to the Ultimate Sovereign, wherein verses referring to God as harsh and severe were overwhelmingly outnumbered (by a 2:1 ratio) by references to God's kindness and forgiving nature. Similarly, the imagery associated with the Muslim leadership's attitude towards the godfearing and submissive believer during Muhammad's lifetime and the Rashidun period was again primarily compassionate and caring in content. The import of such an imagery and orientation, within the general framework of doctrinaire Islam's decided tilt in favour of authoritarianism (rather than democracy), can be better

understood and appreciated in the context of Rousseau's view on the imperatives of political power. In The Social Contract, Rousseau explains that the strong and the powerful can sustain their supremacy only if they are able to translate "might into right, and obedience into duty."[130] Islam's portrayal of God, in particular, and temporal authority, in general, as being primarily compassionate and caring reveals basic political objectives and goals similar to those identified by Rousseau over ten centuries later, and reflects, albeit indirectly, the importance attached in the Islamic political culture to loyalty and allegiance vis-à-vis sources of authority. More succinctly put, the basic tenets of Islam, as a general rule, foster the idea of a kind and caring God,[131] and facilitate thereby a close identification of the masses with those individuals who exercise authority in the name of God and claim to have been delegated such authority by the Ultimate Sovereign. In this manner, the powerful is, indeed, transformed into and portrayed as being the rightful authority in the polity of Islam, and, as a consequence, mass obedience towards such authority is personified at the doctrinaire level as being a religious obligation and duty of the devout believer. Also, the Muslim faithful is encouraged to believe that, as long as he obeys God, he should neither fear the Ultimate

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[130]C. Frankel, trans. and ed., The Social Contract by Jean Jacques Rousseau (New York: Hafner Publ. Co., 1947) p.8.

[131]This is not to gainsay that doctrinaire also warns the Muslim believer against the severe consequences of disobedience vis-à-vis the Ultimate Sovereign and His loyal lieutenants in the temporal realm.

Sovereign nor his delegated lieutenants on earth - but rather should pledge his unquestioned loyalty and whole-hearted allegiance. The believer is advised, in no unclear terms, to submit to and obey those in positions of authority. In the case of the believer's attitude towards God, no scope whatsoever is provided either for disobedience or expressing dissent, and unconditional submission is maintained as being the only path to salvation. Similarly, unquestioning obedience towards Muhammad, and acceptance of his "inspired" leadership is strongly recommended in doctrinaire Islam. And, in the case of temporal authority, Muslims are again advised to primarily obey and submit to the extant leadership.

It is clear from the above characterisation of the polity of Islam, as envisaged at the doctrinaire level, that obedience is considered as the principal mainstay of the Muslim world. At the apex of the pyramidal structure of Muslim society, comprising the community of believers is located none other than the Ultimate Sovereign Himself - and every individual believer, regardless of his position or status, is required by the sharia[132] to submit to and comply with the commandments of God. To the extent that the temporal ruler himself has to abide by the sharia, obedience to his dictates by the Muslim masses is considered in Islam as automatically constituting a pledge of allegiance by the

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[132]The term sharia refers to the divine laws of Islam - as formulated by God - and made explicit in the Quran and the sunnah.

populace to the will of God. Thus, under normal circumstances, doctrinaire Islam neither recognises the need nor permits disobedience and dissent vis-à-vis those in positions of authority. It does, however, provide marginal scope (in theory at least) for limited maneuvering by the masses in atypical conditions. Reference was made earlier in this chapter to Muhammad's statement suggesting that if the ruler of the Muslims does not himself comply with the sharia, the populace at large is not dutybound to obey him. The incorporation of such a conditional clause, when viewed in light of Islam's preeminent emphasis on obedience and its fundamental premise that the responsibility to administer political accountability rests with none other than the Ultimate Sovereign, falls far short of indicating any serious concern at the doctrinaire level regarding the need to either provide, on an ongoing basis, a participatory role for the populace, or to incorporate effective safeguards against an "unruly" ruler. Furthermore, since the pious were, indeed, considered to be in positions of authority in the Muslim polity during Muhammad's lifetime and the Rashidun period, doctrinaire Islam's conditional endorsement of non-compliance with the ruler's directives remained in relative disuse during the early decades of Muslim history and failed to receive sufficient recognition in the political culture of Islam.

Islamic political theory, as formulated by Muslim jurist-theologians, also served to reinforce the idea of

submitting to authority and failed to emphasize the importance of either the concept of political accountability or the idea of public participation. For example, al-Ghazzali(d.1111AD), considered as the great systematiser and the "St. Augustine" of Islamic thought, maintained that nothing whatsoever could justify disobedience of authority and the disturbance of public tranquility. In elaborating upon this basic premise, al-Ghazzali explained that while the devout Muslim should, indeed, refrain from cooperating with an impious ruler, he should express dissatisfaction by words, if possible, and alternatively by silence - if words might promote rebellion.'[33] A cautious and hesitant stance such as this was not unique to al-Ghazzali, and was also reflected in the opinions expressed by other prominent Muslim jurist-theologians such as al-Baqilani (d.1012), al-Bagdadi (d.1037) and al-Mawardi (d.1058), who preceded him. It was generally felt by these luminaries of Muslim political thought that while, in accordance with the hadith and the basic tenets of Islam, an unrighteous'[34] ruler had no claims to obedience of the Muslim community, a policy of open rebellion and civil strife was still inadvisable and counter-productive.'[35]

'[33]Mortimer, op.cit., p.38.
'[34]Non-compliance with the dictates of God would "qualify" one as an unrighteous person.
'[35]Such a position adopted by Muslim jurist-theologians is indicative, on the one hand, of their utter helplessness and frustration over the loss of effective power by the caliphs and its usurpation by the "militarily-mighty" sultans, and, on the other hand, of their subsequent attempts to reconcile with the altered political realities.

The identity of the self - as outlined in the basic framework of Islam - emerged mainly as a byproduct of the emphasis on obedience and Islam's "authority-centred" perspective. The believer is reminded categorically of his total dependence on God's mercy, guidance and benevolence for his very survival. Also, the accepted classic and traditional view of Islam leaves practically no room for individuals to have a meaningful say in decisions which affect their lives, and man's role in the polity of Islam is defined primarily in terms of operating within the limits which have been pre-established by the Ultimate Sovereign and submitting (without question or complaint) to God's command and authority. Such an imagery was established both in the Quran and hadith literature, and the patron-client relationship between the individual and figures of authority received added reinforcement during the Rashidun period.

Considered collectively, doctrinaire Islam's representation of the relationship between the individual self and authority figures, in conjunction with the opinions expressed by prominent Muslim jurist-theologians on this issue, promotes within the political culture of Islam a low

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[135](cont'd) A good review and summary account on the perspectives of prominent Muslim jurist-theologians is available in A.H. Syed, Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity (New York: Praeger, 1982), pp.12-41. Also see S.J. Shaw, W.R. Polk, eds. Studies on the Civilization of Islam by H.A.R. Gibb (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1962); G.E. Von Grunebaum, Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of A Cultural Tradition (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955), pp.127-140.

sense of individual self esteem,[134] excessive submissiveness vis-à-vis authority figures and a proclivity of the individual believer to rely upon an external coordinating agency (rather than on one's own abilities and strengths) for guidance and support. Also, the allegiant-subject mentality generated at the doctrinaire level hampers the incorporation within the Islamic political culture of either an effective system of checks and balances upon political authority or the participatory dimension of the Civic Culture, and facilitates thereby the emergence within Muslim polities of an authoritarian-type leadership, often garbed in the guise of a "messiah."

In addition to the "authority centred" perspective of Islam based on the premise of a peripheral role of the populace in the Muslim polity, the authoritarian nature of doctrinaire Islam also found expression in its "ingroup-outgroup" imagery of the environment and traditional distaste for dissent. The idea that dissenters should be relegated to an "outgroup" status found its clearest and most militant manifestation in the form of a distinct endorsement of jihad. The goal underlying the waging of holy war, as outlined in Islamic beliefs and sanctioned by none other than the Ultimate Sovereign, was to expand the realm of Islam at the expense of the "outgroup."

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[134] Themes supportive of a fatalistic orientation amongst the believers, as mentioned in this chapter, are also indicative of the marginal importance attached within the Muslim belief system and the Islamic political culture to the capabilities of the individual self.

Such a policy goal reveals doctrinaire Islam's bipolar perspective of society and its non-accommodatory attitude vis-à-vis the "outgroup." Historical records of Muhammad's lifetime and the Rashidun period are replete with accounts regarding the punitive measures and violent means which were adopted by the Muslims in dealing with the disbelievers, and serve to confirm that, during Muhammad's lifetime and also during the Rashidun period, the "ingroup-outgroup" perspective was taken very seriously, and "outgroup" members, though on occasions tolerated, were never permitted to prevail. The battle of Badr of 624 AD, for instance, is romanticized in Muslim political history, and the glorification of such battles undertaken by the believers in Islam has fostered in the Muslim culture an imagery of a continuing and irreconciliable dispute with those who do not subscribe to the fundamentals of Islam or fail to conform to the mainstream Muslim approach. In keeping with such an imagery and mind-frame, the Rashidun caliphs, serving as the conscience keepers of the Muslim society of seventh century Arabia, also introduced a pattern in Muslim political history of demanding the obedience of the Muslim populace, and dealt severely with any opposition - domestic or external - which was perceived as being potentially destabilising either to their rule or the supremacy of Islam. My discussion on the Riddah Wars (632-633AD) and the treatment meted out to the Kharjites during the Caliphate of Ali attests to this. Such a politico-cultural history leaves

little room for doubt regarding the authoritarian style of Muslim rule during the Golden Period of Islam, and is suggestive of the long-standing importance of the military and coercive instruments of power to the Muslim political experience. In fact, since Islam, amongst other approaches, endorses the use of violence and glorifies the waging of warfare by the pious for the purpose of establishing and perpetuating Muslim predominance, the military, under Muhammad and the Rashidun caliphs, remained indistinguishable from the Muslim political machine. The military's importance in the political culture of Islam was facilitated by this traditional non-existence of any clearly defined boundaries separating the political from the military realm. My review of Muhammad's leadership style and that of the Rashidun caliphs indicated that the offices of the supreme warlord and the chief of the civil administration were singlehandedly administered by the extant head of the Muslim community. Along similar lines, the provincial governors of the conquered territories during the Rashidun period were army generals, and given the close fusion of functions between the military and civil administrations, those charged with the responsibility of collecting taxes from the conquered territories in peace times were, in fact, the same individuals who led the Muslim armies to the battlefields during times of war.[37] At a more macro level also, the umma was not compartmentalised into

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[37] P.K. Hitti, History of the Arabs: From the Earliest of Times to the Present (London: Macmillan, 1970), p.173.

the civilian and military sectors, and every individual believer was expected to be ready and willing at all times to unitedly fight to protect and further the cause of Islam. Soldiering was considered in the Muslim world of medieval times not only as noble and religiously sanctioned, but also very profitable, and, to the extent that the wages of the soldiers were determined on the basis of the total size of the booty which was netted during military expeditions, the Muslim faithful was, understandably so, generally enthusiastic about participating in jihad - as these military ventures were believed to be.

In the period following Muhammad's death, the primacy of the military in the polity of Islam received an additional boost due to the absence within the Quranic text or the Prophet's pronouncements of any definite guidelines regarding the crucial question of political succession, and also because of the inability of the Muslim community to amicably resolve this issue. My review of the Rashidun period referred to the perpetual crisis and recurring violence which plagued the Muslim community over the question of political succession and such a pattern persisted during the Abbasid and Umayyad periods, and also in later centuries of Muslim history.[33] All this served to make the military - the primary vehicle of authority -

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[33]I have, in this chapter focused on Muhammad's lifetime and the Rashidun period. For an overview perspective on political violence during the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties, see Armajani, Ricks, op.cit., pp.55-78; P. K. Hitti, Islam: A Way of Life (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1970), pp.72-103.

increasingly vital to both the attainment of political power and also its consolidation in the polity of Islam. A continuing trend in this direction eventually culminated in a situation whereby, in the period following the demise of the Abbasid caliph al-Mamun (d.833 AD), political power shifted totally into the hands of the military - who found it politically expedient to rule in the name of the puppet caliph, rather than abolish the caliphate. Thus, within two centuries after Muhammad's death, the caliph was rendered powerless, and served merely as a means to provide popular legitimacy to the praetorians-turned-sultans and to accord religious sanction to the preeminence and ruler-type role of the military in the authoritarian-type Muslim state. It was in recognition of this altered balance of power, which had, in essence, made the military the prime actor and the ultimate source of authority in the culture and polity of Islam that al-Ghazzali, in his works Ihya ulum el-din and Kitab el-Iktisad fi'l Iktikad, acknowledged that:

> Government in these days is a consequence solely of military power, and whosoever he may be to whom the holder of military power gives his allegiance, that person is caliph.'''

Notwithstanding my findings regarding the primarily authoritarian nature and pro-military perspective of doctrinaire Islam, certain rudimentary elements of republicanism were also noted to be a part of the

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'''Cited in H.A.R. Gibb, H. Brown, Islamic Society and the West (London: Oxford University Press, 1950); p.31; also see M.M. Rabi, The Political Theory of Ibn Khaldun (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1967), p.90.

fundamental framework of Islam. For instance, my findings regarding the Quranic principle of shura and its implementation during the early decades of Islam, Muhammad's recommendations to follow the largest group, and the tradition of baya extant during the Rashidun period somewhat detract from the strictly authoritarian model and manifest a certain degree of receptivity at the doctrinaire level to both a broad-based approach to decision-making and the idea of including the populace in the policy-making process. Similarly, Muhammad's statements, as incorporated in the hadith literature, suggesting that the Muslim masses were required to obey the ruler only if he governed in accordance with the sharia also reveals a nascent form of the principle of political accountability - which is fundamental to democracy and the republican spirit. These rudimentary trappings of democracy were, however, stifled by the absolutist type of dynasties which were established by the Umayyads and the Abbasids in the post-Rashidun period. During this phase of Muslim history, which extended over a time-span of six centuries, the role of the Muslim populace as participants in the political decision-making process, which was already somewhat tenuous and vaguely defined during Muhammad's lifetime and the Rashidun era, became increasingly remote to the Muslim political experience. In addition, a proliferation (since the tenth century) of the idea amongst the vast majority of Muslims that the "doors of

ijtihad"[40] had been closed, robbed Muslim society of its creative vitality[41] and also eliminated any viable prospects for a possible reinforcement of the nascent republican spirit which was noted at the doctrinaire level. As a result, the authoritarian form of government, prevalent during Muhammad's lifetime and the Rashidun period (and arduously adopted - minus the republican spirit - by the Umayyads and the Abbasids), did not undergo any major change in the centuries ahead, and power and authority in the Muslim world continued to primarily flow from the cutting edge of the sword.

While the findings on the fundamentals of Islam, as outlined in this chapter, provide useful insights regarding the authoritarian-military nature of the inputs which originate from the doctrinaire level and impact upon and influence the political culture of Islam, an examination of the socio-political history and traditions of particular Muslim polities is essential to obtain a more comprehensive and complete understanding of the cultural underpinnings to authoritarian-military rule in twentieth century Muslim society. Chapter 3 attempts such an examination and analysis in the context of Pakistan.

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[40] Ijtihad refers to the exertion of human reason to ascertain a rule of sharia .

[41] For details, see I.A. Ragab, "Islam and Development," World Development, 8, 7/8 (July/August 1980), p.517; F.M. Denny, An Introduction to Islam (New York: Macmillan; London: Collier Macmillan, 1985), pp.219-220.

III. Islam and Authoritarian-Military Rule in Pakistan: A Political Culture Perspective

Pakistan emerged as an independent state in 1947 with the declared intent and purpose of fulfilling the aspirations of those Muslims of the subcontinent who wished to have a homeland of their own. Over ninety percent of Pakistan's current population subscribe to the faith of Islam and the Pakistani Muslim's sense of self identity revolves primarily around his religious beliefs. Also, he takes pride in being a member of a religious community which originated in the arid deserts of seventh century Arabia and spread subsequently to different parts of the world, including the Indian subcontinent.

My findings on the political culture of Muslims living in undivided India till 1947 and in Pakistan thereafter, as presented in this chapter, have been organised primarily around the three broad issue areas mentioned in the theoretical framework on authoritarian-military rule. An attempt has also been made to provide the reader with a perspective on how the Muslim personality in the subcontinent was influenced by the predominantly Hindu environment in undivided India and the period of British colonial rule in the region.

A. Authority and the Individual Self: A Command-Compliance Relationship

The authority-centred nature of Muslim society in Pakistan is noted in the various dimensions of the day to day life of the believer. For instance, a Pakistani Muslim attaches great importance to God's guidance, and relies heavily upon His assistance for both his personal progress and the continued prosperity of the community. This manifests itself in the proclivity of the Pakistani Muslim to "embark" on any task, journey or even a meal by saying bismilla hir Rahman nir Rahim ("In the name of God, the Beneficient, the Merciful"). Similarly, he will thank God after the successful completion of a certain activity by proclaiming al-hamdulillah.'[42] It is also not uncommon to consider disasters occurring on account of human error and natural calamities as being indicative of God's wrath. Furthermore, poverty and riches are popularly believed to be divinely decreed - rather than attained by human endeavours,'[43] and mass myths prevail in Pakistani society, whereby efforts, for instance, to control population size - are considered as being futile and against the will of God.'[44]

'[42]Based on the author's personal observations during his years in Pakistan.

'[43] Z. Huque, "Pakistan and Islamic Ideology," in Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship (The Political Economy of A Praetorian State), eds. H. Gardezi, J. Rashid (London: Zed Press, 1983), p.370.

'[44] For details, see K.B. Sayeed, "Islam and National Integration in Pakistan," in South Asian Politics and Religion, ed. D.E. Smith (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp.409-411.

In addition to the all-pervading presence and power of the authority of God, as perceived by the Muslim believer in Pakistan, other figures of authority whom an average Pakistani normally encounters in the course of his life generally include:

a)The father - at the level of family;

b)The mullah - at the community level (religious domain);[165] and

c)The feudal lord/tribal chief - at the community level (social realm).

In discussing the role of the father as an authority figure, it should be mentioned, at the very outset, that the family serves as the pivot of social life in a typical Pakistani setting, and the psychological roots of one's conception of the individual self originates here. Children generally live with their parents well after having attained adulthood,[166] and are taught during their childhood and teenage years to be submissive, obedient and respectful to elders - especially the father. Underlying this initial socialisation in deference and submissiveness to one's father is the overall emphasis on respect for power and authority. As the principal (and possibly only) bread-earner and the person who protects and looks after the family

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[165]Religious and social domains are not strictly separated in Islam. In our analysis, such a distinction has been employed for purposes of clarity.

[166]In the extended family system - as is not uncommon in Pakistan, three generations, viz. the grand parents, parents and the children often coexist under the same roof.

interests, the father wields near absolute powers in the family and holds the position of the principal authority figure. In this capacity, he exacts "..complete obedience which is required as a matter of ethical and religious obligation."[48] A form of training such as this serves as one of the earlier exposures of the child to the practical implementation of the message of obedience to figures of authority - as enshrined in doctrinaire Islam.[49]

Exposure to sources of religious authority such as the mullah,[50] mosque and the madressa[51] furthers the message of obedience and submission obtained at the level of family. Muslim children in Pakistan commonly accompany their parents and elders to the mosque for attending the Juma (Friday) prayers - which, in accordance with the basic tenets of Islam - are mandatorily to be offered in congregation. The rituals of Islam such as the postures of standing, bowing and prostration, adopted by the believer while offering prayers,[52] are strictly enforced in the mosque. Furthermore, the imam's authority, as the prayer leader, is obeyed by the congregation of believers, and questioning his

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[48] S.M.M. Qureshi, "Political Culture of Pakistan: The Mass Dimension" (research in progress).
[49] This has been discussed in chapter 2.
[50] A mullah is one who performs religious functions. While Islam does not provide for any ordination or priestly class, the duties of a mullah could, more often than not, require full time attention. For a discussion on this, see Qureshi, "Political Culture of Pakistan: The Mass Dimension," p.27.
[51] A madressa is an institution for training in Muslim religious education.
[52] In chapter 2, these rituals and their significance in the context of a culture based on the command-compliance idea have been discussed in detail.

authority would be unthinkable to the average believer in Pakistani society.'[152] This pattern of unquestioned obedience is facilitated by the manner in which religious education is imparted to the Muslim populace in Pakistan. The believer is primarily taught the rituals of his religious duties and made to memorise verses of the Quran. And while rote behaviour and replication constitute the major thrust of this religious education, insufficient attention is paid to providing an indepth and comprehensive understanding of the fundamentals of Islam.'[153] In this manner, the mullah maintains his monopoly over "valid" interpretations of the scriptural framework of Islam - and, the Muslim mind, on the one hand, becomes vulnerable to blind indoctrination, and, on the other hand, manifests a high degree of susceptibility to seeking guidance from an external coordinating agency, rather than relying on the capabilities of the individual self. Also, the individual believer becomes socially acclimatised to believe that his role is relegated primarily to conform to his higher-ups, and is thus inclined to seek a patron in the various dimensions of his day to day life.

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[152] For a discussion on this, see Qureshi, "Political Culture of Pakistan: The Mass Dimension," p.19.

[153] Based on author's personal observations of a typical societal setting in Pakistan. Similar conclusions are mentioned in Sayeed's article "Islam and National Integration in Pakistan," in Smith, South Asian Politics and Religion, p.410. It should be noted that since one can offer one's prayers and fulfil one's mandatory religious duties merely by memorising the Quranic verses, it is not essential for practicing Muslims to learn Arabic to a degree where they can, in fact, comprehend the contents of the Quranic text.

Deference and submission vis-à-vis authority figures is also fostered by the feudalistic nature of Pakistani society. Our review of the Quran, sunnah and the Rashidun period, as presented in chapter 2, revealed no explicit endorsement of feudalism and the concentration of economic wealth in the hands of a few. The Muslim laws of inheritance, in fact, allow an individual to bequeath only a third of his wealth in the manner in which he so desires. The remaining two-thirds are to be mandatorily distributed amongst one's children/relatives in accordance with a formula prescribed by Islam. Very little is left to chance, and detailed Quranic guidelines on the question of inheritance are based on the principle of encouraging a dispersal of wealth "from one to many, rather than its channelling from many to one."[154]

The reality of Muslim history has, however, not lived up to the Quranic ideal, and feudalism, as it exists in twentieth century Pakistani society, stands testimony to this. It also represents a continuation of the feudal mode of production which "prevailed in the Muslim world throughout medieval times, under the Umayyads, Abbasids and later regimes" and "... which rested on the division of society into a minority of landlords ... and a vast majority

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[154] See Quran, 4:11-12. For a good discussion on laws of inheritance in Islam, see J.S. Cummings, H. Askari, A. Mustafa, "Islam and Modern Economic Change," in Islam and Development: Religion and Sociopolitical Change, ed. J.L. Esposito (Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1980), p.35.

of slaves and serfs."[155] Furthermore, in keeping with the principles which are basic to feudalism as a social phenomenon, feudalism in Muslim India was exploitative and extractive in nature and contributed, in the final analysis, to a perpetuation of the subsistence level existence of the peasant.[156] Thus, in Sind, for instance, the peasants have traditionally been, and continue to be, treated like chattels, "... serving their master's desire...."[157] The feudal lord known as the rais or wadera in Sind literally "presides" over the life of the hari (peasant). The comments submitted by a member of a commission constituted in the post-1947 period to investigate the plight of the hari - excerpts of which are mentioned below - attest to the pitiful plight of the hari:

> The *hari* behaves like a helpless slave when he has to face the *zamindar*.... As soon as the *zamindar* appears on the fields the *hari* and his children go and bow before him till they touch his feet, then rise up to kiss his hand. This they do not out of respect but to make him feel that they are his humble creatures who prostrate themselves before him and live at his mercy....
>
> Islam gives him the ideal of the greatness of God and submission to no one except Him. But when his Islam is put to the test in the fields where the *zamindar* has taken hold of all the resources of the earth in the name of Islam and can at any moment starve the poor *hari* to death, the great ideals of Islam vanish from the *hari's* mind. He forgets the greatness of God and bows in abject submission to the *zamindar*.... He feels that this is perhaps his

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[155] Huque, "Pakistan and Islamic Society," in Gardezi, Rashid, op.cit., p.369. For details, also see pp.369-371.

[156] For some discussion on this see J. Sarkar, Mughal Administration (Calcutta: M.C. Sarkar & Sons, 1963), pp.77-90.

[157] L. Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development (Boulder,Colo.: Dawson, Westview, 1980) p.142.

> destiny and the local religious "leaders", the *pirs* and the mullahs console the *hari* with the doctrine of "fate".'[88]

Masud's characterisation of the situation in Sind is a good example to illustrate how societal structures, which are not necessarily in accordance with the Quranic precepts, and are often indigenous to the local context, nonetheless perpetuate themselves in Muslim societies due to the manner in which the fundamental tenets of Islam influence mass perceptions and orientations. In this particular instance, the relationship between feudalism as a socio-economic phenomenon in Sind and the fatalistic attitudes emerging from the religious realm[89] serves as the focus of the author's attention. The overall thrust of the author's findings is, however, not exclusive to Sind, and holds generally true for the other provinces of Pakistan also. For instance, in Punjab, the largest province (in terms of population size), the zamindars (landowners) and the commoners such as the peasants and the kammis (village craftsmen) comprise the two main "castes."[90] While the fact of being Muslim fosters a sense of equality amongst the

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[88]M. Masud, "Note of Dissent to the Report of the Government Hari Enquiry Committee," as quoted in T. Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power (London: Jonathan Cape, 1970), p.99. The term zamindar refers to the landlord. Pirs are Muslim spiritual guides or mentors.

[89]This has been discussed in chapter 2.

[90]The term "caste," as employed in Eglar's analysis (and by me) should not be interpreted literally. It has been used to emphasize the clear and "caste-like" social distinctions existing between the landlord and the peasant. It is also suggestive of the impact of Hindu[illegible]pon Muslim society in the subcontinent. See Z. Eglar, A Punjabi Village in Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p.28.

believers - permitting thus the zamindar and the kammi to sit and eat together,'[61] a form of patron-client relationship nonetheless exists between the two parties on account of the authority and power of the zamindar. This is manifest most clearly in the case of the chowdhri - who serves as the village chieftain or headman - and belongs to the zamindar class. In outlining the functions performed by the chowdhri, Eglar explains how, for example, in times of need the kammi borrows from

> ... the *ghar* - the household of the *chowdhri* - money and provisions, and also get free medicine. Neighbors or *kammis* who have no buffalo, or whose buffalo goes dry, get their *lasi*, buttermilk, regularly from the this house. When a child is born, *kammis* expect to get its first shirt from the *ghar*, for it brings good luck. And when the poor die the *chowdhrani* sees to it that they have a shroud.'[62]

The chowdhri, in particular, and the smaller zamindars, in general, also help to form a link between the government and the mass populace, and see to it that, at times of distress, government loans, which might be available, are, indeed, taken benefit of, and also ensure that no such opportunity is bypassed or missed.'[63]

The concept of command-compliance, as noted in the countryside of Sind and Punjab (the two major provinces comprising over 75 percent of Pakistan's population), is also manifest in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and

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[61] Ibid., p.29.
[62] Ghar means house or household. Chowdhrani refers to the wife or the mother of the chowdhri. See ibid., pp.31-32. Also, for details, see S. Ahmad, Class and Power in a Punjabi Village (New York, London: Monthly Review Press, 1977), pp.91-126.
[63] Eglar, op.cit., p.31.

Baluchistan. The masses in both these provinces are much influenced by strict tribal codes, the concept of group unity'[14] and the reality of the overwhelming power of the aristocratic tribal chiefs such as the khans or sardars.'[15] Furthermore, unquestioning loyalty and allegiance is rendered to the sardar - who serves as the hakim'[16] and is located at the apex of the pyramid-like pecking order. At the lower stratum of this hierarchical system are located the menial workers - who are treated either as outright slaves of the hakim or alternatively serve as servants and sharecroppers.

In reviewing the Muslim history of India for obtaining a somewhat more macro (and historical perspective) on the Muslim imagery in the region regarding authority figures and the individual self, cultural themes, political practices and rituals suggestive of an autocratic type of polity again become manifest. Such manifestations are available, albeit indirectly, from the command-compliance relationship which has traditionally existed between the Muslim ruler and his subjects. The nature of social contract between the rulers and the populace during the Delhi sultanate, which preceded

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'[14]See Qureshi, "Political Culture of Pakistan: The Mass Dimension," p.21; and R.V. Weekes, ed., Muslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic Study (volume 2) (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1984), pp.622-628.

'[15]For some discussion on this, see Y.V. Ganovsky, L.R. Gordon-Polonskaya, A History of Pakistan (1947-1958) (Lahore: People's Publishing House, 1970), p.95, p.158; R.G. Wirshing, The Baluchis and the Pathans (Minority Rights Group Report No. 48) (London: Minority Rights Group, 1981), pp.4-5.

'[16]In the vernacular, this term refers to the person who governs or gives orders.

the Mughal era (1526-1857), is aptly borne out in Alauddin Khalji's (period of reign: 1296-1316) statement that

> Men are heedless, disrespectful, and disobey my commands; I am then compelled to be severe to bring them into obedience. I do not know whether this is lawful or unlawful; whatever I think to be for the good of the state, or suitable for the emergency, I decree.'[6]

Khalji's statement, in addition to reinforcing our earlier observation regarding the traditional Muslim emphasis on obedience, leaves little room for doubt regarding the arbitrary and autocratic nature of Muslim rule in the subcontinent. It also brings to the forefront the relative insignificance of the masses as masters of their own destiny in the Muslim history of the subcontinent and outlines clearly the extent to which the populace has historically been subject to the whims and desires of the sultan. In lending legitimacy to such an authoritarian style of administration, the Muslim sultans of Delhi actively promoted the practice of "investiture." In functional terms, this involved a request by the Delhi sultans for religious sanction to their rule from the reigning Abbasid caliph. The sultan's legal authority, in other words, was considered to be contingent not upon the mass mandate, but rather upon the endorsement by the Abbasid caliph. Such an idea was popularised by incorporating the caliph's name on coins which were minted at the Delhi mint and by mentioning it in the khutba (sermon), which preceded the Friday

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[6] F. Abbott "Pakistan and the Secular State," in Smith, South Asian Politics and Religion, p.359.

congregational prayers.'[16] Also, in the period following the demise of the Abbasid caliphate in 1258, the Delhi sultans maintained the facade of having received the religious sanctification to their arbitrary and authoritarian pattern of administration under the guise of titles such as nasir-i amir al-muminin (helper of the commander of the faithful) or yamin al-khilafat (right hand of the caliphate) - which were increasingly adopted by the Indian sultans.'[17] In this manner, the imposition of authority from above, as is common to authoritarianism, served as the mainstay of Muslim political power in the subcontinent, and democratic concepts based on the premise of popular rule received little or no recognition in the Muslim history of India.

Under the Mughals - who came to power in 1526 - after the decline and eventual demise of the Delhi sultanate, the formality of seeking investiture and other such symbolic gestures of sustaining a linkage with the Muslim heartland went into gradual disuse. The "authority-centred" perspective of Muslim society, however, continued to prevail, and this reflected itself in the absolute powers which were available to the Mughal monarch. In addition to performing the functions associated with the head of state, the emperor also served as the chief legislator, the

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'[16]Such practices can be traced back to the early eleventh century when Mahmud of Ghazni submitted himself, in "enlightened self interest," to the spiritual sway of the Abbasid caliph. The coins which were minted during this period also bore the caliph's name alongside that of Mahmud. See A. Ahmad, Studies in Islamic Culture in the Indian Environment (Oxford: Clarendon, 1964), pp.1-11.

'[17]See ibid., pp.7-10.

commander of the state forces and the fountain-head of justice.'[170] Furthermore, the emperor ordered the collection of taxes from the crown lands, appeared in the diwan-i-aam (public court) to hear public appeals from the populace, and, as the chief-patron, delegated jagirs (land-holdings) to the nobility and those deemed as being "deserving."[171] The criteria to qualify for these landholdings and other benefits, in the absence of any customary rules or historical regulations limiting the emperor's power and authority, depended largely upon his whims and personal desires, and principally emphasized prerequisites such as blind loyalty and unquestioning obedience to the emperor. Also, akin to the period of the Delhi sultanate, a submissive attitude vis-à-vis the emperor was actively promoted,[172] and if required, "exacted."

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[170]K. Ali, A Study of Muslim Rule in Indo-Pakistan (Dacca: Famous Publishers, 1963), p.204. The author's comments were intended to principally describe Akbar's reign as emperor. To the extent that the author's portrayal reflects the centralised nature of the Mughal monarchy, with near absolute powers resting with the monarch himself, it serves as a valid representation of the entire Mughal period.

[171]Jadu Nath Sarkar's discussion on the Mughal emperor's prerogatives also mentions certain customs and traditions which were designed to reinforce the imagery of subservience of the masses. See Sarkar, op.cit., pp.119-131.

[172]Under Akbar, the principle of mazhar (infallibility) of the emperor was introduced. The practice of darshan (viewing of the emperor for public veneration) is also commonly associated in historical records with the Mughal period in India. See B. Gascoigne, The Great Moghuls (New York, Evanston, London: Harper & Row, 1971), p.117; Sarkar, op.cit., p.120.

B. Relations with the "Outgroup" : Conflict, Conversion or Coexistence?

The concept of an "ingroup-outgroup" mentality, as outlined in the theoretical framework on authoritarian-military rule, referred to a form of polarisation of society - whereby one's differences with the "outgroup" are perceived as being irreconciliable. It was also mentioned that such perceptions serve as dampers to constructive dialogue and compromise between competing parties, and contribute thus to authoritarian strains, intolerance and a proneness within the culture to resort to violence as a means of conflict resolution. In attempting to examine whether such a mentality, as noted in my discussion on doctrinaire Islam in Chapter 2, is also reflected in the Muslim history of India, I have, in addition to providing an overview of the conceptual framework of Muslim India, also incorporated, for illustrative purposes, some discussion on the policy orientations of prominent Muslim sultans and emperors.

In the context of the Muslim psyche in the subcontinent, the "ingroup-outgroup" mentality found expression principally in reference to the believers in the Hindu faith. In establishing their rule, the Muslim forces came into conflict with the Hindu rulers, in particular, and the indigenous Hindu populace, in general. To the extent that expansion of the Muslim empire was possible only at the expense of the extant Hindu kings, the rivalry between the

two groups was, for all practical purposes, akin to a zero-sum game. The continuing reality of the Hindu majority population'[173] made the situation all the more compelling, and contributed to a proneness amongst the Muslims, operating as a minority government, to adopt policies intended at subduing the Hindus and keeping them relegated to a perpetually subordinate position.'[174] Such a policy approach emphasized conflict and conversion - rather than coexistence with the "outgroup," and this is noted clearly in the forcible circumcision reported to have been undertaken by Muhammad bin Qasim during the early Muslim forays into Sind in the eighth century.'[175] The pattern of violence and intolerance, as noted in Qasim's policies, is also reflected in the proclivity of several other Muslim rulers to be unsympathetic towards members of the "outgroup." According to Titus, the whole object of the Muslim sultans of Delhi was "... the religious one, of either converting the infidels or of 'sending them to hell with the sword'."'[176] The mainstream Muslim approach, in

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'[173]According to Esposito, the Muslim population in India, despite all the efforts at proselytisation and religious conversion, had never exceeded a quarter of the total population of the subcontinent during the entire period of Muslim rule. See Esposito, Islam and Development, p.140.

'[174]K.L. Srivastava, The Position of Hindus under the Delhi Sultanate (1202-1526) (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1980), p.146. The author refers to the analysis of the reputed Pakistani scholar, Dr. I.H. Qureshi in emphasizing that fears vis-à-vis the Hindu majority population were shared by both the Muslim nobility and the Muslim masses alike.

'[175]M.T. Titus, Islam in India and Pakistan (Calcutta: YMCA Publ. House, 1959), p.21.

'[176]Ibid., p.16. Such a comment was made in the context of the author's discussion of the period preceding the Mughal era. It should be noted that, in addition to the goals

terms of dealing with the Hindus and other non-Muslim inhabitants of India, consisted principally of offering them with three options. Firstly, they were "encouraged" to embrace Islam. If this option was not availed of, non-Muslim subjects were left with two other choices - neither of which was reflective of a spirit of genuine accommodation based on respect for the "outgroup." As a penalty for recalcitrance, the disbeliever, perceived as a member of the "outgroup," could either fight and fend for himself against the blazing sword of the Muslims, or alternatively, he could pay the poll-tax (jizya) - and thereby acknowledge acceptance of his subject (zimmi) status.'''

Within the general framework, as outlined above, the specifics of policy options varied somewhat from one monarch to another. Thus, for instance, Muslim sultans such as Jalaluddin Khalji (period of reign:1290-1296) and Sikandar Lodhi (period of reign: 1489-1517) rigorously exacted jizya (or poll-tax) from their Hindu subjects and, in addition to this, ruthlessly suppressed the Hindus in the name of jihad.''' The Mughal era, which followed the demise of the Delhi sultanate, also witnessed policies which were prejudicial to the Hindus. This is most clearly noted during Aurangzeb's reign as emperor in the seventeenth century. The

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'''(cont'd) identified by Titus, plunder and profit served as added incentives.

'''While a zimmi was permitted to live under Muslim rule, full citizenship rights were normally reserved only for the believer in Islam.

'''A good account of the jihad and jizya policy of the Delhi sultans is available in Srivastava, op.cit., pp.79-98.

poll-tax, earlier rescinded by Akbar, was reintroduced, and acts of violence against the Hindus, such as the destruction of the Hindu religious city of Mathura also occurred during Aurangzeb's reign.'''

The above mentioned characterisation of the nature of Muslim rule in India is not intended to gainsay periods when coexistence and even some cooperation occurred between the Hindus and Muslims. Instances of Hindu-Muslim cooperation can be traced as far back as the eighth century - when a cousin of Dahir, the ruler of Sind, provided assistance to the invading forces of Qasim.''' Similarly, historical records refer to the recruitment of the Hindu general Tilak by the Muslim monarch Masud (period of reign: 1030-1040),''' and to Akbar's (period of reign: 1556-1605) efforts to foster goodwill and understanding between the Hindus and the Muslims.''' Instances such as these did not however alter,

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'''Titus, op.cit., p.25, p.30. Aurangzeb's reign also witnessed a growing popularity of the orthodox fundamentalist Naqshbandi order - led by Sheikh Ahmad Sirhindhi. See Mortimer, op.cit., p.58.

'''Srivastava, op.cit., p.1.

'''Masud was the son of Mahmud of Ghazni. It may be interesting to note that some analysts, in fact, suggest that the Muslim recruitment of Hindus into the service of the state was necessitated by a shortage of manpower and was permitted only to the extent that it served to perpetuate Muslim rule. For example, see Srivastava, op.cit., p.146.

'''The concept of Din-i Ilahi (Divine Faith) - which represented a syncretisation of Islamic beliefs with Hindu and other religious values and practices prevalent in the Indian scene - was introduced and actively promoted by Akbar. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, the poll-tax (jizya) was rescinded during this period of the Mughal era. It is important to recognise, however, that Muslims of the subcontinent commonly believe that Akbar's accommodatory approach in his dealings with the Hindus was tantamount to heresy. See A. Ahmad, Islamic Modernism in India and Pakistan (London, Bombay, Karachi: Oxford University Press,

in any significant way, the "ingroup-outgroup" mentality of South Asian Muslims, and in the context of twentieth century Muslim nationalism, sentiments of distrust vis-à-vis the Hindus received reinforcement and further impetus under the leadership of prominent Muslims such as M.A. Jinnah and Allama Iqbal.[183] In 1930, for example, Iqbal proposed the idea of a separate Muslim state comprising the Muslim majority regions as a measure to prevent Hindu dominance.[184] Similarly, in 1939, Jinnah, serving as the spokesman for the Muslims in India, declared that "... democracy can only mean Hindu raj all over India; to this the Muslims will never submit."[185] Other statements made by Jinnah in the mid-forties emphasized that "blending two nations - Hindus and Musalmans - is an impossibility...."[186] and that "Hindus and Muslims, though living in the same towns and villages, had never been blended into one nation; they were always two different entities."[187]

The attainment of Pakistan as a separate homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent served to provide the Muslims in India with a tangible alternative to their minority status in undivided India. This did not, however, significantly alter their "ingroup-outgroup" mentality, and

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[182](cont'd) 1967), p.114.

[183]Jinnah is regarded by Pakistanis as the founder of Pakistan. Allama Iqbal is a much revered philosopher-poet of Indian Muslim origin.

[184]For a summary account of Iqbal's scheme see Syed, Pakistan: Islam, Politics and National Solidarity, pp.42-48.

[185]I. M. Stephens, Pakistan (New York: Praeger, 1967), p.27.

[186]J. Ahmad, ed. Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah (volume 2 (Lahore: Sh. Muhd. Ashraf, 1947), p.9.

[187]Ibid., p.2.

in the absence of the Hindu factor, one-time allies, who had jointly striven for the attainment of Pakistan, now turned against each other like bitter enemies. The socio-political environment within Pakistan in the post-1947 period was thus no less vicious than the situation which had prevailed in pre-partition India, and prominent Pakistani landowners such as the Daultanas and Qureshis in the Punjab province are reputed for their bitter enmity vis-à-vis the Legharis, Gardezis and Noons;[16] the concept of group unity (biradari) in the North West frontier regions of Pakistan translates itself into distrust and hostility towards other Pakistanis who are considered as outsiders;[17] and the Shias and the Sunnis in Pakistan view each other suspiciously and have, on several occasions, confronted each other in violent street riots and bloody battles. All this is reflective of the sense of distrust and hostility which continues to pervade the general climate in Pakistan, and which influences strongly the popular attitudes of Pakistanis vis-à-vis those whom they do not either agree or identify with. Such a tribal mentality, based on confrontation (rather than accommodation) as a means of conflict resolution, makes the conception of loyal opposition somewhat alien to the Pakistani political climate. In addition, the expression of dissent, or affiliation with a group or political movement which is not viewed favourably by the mainstream Muslims in

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[16] K.B. Sayeed, The Political System of Pakistan (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1967), p.87.
[17] See Weekes, op.cit., pp.622-628.

Pakistani society (or by those in positions of power) has, more often than not, resulted in serious and deadly consequences. Confirmation to this effect is available from events such as the 1953 disturbances in Pakistan, which were triggered by the anti-Ahmadi sentiments existing within the body polity of Pakistan.'[10] Similarly, when the West Pakistani based military cracked down upon the popularly elected Awami League in 1970,'[11] and unleashed a reign of terror upon the Bengalis (most of whom were Muslims), the ethos of intolerance and confrontation - characteristic of the "ingroup-outgroup" mentality of authoritarian-type cultures - again manifested itself.'[12] It also served to bring to the forefront the traditional importance of the military (and the use of violence) in the Muslim polity. This dimension of Pakistan's political culture is examined in the following section from a socio-historical perspective.

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[10]The Ahrar Party, which represented nationalist Muslims in undivided India, had in the 1930s first proposed, without success, that the Ahmadis be excluded from Islam. Subsequent political pressure over the question of the status of Ahmadis in the Islamic state of Pakistan culminated in the 1974 government decision to declare them to be non-Muslims. For a discussion on this issue see M.D. Ahmad, "Pakistan: The Dream of an Islamic State," in Religion and Societies: Asia and the Middle East, ed. C. Caldarola (Berlin, New York, Amsterdam: Mouton, 1982), p.275.

[11]The Awami League was a Bengali nationalist party. Although East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) had a higher percentage of Hindus in comparison with the western wing of the country, it nonetheless was an predominantly (over 80 percent) Muslim community.

[12]The military crackdown was popularly believed to be a holy war (jihad) against infidels and disbelievers.

C. Role and Relevance of the Military in the Muslim Polity of the Subcontinent

The role and relevance of the military in the Muslim culture and polity of the subcontinent can be best appreciated in the context of the traditional nature and goals of Muslim rule in the subcontinent. The Muslims, in fulfilling their conquest oriented goals and empire building designs in the subcontinent, had relied principally upon their superior firepower. The process of expanding the frontiers of Muslim rule in India by military means continued throughout the period of the Delhi sultanate and attained new heights during the Mughal era. The Mughal pride in their Mongol ancestry,'[3] in blending in with the traditional Muslim conception of holy war (jihad), resulted in the military occupation and Muslim control of Gujrat, Punjab and Bengal within four years after the establishment of the Mughal empire by Babar. And by 1707, when Aurangzeb, the last of the Great Moghuls died, the militant Rajputs had been subdued, and much of South and South-eastern India had also been brought under the Mughal fold.'[4]

In the administration of the newly acquired territories too, the pro-military orientation and approach reflected

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[3]It may be interesting to note that the term "Mughal" derives from the Persian variant of the word which means "Mongol." For a background on Babar's heritage, see Gascoigne, op.cit., p.15.

[4]Ibid., p.250. For a comparison between the Muslim-controlled areas in India on the eve of Babar's invasion and the expanded boundaries of the Mughal empire in the eighteenth century, see maps provided in S.F. Mahmud, The Story of Islam (Lahore, Karachi, Dacca: Oxford University Press, 1959), p.241, p.265.

itself. Under the Delhi sultanate (and also during the early period of the Mughal era), Hindu rajahs and other landlords were required to pay tribute as a subject people. Compliance was ensured by a force of arms - thereby making the army essential for asserting the authority of the emperor.'''' Under the Mughals, a more ambitious plan to control and assimilate the conquered territories and people was undertaken.''''' In giving practical meaning to such a policy goal, the civil and military sectors of government were integrated and the military was given a definite position of prominence in the governmental machinery. All categories of employment were defined in terms of ranks in the army, and even civil officers were assigned to military departments, enrolled as members of the army and graded in ranks called mansabs.''''' Furthermore, the salaries of all civil departments had to be endorsed by the Military Pay and Accounts Office - headed by the Paymaster of the army.''''' The fusion of the military and civil administration, as mentioned above, bore a close resemblance to the traditional Muslim form of administration, and represented thus, not a

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''''S.M. Edwards, H.L.O. Garrett, Mughal Rule in India (London: Oxford University Press, 1930), p.159.

''''' The reorganisation occurred largely due to the personal initiative of the Mughal emperor Akbar. In the preceding centuries, a somewhat decentralised approach to administering the conquered lands was necessitated due to the fact that the Muslims were not sufficiently numerous or adequately capable (in military terms) to directly administer from Delhi. See ibid.

''''For details, see Sarkar, op.cit., pp.21-22, 201-203.

''''The term bakshi was employed in the Mughal period to refer to the army paymaster and reflects the popular imagery regarding the army as the "bestower" of political power and source of livelihood.

pure invention of Muslim India, but rather constituted a perpetuation of the pattern of governing which was put in place by Muhammad himself, and which persisted during the Rashidun Caliphate, and the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties.

The preeminence of the military in the Muslim polity of India was also necessitated due to the adverse conditions which the Muslim rulers had to cope with in order to sustain their political power. For instance, the Hindus had never reconciled themselves totally to the reality of Muslim rule and the loss of political power. And given their majority status in India, they continued to pose a potential threat to the Muslim rulers in India. While Akbar's accommodatory policies precluded such potential threats to transcend the critical threshold and translate into acts of active rebellion, other Muslim monarchs, such as Aurangzeb, were often faced with attempts by Hindu forces to destabilise, and if possible, dethrone them.'[199] Under circumstances such as these, the sword, rather than willing submission, continued to serve as the backbone of Muslim rule in India.

The absence of any generally accepted guidelines regarding the appointment and removal of the Muslim leadership was an additional factor which promoted the importance of the military in the Muslim polity of India. In reviewing the manner in which political transition occurred in Muslim India,[200] it is more than amply clear that, akin

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[199]For a good account on this, see Mahmud, op.cit., pp.266-270.

[200]For a summary account, see ibid., pp.151-172, 241-273.

to the early centuries of Islam, Muslim power in the subcontinent continued to flow from the cutting edge of the sword. Violent feuding amongst members of the Muslim nobility was often precipitated by the volatile nature of the political succession issue. Islamic law does not provide for the rule of primogeniture for succession, and thus all the sons of a father are considered equally eligible to inherit his wealth and property. Similarly, in the case of royal succession, the sons of the deceased monarch have equal claims to the throne. The ultimate outcome, under these circumstances, depended invariably upon the superior firepower of a certain claimant for political office and his ability to muster the support of the most powerful army commanders. It is noteworthy to mention in this context, that during the Delhi Sultanate which lasted for about three centuries, no less than thirty sultans belonging to several dynasties occupied the royal throne, and over half of them became victims to assassination plots engineered by their opponents.[20] Such a pattern of violence over the question of political succession was not unique to the Delhi sultans, and manifested itself also in the Mughal era. Aurangzeb's accession to the throne, for example, was possible only after his forces succeeded in defeating those of his brothers Shah Shuja and Dara Shikoh. Conflict and discord over political succession also contributed to the confinement by Aurangzeb of his own father Shah Jehan and

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[20] D.P. Singhal, Pakistan (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1972), p.15.

the gruesome death of Dara Shikoh - whereby his head was severed from the rest of his body under personal orders of Aurangzeb himself.[202]

The inadequacy of the Muslim political institutions to ensure a stable functioning of the polity and the shedding of "noble" blood in rather "ignoble" ways over the question of political succession enhanced the importance of the military (rather than the mandate of the people) as the ultimate source of political authority in the history of Muslim India. In recognition of this, it became common practice amongst the Muslim emperors in India to take personal charge of the military and occupy the position of commander-in-chief. Loyal lieutenants were handsomely rewarded and often received appointments as governors of the provinces. And the monarch's ability to ensure the political viability of his reign depended, in the final analysis, upon how effectively he could continue to keep his military commanders (rather than the mass populace) happy and contended, and thereby ensure their sustained support in dealing with formidable foes - domestic or otherwise.[203]

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[202]Gasgoigne, op.cit., pp.215-222.
[203]A similar view is expressed by S. Qureshi in "Military in the Polity of Islam: Religion as a Basis for Civil-Military Interaction," op.cit.

D. Muslim Society in the Indo-Pakistani Subcontinent: A Case of Continuity or Cultural Change?

My analysis in this chapter regarding the customs common to contemporary Pakistani society and the political culture and history of Muslims in the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent manifests several of the norms, beliefs and practices which were noted at the doctrinaire level, and which were identified in our theoretical framework as being contributory to authoritarian-military rule. The preeminent emphasis on obedience and submission and the non-existence of any participatory role for the populace, as noted in these attributes, serve to reinforce the subject mentality mentioned in my discussion on doctrinaire Islam. Also, within the patron-client framework existing between authority figures and the individual self, unquestioning allegiance to those in positions of authority presents itself as an important component of the heritage and history of the Pakistani Muslim. Considered collectively, this is reflective of an "allegiant subject" orientation - as is common to authoritarian-type cultures. In addition, the military dimension to authoritarianism manifests itself in no unclear terms in the context of Muslim society and civilisation in the subcontinent. It may thus be concluded that the near endless pattern of authoritarian-military rule noted in the political arena of Pakistan can, indeed, be traced back to the traditional orientations and norms which existed in the political culture and historical past of the

Muslims of the subcontinent.

Within the broad framework of Islamic political culture in the subcontinent, as outlined above, the beliefs and values of the Hindu majority population in India also influenced the orientations and attitudes of South Asian Muslims. The most distinctive feature of Hindu society is its caste-oriented mentality, and the impact of Hindu beliefs upon Indian Muslims reflected itself primarily in the form of the four-tier "Syed-Shaikh-Moghul-Pathan" class structure which has traditionally existed in the upper echelons of Muslim society in India. The resemblance (in form, if not in essence) between the four-tier class structure employed by the privileged class of Indian Muslims to "distinguish and discriminate" amongst themselves and the basic structure of Hindu society, which also comprises four castes (Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishas and Sudhras), leads us to postulate that the Muslim perspective in South Asia was, indeed, influenced by the cultural climate in India. And while the Muslim class structure was not as strictly defined as the Hindu caste system, and also permitted the possibility of some upward social mobility for those who were able to prosper economically, it nonetheless was based on the fundamental premise that some Muslims were "worthier" than others. The Syeds, for instance, claimed descent from Ali, the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad, and on these grounds asserted their superiority over the Shaikhs, who were believed to have emerged from amongst the ranks of the

Quraish tribe to which Muhammad belonged, and also over the Mughals and the Pathans.[204]

At the level of doctrinaire Islam, all Muslim believers are considered to be equal in the eyes of Allah and, in keeping with such a belief, it is customary for Muslims in the subcontinent (and around the world) to pray alongside each other in the mosque - regardless of race, colour or class. However, in terms of social stratification, the Muslim community in the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent was clearly not immune to the influence of the "super-sub distinctions" common to the Hindu caste system, and the class distinctions existing within the Muslim ranks attests to this. In recognition of the change which the Muslim community in India had undergone and which represented a form of deviance from the equalitarian message of doctrinaire Islam, Allama Iqbal, the much revered Muslim poet-philosopher of India, in commenting upon Indian Muslims, lamented that "surely we have out-Hindued the Hindu himself."[205]

In addition to the influence of Hindu beliefs and practices, Muslims in the subcontinent were also exposed to Western ideas and education during the period of British colonial rule. Following the decline of the Mughal Empire in the post-Aurangzeb period, the British, over a period of

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[204]The descendants of the Turkish and Afghan military conquerors of Northern India were included in the Mughal and Pathan categories. See D.N. Wilber, Pakistan: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture (New Haven: Hraf Press, 1964), p.118.

[205]Ibid., p.118.

time, strengthened their colonial control over India. As part of their strategy of gaining greater control over India, an attempt was made by the colonial rulers to "civilise the natives" and promote western ideas and institutions which were commensurate with their colonial ambitions and interests. The English ideas of liberalism and democracy and the concept of rule of law were in some ways made available to Indians, and were promoted via the educational system which emerged during the period of British rule in India. In this manner, western perspectives and political thought gradually permeated and took hold of the thinking of those Indians - Hindus and Muslims alike - who were most in touch with things English. However, the lifestyles, orientations and attitudes of the masses were not altered significantly. This was especially true in the case of the Muslim majority regions which were located in the North West part of British India and are currently incorporated within the geographical boundaries of Pakistan. Being somewhat distantly located from the seat of British power in Delhi and other major Indian cities, the populace in these areas remained relatively isolated and, as a consequence, more insulated from the changes occurring in the major political centres in India. Added to this, the British found it politically expedient to permit a perpetuation of the traditional feudal structures (based on the command-compliance idea) and the continued supremacy of the Muslim landed aristocracy in the North West part of

undivided India in return for the support of the Muslim privileged class.[206] Thus, in 1857, when the Muslims of the North Central parts revolted against their colonial masters, their co-religionists in the North West refrained from supporting the revolt, and went a step further by helping the British in suppressing it.[207]

It is clear from my above account that the British colonial masters were careful to "civilise the natives" of the subcontinent only to the extent that it served their imperial interests. Traditional patterns and cultural orientations which were considered conducive to the colonial interests of the British were not only sustained, but also further strengthened. Thus, akin to the manner in which the traditional feudal structures in the North West part of British India were left relatively undisturbed, the period of British rule in India did not witness any dilution in the "we-they" mentality of the Muslims. In fact, the British "divide and rule" policy in the subcontinent aggravated the situation and deliberately pitted the Muslims and the Hindus against each other - thereby enhancing the Muslim sense of insecurity vis-à-vis the Hindu majority population.

The nature of British rule in India also served to reassert, though in a somewhat altered form, the traditional Muslim emphasis on the military's role in politics. The colonial regime relied heavily on the "internal security"

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[206] S.J. Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making (Karachi, London: Westview, 1986), p.20.
[207] Ibid.

functions of the army to ensure its sustained survival. In this connection, the martial spirit of the Muslims was recognised as a useful resource by the British, and the district of Rawalpindi and other surrounding areas which are currently within the territorial boundaries of Pakistan functioned as important recruiting grounds for the British army in the nineteenth and early part of the twentieth century.[200] Thus, the military as a means to maintain public order - common to Muslims since the earliest of times - continued, ironically enough, as a political reality in the subcontinent under the "civilised" British.

E. Epilogue

At the dawn of independence in 1947, the Indian Muslim community, now organised under the banner of Pakistan, reflected ideas and political orientations derived from doctrinaire Islam, the Hindu environment in the subcontinent and the British presence in the region. What emerged as the end product of this socialisation process of several centuries was a political culture which was heterogenous in nature, and which reflected Islamic values (emerging from the doctrinaire level) - but was also embossed with the concepts of democracy (due to the British influence) and the Hindu notions of class/caste distinctions. Furthermore, the exact nature of the mix between the Islamic/Arabian, democratic/Western, and Hindu/Indian components was not

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[200] Ibid., p.56.

identical throughout the entire Pakistani population.

Pakistan in 1947 thus constituted a polity which claimed a common adherence to Islam, but failed to demonstrate a common understanding on the desired role of Islam in the politics of Pakistan. Those Pakistanis who had been exposed to western ideas and a secular lifestyle manifested an eclectic perspective vis-à-vis Islam and were generally inclined to be supportive of notions of democracy - as introduced to them during the period of British colonial rule in undivided India. Others, however, on account of their traditional lifestyles and limited exposure to the outside influence of the west, emphasized the importance of strictly adhering to the dictates of doctrinaire Islam and of replicating the type of polity which existed during Muhammad's lifetime and the Rashidun period. This was viewed by the conservative elements within Pakistani society as being the desired destiny of the state of Pakistan. These competing perspectives continued to prevail and served to provide the platform upon which the "drama" of Pakistani politics unfolded. Chapter 4 examines the nature of this drama with specific reference to the manner in which authoritarianism and military rule in Pakistan was influenced by the shifting balance of power between the western-oriented elements and the fundamentalist factions existing within the body polity of Pakistan.

IV. The Nature of Rule in Pakistan

A. Introduction

> Pakistan is like Israel, an ideological state. Take out Judaism from Israel and it will fall like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse. [209]
>
> Ziaul Huq

The above mentioned position of Pakistan's former President, though comparing, interestingly enough, Israel and Pakistan, reflects nonetheless the manner in which Islam has ever so often entered the political discourse in Pakistan. It also manifests the long-standing proclivity of the Pakistani leadership to refer to the relationship between Islam and the concept of Pakistan. All this does not, however, alter the reality that, since Pakistan's creation in 1947, the political scene in Pakistan has witnessed a near endless continuum of dialogue, debate and dissension on how to give practical meaning and substance to the Islamic identity of Pakistan. The origins of this debate can be traced back to the very fact that Islam, at the doctrinaire level, contains no definite theory of state.[210] Furthermore, Islam in the Indo-Pakistani context, in addition to being influenced by inputs emerging from the doctrinaire level, also became overlaid with the Indian/Hindu and British/western influence. Reference in

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[209] Economist, 12 December 1981, p.32.
[210] This has been discussed in chapter 2.

this regard has already been made in chapter 3, and I had mentioned how cultural inputs emerging from the indigenous context in India had contributed to create an Islamic political culture in the subcontinent which was essentially heterogenous in nature. It was also observed that although the western-oriented elements amongst Pakistani Muslims[2''] were more familiar with and also somewhat supportive of notions of secular democracy, albeit of a colonial and somewhat flawed nature, such a political perspective did not appeal to the sensibilities of the Islamists. In a culture and climate such as this, political harmony was commonly "invoked" by the Pakistani political elite by paying, on the one hand, homage and lip service to both Islam and democracy, and, on the other hand, administering the affairs of state in an authoritarian manner.

The form of political facade, as mentioned above, was initiated by the founder of Pakistan, Jinnah himself. In

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[2''] The term "secularist" has been employed in this chapter to refer to those Pakistanis who were secular-minded and western oriented, and to distinguish them from the "Islamists." Both secularists and Islamists subscribed to the same religious faith, viz. Islam, but their attitude and orientation vis-à-vis Islam and politics differed. Secularist Muslims were inclined to be eclectic in outlook and manifest a somewhat multifaceted view on life which, though not necessarily ignoring or denigrating Islam, was not overly preoccupied with it. Furthermore, the slogan of Islam was often viewed by the secularists as being a useful tool to attain political goals and objectives which were essentially mundane and "this worldly." The secularists have, for the most part, comprised the political elite in power in Pakistan, and their outlook is best exemplified by Jinnah's leadership style, as discussed in the following pages of this chapter.

In sharp contrast to the secularists, the Islamists were more inclined to be fundamentalist oriented and emphasized the Islamisation of politics.

terms of personal orientations and lifestyle, Jinnah was secularist and western-oriented. This did not, however, preclude him from adopting the mantle of a Muslim and venturing into the realm of religious politics by supporting, in the later stages of the Pakistan movement, the creation of an "ulema-inspired" political party (Jamiat-ul-ulema-e-Pakistan) headed by Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Usmani. A political posture such as this was assumed by the secularist-oriented Jinnah in order to win over the predominantly conservative and religiously oriented Muslims residing in the Muslim majority regions of the North West part of British India, and thereby enhance the prospects of a Muslim League victory in the crucial elections of 1946. In this manner, Jinnah attempted and also succeeded in establishing the Muslim League's claim to be the sole representative of the Muslims in undivided India. Similarly, notwithstanding the primarily secularist thrust of Jinnah's political programme for Pakistan, the facade of Islam was upheld in several of his public statements announcing that the concept of Pakistan was synonymous with the "essential principles of Islam,"[212] and that the Quranic enunciations had relevance to ".... every act, speech and movement from the ceremonies of religion to those of daily life...."[213] Jinnah's ambivalence, bordering on a lack of serious concern

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[212]Jinnah's speech of February 1948, as cited in A. Husain, "From Nationhood to Umma: The Struggle of Islam in Pakistan," Asian Thought and Society, 5, 13 (April, 1980), p.48.

[213]A. Iqbal, Islamisation of Pakistan (Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delli, 1984), p.44.

about the inclusion of Islamic principles in the actual management of the affairs of state in Pakistan, is, however, obvious from other statements made by Jinnah in which it was categorically indicated that religion was "strictly a matter between God and man,"[214] and that Pakistan would be "a modern democratic state, with sovereignty residing with the people."[215]

Under Jinnah, democracy in Pakistan, akin to Islam, did not have much of an opportunity to develop. Studies on Jinnah's leadership style refer to his "ivory tower" approach to decision-making and to his conscious efforts to remain "aloof and above the politics of mass passion."[216] Mass politics in "illiterate societies" was considered by Jinnah as being undesireable,[217] and the masses were perceived by him as being peripherally important to Pakistani politics. Evidence to this effect is available from the position adopted by Jinnah on various political issues. For example, on 21 March 1948, Jinnah, while addressing a public rally of over 300,000 people in Dhaka, the capital city of the predominantly Bengali-speaking East Pakistan, proclaimed: "... let me make it very clear to you that the state language is going to be Urdu and no other language."[218] An utterance such as this by the very founder

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[214] Statement made in Bombay in 1943. See ibid., p.32.
[215] Ibid., p.33.
[216] S.M.M. Qureshi, "The Consolidation of Leadership in the Last Phase of the Politics of the All India Muslim League," Asian Profile 1, 2 (October, 1973), p.305.
[217] Ibid.
[218] M.A. Jinnah, Speeches as Governor-General of Pakistan: 1947-48 (Karachi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), p.86.

of Pakistan reflected in no unclear terms the relative "insignificance" of the masses in the eyes of Jinnah.[219]

The immediate post-independence period in Pakistan also witnessed the instituting of a "one-man" style of leadership under Jinnah. Thus, in addition to occupying the office of Governor General, Jinnah singlehandedly served as the leader of the Constituent Assembly and the Muslim League. Furthermore, Jinnah made it a point to be personally responsible for selecting the prime minister and the members of the cabinet.[220] In this manner, very little scope was provided for anyone, other than Jinnah himself, to participate in the shaping of Pakistan's political path.

B. Political Rule in Pakistan: The Post-Jinnah Decade

In the period following Jinnah's death in 1948, Pakistan was faced with a serious political vacuum. The autocratic pattern of governing instituted by Jinnah had precluded a second-rung of political leadership to evolve. Added to this, the newly emergent state was still ill equipped to cope with the competing demands of the forces of democracy and Islam. The pioneer leadership in Pakistan, in responding to the responsibility of having to define

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[219]Continuing controversies over the language issue and the inability/unwillingness of the West Pakistani-based federal establishment to effectively incorporate popular sentiments in the formulation of language policies contributed to growing domestic dissent in East Pakistan and culminated in the eventual break-up of the eastern part of the country in 1971.

[220]R. Gandhi, Eight Lives: A Study of the Hindu Muslim Encounter (New York: State University of New York Press, 1986), p.129.

Pakistan's destiny in the post-Jinnah period, adopted the approach instituted by the founder of Pakistan himself, and incorporated thereby the trappings of both democracy and Islam in the constitutional documents which were formulated during this period. For instance, the Objectives Resolution (1949), though acknowledging God's Sovereignty over the entire universe, also stated that authority had been delegated "to the State of Pakistan through its people... wherein the State shall exercise its power and authority through the chosen representatives of the people...."[221] In addition, the Objectives Resolution explicity indicated that "... the principles of democracy... as enunciated by Islam shall be fully observed...."[222]

The ambiguity in the Objectives Resolution regarding how the principles of democracy and representative government could be meshed in with the idea of the Supreme Sovereignty of God impeded progress both in the path of Islam and the cause of democracy. Further, the masses were not provided with adequate opportunity to influence the shaping of the country's destiny in the first decade of Pakistan's political history. Justification for this was provided by the pioneer politicians in the following manner:

> The masses of this country are overwhelmingly illiterate.... They are bound to act foolishly sometimes.... It was thus necessary, in fact, essential, that there should be somebody to rectify their blunders.[223]

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[221] Iqbal, Islamisation of Pakistan, p.42.
[222] Ibid.
[223] Statement of Iskander Mirza, the then Minister of Interior (and the future Governor General of Pakistan), as

The concept of "controlled democracy"[224] - which in essence amounted to an autocratic style of administration - was also an idea which much influenced the attitude of the pioneer politicians vis-à-vis the masses.

The 1956 Constitution of Pakistan did not alter the situation significantly, and while Pakistan was proclaimed to be officially a democratic state founded on the principles of Islam, neither the democratic spirit nor the Islamic content was sufficiently reflected in the manner in which the country was governed.[225]

The Islamists could hardly be expected to be satisfied for too long by mere symbolics and innocuous insertions in the constitutional documents referring to the Islamic nature of Pakistan's political framework. Added to this, they were cognisant of the fact that the bulk of their 22-point formula, as enunciated in 1951 on the basis of an unanimous agreement between the various Islamist groups, had failed to be incorporated in the constitutional framework of Pakistan.[226] The growing distrust between the secularists who were at the helm of political affairs in Pakistan and the Islamists reached a crisis situation over the Ahmadi issue in 1953. Demands were made by the Islamists that the Ahmadis be declared as non-Muslims,[227] and the violence instigated by Muslim fanatics against the members of the

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[223](cont'd) cited in Dawn, 31 October, 1954.
[224]Iqbal, Islamisation of Pakistan, p.57.
[225]See ibid, pp.65-74 and Husain, op.cit., p.51.
[226]For details regarding the recommendations of the ulema, see Iqbal, Islamisation of Pakistan, pp.51-53.
[227]Reference to this issue has also been made in chapter 3.

Ahmadi community almost paralysed the government. The might of the Islamist to mobilise the masses, as evidenced during the Ahmadi crisis, could hardly be ignored by the secularist leadership in Pakistan, and a court of inquiry constituted to investigate into the Ahmadi crisis categorically stated that:

> If there is one thing which has been conclusively demonstrated in this inquiry is that provided you can persuade the masses to believe that something they are asked to do is religiously right or enjoined by religion, you can set them to any course of action, - regardless of all considerations of morality or civic sense.[223]

The secularists, in responding to the situation caused by the Islamist agitation adopted a "get-tough" policy. The military was beckoned to maintain law and order, and the religious troublemakers and their accomplices were arrested, convicted and imprisoned. In this connection, it is noteworthy to observe that, amongst those Islamists who experienced the wrath of the secularists was the then Jamat-i-Islami chief Maulana Maududi. He was sentenced to death for his alleged complicity in the 1953 disturbances - but this sentence was later commuted by the political leadership in Pakistan.

While Maududi's death sentence and several other convictions were later commuted due to political considerations (or acts of mercy, as the government preferred to call them), no significant concessions were

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[223]For details, see Report of the Court of Inquiry Constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954 to Enquire into the Punjab Disturbances of 1953 (Lahore: Government Printing Office, 1954), p.285. Commonly known as the Munir Report.

made to the Islamists over the Qadiani issue itself. Neither did Prime Minister Nazimuddin declare the Qadianis as a non-Muslim minority, nor did he dismiss Zafarullah Khan (a Qadiani) from the Foreign Ministry - as demanded by the Islamists. The government's firmness vis-à-vis the Islamists was, however, made possible only on account of the military's "willingness" to assist the politicians in subduing the potential troublemakers. In this manner, the military gained gradual inroads into the political arena.

By now, the Pakistani populace had become totally disillusioned not only with the secular oriented leadership and their program for western type democracy in Pakistan, but also with the political ideas which they professed and claimed to represent. In other words, political infighting and ineptness, as witnessed in the early period of Pakistan's existence as an independent, sovereign state became commonly associated in the minds of the masses with the concept of parliamentary democracy, and the political stewardship of Pakistan under a civilian leadership. The Pakistani cabinet was constituted, dissolved and reconstituted over half a dozen times in the post-Jinnah decade, and Pakistan, during this period, was treated more like a fiefdom by those at the helm of political affairs.[22] In this manner, democracy, over a period of time, became

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[22] For a good account of the manner in which the affairs of state were administered during this period, see H. Yusuf, Pakistan In Search of Security: 1947-1977 (Lahore: Afrasia Publications, 1980), pp.24-53; and Stephens, op.cit., pp.231-247.

completely discredited, and the military (under General Ayub) was thus able to invoke authoritarian rule in Pakistan in 1958, and portray it as a cleansing process to rid Pakistani politics of its ills. And the populace at this juncture had little reason not to believe that authoritarianism - under the supervision of the military - might, indeed, provide them with prospects for a better and more rosy future. Furthermore, to the extent that the Islamic political culture (as observed earlier in this study) was essentially authoritarian-military in nature, the military junta of Ayub was, for all practical purposes, operating on political turf which was already acclimatised culturally to the idea of a position of prominence for the military in the political process.

C. The Ayub Era: Decade of Development or Western Decadence?

Ayub Khan seized power with the professed intent of putting the country "on an even keel."[230] In a radio address on 7 October 1958, Ayub accused the Pakistani politicians of having exploited the "sacred name" of Islam for political benefits,[231] and, in chalking a new path for Pakistan, rapid economic development, rather than Islam, was aggressively peddled by Ayub as being the proper way of promoting the well-being of the masses and enhancing the level of unity amongst Pakistanis. In fact, soon after coming to power, Ayub decided (on 10 October 1958) to drop the word "Islamic"

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[230] Syed, op.cit., p.103.
[231] Ibid.

from the country's official name,[232] and the Constitution of Pakistan, as originally formulated by Ayub, referred to Pakistan as the Republic of Pakistan - rather than the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. Such attempts by Ayub to manifestly provide Pakistan with a secular and development oriented mentality - devoid of the Islamic content - created much anguish and annoyance amongst Islamist groups such as the Jamat-i-Islami.[233]

Ayub's alienation of religious groups was not limited to the question of Pakistan's official name. The introduction of the Family Laws Ordinance in 1961 - aimed at regulating polygamy and divorce - also resulted in a storm of controversy. At the helm of this opposition to Ayub's de-Islamisation program was again the Jamat-i-Islami, and the government responded to such continued opposition by banning the Jamat-i-Islami in January 1964.[234] As part of this intolerant attitude vis-à-vis dissenters, and in keeping with its authoritarian nature, the government also imposed press controls, student and worker unrests were dealt with severely, and political repression was effectively executed.[235] In this manner, the Ayub regime

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[232] Ibid.

[233] Mounting pressure from the fundamentalists eventually led to constitutional amendments aimed at correcting the affront caused. See ibid.

[234] The Jamat-i-Islami was declared as an unlawful association and banned under the Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908. For details, see H. Feldman, From Crisis to Crisis: Pakistan (1962-1969) (London, Lahore, Karachi, Dacca: Oxford University Press, 1972), p.66.

[235] For details see T. Ali, Pakistan: Military Rule or People's Power, pp.122-124.

left no stone unturned to severely restrict the ability of opposition groups to combat the ruling junta in the political arena. The "brunt" of Ayub's modernisation program, however, was borne by the Islamist groups in Pakistan, who were viewed as impediments to progress and prosperity. In countering their influence upon the Muslim masses in Pakistani society, model sermons (khutbas) were developed for Friday prayers and the Islamists were "advised" by Ayub to ponder upon the factors that had imprisoned "the dynamic and ceaseless spirit of Islam in a lifeless and motionless mold."[236] In providing his personal perspective on this issue, Ayub also suggested that it was improper to expect the twentieth century Muslim to "go back several centuries"[237] to qualify as a practicing Muslim.[238]

Ayub's approach to Islam was fairly typical of the westernised and secular oriented elements within the Pakistani army. The issues which were on the top of the government agenda under Ayub pertained mainly to "this worldly" types of concerns such as economic growth and development. The Islamists, however, far from identified with such policy priorities and goals, and this is clearly reflected in Maududi's analysis of the impediments to Islamisation in Pakistan. Writing in his major work Islamic Law and Constitution, Maududi crisply questioned:

Can an irreligious state, with Westernised people at

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[236]Cited in Syed, op.cit., p.105. Also see Husain, op.cit., p.52.
[237]Syed, op.cit., p.105.
[238]For details see ibid., pp.104-106.

> its helm, do this job? Will the persons well versed only in running bars and nightclubs and movie houses spend their energies in constructing and maintaining the Mosques? If the answer is in the affirmative, it will indeed be a unique experiment of its kind in human history....[239]

Maududi's statement indicates that the Islamists found little hope for the establishment of an Islamic system under either Ayub or other secular-oriented and western trained leaders. Their frustrations, however, failed to attain fruition in the form of Ayub's ouster as long as the military stood behind him. When Ayub first came to power, he did not hesitate to acknowledge that his authority "lay ultimately with the power of the sword,"[240] and even after Martial Law was lifted in 1962, Ayub continued to rely heavily upon the support of the military to neutralise and reckon with serious challenges to his rule.[241]

In addition to relying upon the military to sustain his regime, Ayub, in dealing with the Islamists, increasingly adopted policies aimed at impinging upon the Islamists' terrain and at undermining their claim that his regime represented western decadence. Reference has already been made to the model khutbas which were prepared in order to influence the Muslim mind at the mass level. Also, in

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[239] S.A.A. Maududi, Islamic Law and Constitution (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1960), p.105. For an excellent commentary on Maududi's perspective, see C.J. Adams, "Maududi and the Islamic State," in Voices of Resurgent Islam, ed. J.L. Esposito (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp.99-133.

[240] For details, see R. Jahan, Pakistan: Failure in National Integration (New York, London: Columbia University Press, 1972), p.61.

[241] See ibid.

attempting to portray Islam in a manner which would legitimise, in religious terms, Ayub's modernisation efforts, research institutes were advised to actively advocate modernist interpretations of Islam. And, notwithstanding Ayub's earlier attempts to drop the term "Islamic" from the official name of Pakistan, the newly constructed capital city was named Islamabad and the Preamble to the 1962 constitution acknowledged Allah's Sovereignty over the entire universe.[242]

Political opposition to Ayub's regime, however, continued to mount. On the religious front, the Islamist remained unconvinced about Ayub's "Islamisation facade," and the Jamat-i-Islami opted in favour of making the "difficult" choice of supporting a female candidate (Fatima Jinnah)[243] against Ayub's attempts to obtain the mandate of the masses in the mid-sixties. The failure to deliver on the economic front, despite the "decade of development," further undermined Ayub's credibility amongst the masses. Subsistence level existence, abject poverty and growing inequities continued to stare the masses in the face.[244] The period of "Guided Democracy," in other words, had

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[242]The framers of the 1962 constitution nonetheless attempted, as advised by Ayub, to dilute the Islamic content in comparison with the 1956 constitution. See Syed, op.cit., pp.103-104; Iqbal, Islamisation of Pakistan, pp.75-83.

[243]The Jamat-i-Islami, in public statements, clarified that, although a female's candidature for the top political office in an Islamic state was normally unacceptable, Ayub's excesses had necessitated such a choice.

[244]For details, see K.B. Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp.54-63.

contributed to take the masses no farther away from the abyss of economic misery. The situation became all the more severe after the September 1965 Indo-Pakistani war. The war losses and the consequent strains on the economy added to the erosion of public confidence in Ayub's abilities to deliver to them the "fruits of development." Under these circumstances, the promise of development made by Ayub was increasingly perceived by the populace as representing what the Islamist had always portrayed it to be, viz. western decadence.

Ayub's military coup had been staged on the grounds that the civilian leadership in Pakistan was both inept and corrupt. Added to this, Ayub had emphasized his regime's commitment to a program of rapid economic development. To the extent that Ayub's program for prosperity in Pakistan had not really benefited the teeming masses,[245] they not only failed to identify with Ayub's brand of modernisation, but also over a period of time became embittered over the rapidly growing economic inequities. The opponents of Ayub, including the Islamists, made political capital out of this, and by the second half of the sixties, the band-wagon of anti-Ayub forces continued to grow and anti-Ayub

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[245]The Ayub regime's Chief Economist, Mahbubul Haq, in a speech delivered at Karachi in April 1968, outlined how distributive justice had not been a prime objective of the government either in the second (1960-1965) or in the third (1965-170) five year development plans. The growing inequities contributed to an impression in the public's mind that the regime had failed in its economic task. For details, see S.J. Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto, 1971-1977 (London and Basingstoke, 1980), pp.63-66..

demonstrations became a daily affair in Pakistan. This was a clear indication that the Ayub regime had utterly failed to carry the masses along with its program for Pakistan's modernisation. In light of such a political reality, the military stepped into the political scene and, following Ayub's "honourable" exit, a replacement was again provided from within the ranks of the military. Thus, the very force which was behind Ayub's coming to power in 1958 was, in the final analysis, responsible for his replacement. In this manner, the importance of the military - rather than the Islamists or the masses - as the final source of authority in Pakistani politics became clearly established.

D. The Bhutto Era: People's Rule or Police State?

The Bhutto era in the politics of Pakistan was heralded in somewhat unusual circumstances. Ayub's resignation and the imposition of Martial Law by his successor, General Yahya Khan, was followed by a series of political crises in Pakistan - beginning with the rising tension between the two political parties (the People's Party and the Awami League) which had emerged as the major contendors for political power in the December 1970 elections. The next several months witnessed a civil war in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), the humiliating defeat of the Pakistani military in the December 1971 war with India and the emergence of Bangladesh from the erstwhile East Pakistan. A political backdrop such as this provided Bhutto the

opportunity to lead the now dismembered western part of Pakistan.

Bhutto's popularity with the masses was, at this stage, his primary source of authority. His tenure of the top political office had, amongst other "momentous" events, begun with an electoral victory, and the Party platform which was employed to attain this victory emphasized

"Islam is our faith"

"Democracy is our polity"

"Socialism is our economy"

"All power to the people".[244]

The party platform of the People's Party, as formulated by Bhutto, is indicative of the leadership's attempts to ensure that the Islamic element of the political culture of Pakistanis was not ignored. Thus, in addition to ideas such as socialism and democracy, Islam was also carefully grafted onto the basic ideology of the People's Party. In this manner, the blunders made by Ayub, in failing to incorporate Islam adequately in his political program, were not repeated by Bhutto. Also, in sharp contrast to Ayub's idea of "guided democracy" - which provided the populace the "option" only to passively follow the leadership - Bhutto defined democracy in his public slogans in terms of the people themselves being the source of power and authority. In this context, the political slogan Roti, Kapra Aur Makan (Food,

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[244] Z.A. Bhutto, Political Situation in Pakistan (Pakistan People's Party Political Series No. 1) (Lahore: M.H. Ramay, 1968), p.17.

Clothing and Shelter) was skilfully employed to provide the masses, despite their present predicaments and problems, with the hope and promise for a better future. The "twenty-two" family theory, according to which the misery of the masses was due to the exploitation of a limited number of wealthy families in Pakistan was also popularised by Bhutto and the stopping of such exploitation was posited as being the solution to the people's economic woes.[247]

The inability of Bhutto to deliver on his economic promises served a serious blow to his continued popularity amongst the masses.[248] Promises had been made by Bhutto during his anti-Ayub movement and also as part of his election campaign that, unlike the Ayub period, his primary goal was to improve the lot of the "have-nots," rather than line the pockets of the already wealthy. In this context, the hopes of the peasants were raised by pledges that, under the People's Party leadership, they would own the lands they currently tilled for the landlords. Similarly, the factory workers were made to believe that Bhutto's brand of socialism would lead to ownership of factories by the workers themselves. While promises to improve the lot of the average Pakistani by ensuring a better and more equitable redistribution of wealth might, indeed, have been a useful political slogan to generate mass support, Bhutto's public pronouncements rarely took into consideration the reality of

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[247]Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making, p.113.
[248]For details regarding the mounting urban unrest, as occurred during Bhutto's rule, see Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change, pp.157-164.

Pakistan's position as a Third World nation where the resources fell far short of what was needed to meet the basic necessities of life. In this sense, the chances that the heightened expectations of the masses could, in fact, be effectively satisfied by Bhutto's administration (or, for that matter, by any other government) were near to impossible. The masses had already experienced unfulfilled promises under Ayub, and Bhutto's inability to deliver on his economic promises made him, in the eyes of the masses, no better than Ayub. It was this type of mind-set of the masses which had earlier precipitated Ayub's ouster, and, once again, the Islamists made most of this opportunity to undermine Bhutto's popular authority and subsequently precipitate his overthrow.

The Islamists had always been suspicious of Bhutto's socialism - which was considered by them as being the anti-thesis of Islam.[249] In attempting to neutralise the Islamist's allegation that socialism went against the very spirit of Islam,[250] Bhutto had, during his 1970 election campaign and also in the 1972-77 period, made several political maneuvers and compromises. Reference has already been made to the manner in which Islam was incorporated alongside socialism in the People's Party manifesto in order

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[249]During the 1970 election campaign in Pakistan, Maududi was reported as having threatened that those who espoused socialism would have their tongues severed.

[250]Islamist groups in Pakistan, such as the Jamat-i-Islami, fervently believe that socialism is "ungodly" in nature, and thus consider it to be incompatible with the basic precepts of Islam.

to make the manifesto more palatable to the populace. Charges that socialism was against the basic tenets were countered with political rhetoric equating the People's Party version of Islamic socialism with musawat-i-Muhammadi (equality as preached by Muhammad). In addition, the 1973 constitution contained a categorical statement (unlike the 1956 and 1962 constitutions) asserting that "Islam shall be the State religion of Pakistan,"[251] and that laws repugnant to the essence of Islam would not be allowed in Pakistan.[252] A Council of Islamic Ideology was also constituted to make recommendations to the government about ways and means to allow Pakistani Muslims to order their lives - individually and collectively - in accordance with their religious beliefs. On the basis of these "Islamic provisions," contained in Part IX of the 1973 constitution,[253] Bhutto managed to obtain the endorsement of the various religiously inspired parties in Pakistan (including the Jamat-i-Islami) for his constitutional proposals which came into effect officially on 14 August 1973.[254]

Acceptance of Bhutto's constitution by the religious groups and parties did not, however, lead to their acceptance of his leadership. The Jamat-i-Islami and other politically active Islamic groups emphasized that the leader

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[251]For details, see The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973) (Karachi: Government of Pakistan, 1975), p.3; Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making, p.72.
[252]Iqbal, Islamisation of Pakistan, pp.153-154.
[253]The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (1973), pp.70-72.
[254]Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making, p.71.

of the Muslim community must necessarily be a devout and dedicated Muslim. And given Bhutto's western-type lifestyle, taste for alcohol, public pronouncements in favour of socialism and other such "deficiencies," he clearly did not qualify as a good Muslim in the eyes of the fundamentalist elements in Pakistan. Bhutto's "loose" lifestyle had already been made a political issue during the 1970 election campaign, and was again publicly denounced by the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) - formed in light of Bhutto's plan to conduct a general election in 1977. Demands for the establishment of a genuinely Islamic state in Pakistan also gained momentum in the later years of the Bhutto regime.[255]

In dealing with the demands for the creation of an Islamic state and the mounting allegations regarding his un-Islamic lifestyle and practices, Bhutto attempted to boost his personal image and gain political advantage by making additional concessions to the Islamists. Reference has already been made earlier in this study[256] to Bhutto's 1974 decision to declare the Ahmadis as non-Muslims. This was intended to defuse the demands of the Jamat-i-Islami and other activist Islamic groups in Pakistan - thereby denying them the opportunity to make any further political capital out of this issue. Similarly, in spring 1976, the long-standing attempts of the Islamist groups to maintain a monopoly over religious matters was undermined by Bhutto's decision to invite the imams of Mecca and Medina - the two

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[255]Syed, op.cit., p.127.
[256]See chapter 3.

holiest places of Islam - to Pakistan. Measures supportive of Islam, as initiated by Bhutto, also included the funding of an international conference on the life of the Prophet Muhammad, the placing of copies of the Quran in all first class hotels in the country, the closing of all night clubs, the banning of gambling and sale of liquor to Muslims, and declaring Friday, rather than Sunday, as the official holiday in Pakistan.[257]

The ability of the Islamist to extract political concessions from the "socialist moderniser" is more than amply demonstrated by the instances mentioned in the above paragraph. The rising tide of demands made by the Islamists, however, was not contained by these concessions, and their attempts to undermine Bhutto's political viability continued unabated. The Bhutto administration was not entirely unprepared for such an eventuality, and measures had already been taken to enhance Bhutto's powers to resort to, if required, coercive tactics in the political arena. Constitutionally, Bhutto had equipped himself with near absolute powers by making the Prime Minister's recommendation binding upon the President and by ensuring that members of his own party did not have much legal recourse to invoke a vote of no-confidence.[258] Also, in 1973, Bhutto had taken a personal initiative in facilitating the creation of a Federal Security Force along the lines of

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[257]Syed, op.cit., p.127.
[258]For details, see discussion on Article 96(5) of the 1973 constitution in Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change, p.105.

the secret police SAVAK of the former Iranian Shah. Justification for this was provided by the Minister of Interior during the National Assembly debates. It was argued that "efforts have been made all along to topple this Government by disturbances, by language riots, by spreading regional feelings, by growing hatred, sectarian hatreds,"[239] and, in this manner, the creation of the FSF was portrayed as being unavoidable. In tangible terms, however, the FSF was intended to permit the Bhutto regime to perpetuate the authoritarian-type policies of past establishments, and, at the same time, reduce the level of dependence on the military as an instrument of political intimidation and coercion. More succinctly put, Bhutto wished to relegate the military to a position of playing a "supportive" role in the political process - in sharp contrast to the "overseer"-type function which was performed by it under Ayub and Yahya. In working towards attaining this political objective, Bhutto, in less than three months after having assumed power in December 1971, promulgated and put in place an "anti-coup d'état" plan. The positions of the commander-in-chief for the army, navy and airforce were abolished, and the military was placed under the direct command of the civilian leadership. In this manner, an attempt was made by Bhutto to ensure that the military would, indeed, serve the function of assisting the authoritarian-type civilian leadership - without assuming an "overseer"-type of role for itself.[240]

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[239] Ibid., p.107.
[240] Burki, Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971-1977, pp.68-71.

The political climate in Pakistan, however, precluded Bhutto from being able to effectively limit the level and nature of involvement of the armed forces in the political process. Charges and counter-charges regarding attempts to harass and even assassinate political opponents became increasingly heard in the Pakistani political scene, and violence and confrontation - rather than an accommodative approach - to deal with domestic dissent gradually emerged as the order of the day in the later years of the Bhutto era.[241] It was in this politically volatile climate that the 1977 general elections were conducted. The landslide victory of the Pakistan People's Party[242] - and the opposition's allegations regarding election rigging by Bhutto's political henchmen - precipitated a rapidly evolving political crisis between the People's Party and the combined opposition, operating under the banner of the Pakistan National Alliance. The PNA - at the forefront of which was the Jamat-i-Islami - cried foul, refused to negotiate with the PPP, took to the streets and, in the final analysis, demanded the resignation of Bhutto. Such a non-accommodatory approach vis-à-vis one's political opponents was not atypical of the Pakistani political scene, and the failure of the "Islamist-inspired" PNA and the secularists to reckon adequately with their political differences facilitated a return of the military to the political arena. Bhutto, in

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[241]For details, see Ziring, Pakistan: The Enigma of Political Development, pp.109-133.

[242]For election results, see ibid., pp.130-131 . Also, see Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making, p.74.

other words, was compelled to seek the direct assistance of the military to impose public order - despite his long-standing fears that "once the armed forces intervene they play the game according to their own rules."[263] The danger that the military would not settle for a mere "policing" responsibility under the supervision of the civilian leadership and would conduct a military coup was heightened due to public requests made in this regard by prominent opposition leaders. For instance, Asghar Khan of the Tehrik-i-Istiqlal party openly urged the military to oust Bhutto and to take over the reins of government in order to save the masses from the excesses of Bhutto's authoritarian-type and repressive administration.[264] The political climate was clearly conducive for the military's re-entry into politics. Under such circumstances, the successful implementation of "Operation Fairplay" - as the military coup spearheaded by Ziaul Huque was code named - contributed to Bhutto's ouster on 5 July 1977, a reimposition of martial law, and Bhutto's eventual execution on 4 April 1979. The masses, as always, continued to be primarily spectators to this "political" process, and to add to the irony, the political opponents of Bhutto, including the Islamists, hailed the military takeover and willingly accepted the reemergence of the military in Pakistani politics as the only "political alternative" under the given

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[263]Sayeed, Politics in Pakistan: The Nature and Direction of Change, p.107.
[264]Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making, p.69.

circumstances.

E. Ziaul Huq: Messiah or Military Dictator?

Ziaul Huq's ascendancy to power ushered in a new era of authoritarian rule under military supervision - after over a half decade of authoritarian-type rule under the civilian leadership of Bhutto. The first political task which Zia had to reckon with was to justify the military takeover, and in a radio address to the Pakistani nation on 5 July 1977 (the day when the takeover occurred), Zia, in his capacity as the Chief Martial Law Administrator, explained that the military had acted to save the nation from further chaos and crisis. It was also indicated by Zia that underlying the current chaos were contributory factors such as the adamant attitudes of the two major political actors, viz. the PPP and the PNA. The similarity in the reasons provided by Zia and those mentioned by Ayub earlier in 1958 (referred to in a previous section of this chapter) is difficult to ignore. The "saviour" role of the military, mentioned by Ayub during his military takeover, was now being repeated by Zia, and the military's resolve to refrain from entertaining political ambitions was reiterated in the following words:

> I want to make it absolutely clear that neither [do] I have any political ambitions nor does the army want to be taken away from its profession of soldiering.... My sole aim is to organise free and fair elections....[155]

Zia's promise to hold elections indicates a recognition by

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[155]Syed, op.cit., p.136.

the military dictator of the democratic dimension to the political culture of Pakistan. It is also suggestive that in the period immediately following the staging of his successful military coup, Zia had, indeed, pondered the possibility of using the democratic process. On second thought, however, Zia came to the realisation that the path of democracy was fraught with dangers, and fears that this may provoke a resurgence of pro-Bhutto sentiments (and even culminate in a possible Bhutto victory) led the military dictator to abandon the democratic path and capitalise upon the Islamic sentiments of the masses.

In attempting to make the masses identify with his military takeover, Zia, on the one hand, increasingly portrayed himself as a soldier of Islam, and, on the other hand, issued statements in subsequent years suggesting that the anti-Bhutto agitation of 1977 was "basically a voice of protest ... against un-Islamic trends."[216] The Islamisation campaign embarked upon by Zia ranged from punitive measures such as amputation of the right hand for theft to more protracted and pervasive efforts to restructure Pakistan's socio-economic infrastructure in accordance with the basic tenets of Islam.[217]

Zia's attempts to justify his authoritarian-military rule by portraying a "messiah" image of himself was also reflected in his public statements. In addressing the Islamic Ideology Council on 22 June 1981, he declared that

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[216] Iqbal, Islamisation of Pakistan, p.118.
[217] For details, see Syed, op.cit., p.143.

he and his colleagues had received a covenant from God and that "so long as Allah wants us to do our duties, we will do them."[268] Zia, in other words, was clearly stating that he was politically accountable to none other than the Supreme Sovereign, and that the masses did not have any say in this matter. Such an assumption and political orientation, though not contrary to the basic tenets of Islam, goes against the very grain of democratic principles. In lending legitimacy to such an authoritarian type approach to administration and in providing it with religious sanctification, Zia appointed a consultative council (majlis-i-shura) - comprised of 287 members - from various political factions, including the PPP.[269] Furthermore, in 1984 a national referendum was held in Pakistan under government supervision, and Zia was reported as having received a majority endorsement for governing for another five years.[270]

Some important dimensions of the 1984 referendum and its results deserve special mention. Firstly, the conducting of the referendum itself suggests a mounting pressure, as perceived by the Zia regime, to demonstrate that it did,

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[268] Ibid., p.142.

[269] It should be noted that the consultative council was severely limited in its functions and was restricted only to debating public issues - and again within pre-established limits.

[270] The voter was asked to answer "yes" or "no" to a question intended at gauging popular support for Zia's Islamisation programme. An answer in the affirmative was interpreted by the regime in power as an endorsement of Zia's leadership for another term. See R. LaPorte Jr., "Urban Groups and the Zia Regime," in Zia's Pakistan: Politics and Stability in a Frontline State, ed. C. Baxter (Boulder, London: Westview Press, 1985), p.13 and Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making, pp.85-87.

indeed, have the mandate of the masses. In socio-cultural terms, this can be explained in the context of the tradition of baya (extant in the Muslim history of seventh century Arabia), and also the exposure of Muslims of the subcontinent[277] to democratic ideas and principles during the period of British colonial rule.

The positive endorsement given to Zia, notwithstanding some controversy regarding the accuracy of the reported results, is another important dimension of the 1984 referendum. Some of the votes in favour of Zia can be attributed to his messiah image in the religious realm. It is important to note, however, that the growth rate of the economy during the Zia regime was higher than in the case of both the previous two regimes of Bhutto and Ayub.[278] Thus, it would not be inaccurate to postulate that, in addition to Zia's messiah image in the religious realm, his demonstrated ability to "deliver" in the economic domain contributed to make him the natural choice for the average voter in Pakistan.

Zia's popularity, as noted above, was also positively influenced by the cooptation policy adopted by the military vis-à-vis the Islamists. Several appointments to the federal cabinet, for instance, were made from within the ranks of

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[277]This was especially true in the case of Muslims resident in the north central part of British India and the vicinity of Delhi. Many of these Muslims eventually migrated to Pakistan in the post-1947 period.

[278]For economic indices pertaining to growth rates during the Ayub, Bhutto and Zia regimes, see J. Adams, "Pakistan's Economic Performance in the 1980s: Implications for Political Balance," in Baxter, op.cit., p.53.

the extreme right-wing Jamat-i-Islami.[373] Earlier, the Jamat-i-Islami had hailed the military takeover as being a step towards the attainment of an Islamic system in Pakistan, and the leader of the party, Mian Tufail Ahmad (also a relative of Zia) expressed support for Zia's policies. In a certain sense, this relationship between the Jamat-i-Islami and the Zia regime was a marriage of convenience. The Jamat-i-Islami, having failed repeatedly in the electoral process, now settled for "playing second fiddle" in the coalition-cabinet. From the perspective of the military, such a coalition cabinet permitted it to broaden its political base, ensure the support of the Islamists and also justify (even if not in strictly constitutional terms) somewhat its continued existence to both aid-donors in the West and those Pakistanis who were supportive of the electoral process in politics. Added to such common interests existing between the military regime of Zia and the Islamists in the Jamat-i-Islami, the ideological affinity between the two groups assisted the bonding of this relationship.

The policy of coopting different groups and sectors of Pakistani society into the military fold also occurred in the case of the economic elite in Pakistan - who had feared Bhutto's professed preference (in theory, if not in practice) for socialist principles. Thus, for instance, the process of denationalisation initiated by Zia served to

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[373] LaPorte Jr., "Urban Groups and the Zia Regime," in Baxter, op.cit., p.13.

promote a sense of common purpose between the military patrons and big business.[274]

Zia's policy of coopting the Jamat-i-Islami and other groups did not, however, reduce in any way his authoritarian controls upon policy formulation. The army continued to provide the principal prop to his regime, and the politicians from the Jamat-i-Islami were inducted into the cabinet only as junior partners. Their ability to participate effectively in the political process was undermined by permitting only individuals to seek membership of the legislative assembly and by prohibiting political parties from fielding candidates. This was legitimised on the grounds that, since Muslims constituted a single umma, party politics and political factionalism were un-Islamic practices. In this manner, a rather distorted version of representative government, which amounted to nothing short of authoritarianism under the tutelage of the military, was "invoked" by Zia, and was justified by reference to Islamic precepts.

The period following the February 1985 elections also witnessed Zia's promulgation of an order aimed at providing himself with constitutional safeguards to govern in an arbitrary manner and further concentrate power in his own hands. This was in preparation for the planned withdrawal of the military from the political arena (which occurred in

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[274]Robert LaPorte Jr. provides an overview picture on this issue and outlines the response of the various sectors of society to the Zia regime and its policies. See ibid., pp.14-15, p.20.

December 1985), and the replacement of "... Zia the military ruler by Zia the new civilian autocrat."[275] The end product of the constitutional changes invoked by Zia was aptly summed in The Muslim in the following words:

> Everybody is at his [the president's] mercy and he is at the mercy of providence alone.[276]

Zia's faithful allies in the Jamat-i-Islami were also unhappy over Zia's latest monopolisation of political power and the Executive Committee of the Jamat-i-Islami expressed shock and dismay over the fact that Zia had arbitrarily amended the constitution without waiting for the newly elected assembly to deliberate on this issue.[277] From a political culture and socio-historical perspective, however, Zia's approach to politics represented a continuation of the traditional Muslim pattern of rule - based on the concept of an imposition of decisions from above and unquestioned compliance from below.

Zia's ability to sustain himself politically, notwithstanding the parting of ways with the Islamists over his latest measures to further monopolise political power, was assured due to the military's continued support to his regime. It was this same support from his men-in-uniform which had permitted him earlier to go ahead with Bhutto's execution without much fear regarding the wrath of the faithful followers of the one-time powerful People's Party

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[275] Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making, p.91.
[276] See ibid. For some discussion on the constitutional changes, see Syed, op.cit., p.146.
[277] Burki, Pakistan: A Nation in the Making, p.91.

chief and head of state. And, notwithstanding reports regarding a 1984 coup attempt in which about forty officers were implicated,[277] the military, as a general rule, continued to stand behind Zia in the political front. This allowed him to survive politically for over a decade, and in July 1988, Zia publicly announced that national elections were scheduled for November. By now rumors were rife that Zia was, indeed, tired of politics and wanted to retire. Ironically enough, this was not how political transition occurred, and Zia's mysterious death in an airborne military aircraft which exploded in mid-air precipitated political change in Pakistan in the late eighties - bringing the Bhutto name once again to the forefront of Pakistani politics. While the factors underlying the "accidental" death of Zia still remain unexplained, it is amply clear that the November 1988 general election in Pakistan was possible only because the military chose not to find a replacement for Zia from within its own ranks, and was willing to allow the electoral process determine the future political leadership in Pakistan.[278] In this sense, the status of the military - as the ultimate source of authority

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[277] LaPorte Jr., "Urban Groups and the Zia Regime," in Baxter, op.cit., p.15.

[278] Reliable information is unavailable on the actual motives of the military in allowing the electoral process to operate. It is possible, however, that the military's decision to return to the barracks after its prolonged presence in the political arena was, in itself, a calculated move intended at "permitting" the politicians to create a political mess (as they had ever so often done in the past) - undermining thus the public image of the politicians and providing thereby the military with a renewed justification to re-enter the political arena.

- became manifest again in 1988, and reinforced the premise, which is basic to Pakistani politics, that the military as a political factor can never be ignored. The irony in this case, however, was that the same military which had stood behind Zia when he ousted Bhutto and initiated proceedings leading to his execution, had now become a party to the return of Bhutto's daughter Benazir, and also possibly had a hand in Zia's departure from the political scene.[200]

F. Benazir Bhutto: A Fragile Future for Female Leadership

The electoral victory of Benazir Bhutto in the November 1988 Pakistani elections represents a noticeable shift from the previous pattern of male dominance in Pakistani politics. This has, in addition to further complicating the relationship between the Islamist, military and the secular oriented civilian leadership in Pakistan, also somewhat reduced the prospects for constructive dialogue and possible cooperation, based on mutual respect, between the three parties. At the doctrinaire level, Islam designates men to be in charge of women,[201] and the Islamists in Pakistan have almost consistently maintained that a woman cannot be appointed as head of a Muslim state.[202] In the case of Benazir, the opposition by the

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[200]The author's communications with sources in Sind seem to suggest that some secular-oriented military men had possibly master-minded the "accident" which caused Zia's death.

[201]See verse 4:34 of the Quran

[202]The Jamat-i-Islami's endorsement of Fatima Jinnah's candidature in the 1965 Presidential elections against Ayub is possibly the only precarious exception in the post-1947 period.

Islamists is all the more intense due to her "socialist-indoctrination" (as received from her father Zulfikar Bhutto), and her pro-western orientation and lifestyle. Thus, it is highly unlikely that Benazir will ever receive the endorsement of the Jamat-i-Islami or, for that matter, any other fundamentalist-oriented group in Pakistan. The miserable failure of the fundamentalist Muslims in the November 1988 elections[283] has made their political presence in parliament of relatively limited importance. This does not, however, alter their potential to play havoc by inciting the populace - as demonstrated in the past. In this sense, the forces of Islam continue to have relevance to Benazir's political future, in particular, and to the pattern of Pakistani politics, in general.

In reckoning with the religio-political realities surrounding her, Benazir has demonstrated remarkable ability to adapt. Her recent marriage, the bearing of a child and the adoption of the "dupatta (scarf) ritual" to cover her head, as customary amongst Muslim women in South Asia, are all indications of her awareness of the need to reorient her public image for political advantage in a primarily conservative climate.

An effort to conciliate the Islamists was also part of the political strategy of her father during his period of

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[283] It may be interesting to note that Professor Ghafoor Ahmad, a prominent Jamat-i-Islami member, and General Secretary of the multi-party alliance Islami-Jamhoori-Itihad (Islamic Democratic Alliance), failed in his election bid for an Assembly seat. For election results, see Dawn, 18 November 1988, p.1.

leadership in Pakistan. This did not, however, generate any substantial political gains and added to the arrogance of the Islamists - a process which facilitated the military coup of 1977. If the past is any indicator to the future, Benazir is clearly treading on thin ice by attempting to conciliate the Islamists. Her options are, however, quite limited. Recent news reports from Pakistan seem to suggest that although the military is currently tolerating her, it has little respect for this thirty-five year old female head of government. The extent of the arrogance of the army is clearly illustrated by the fact that the army chief-of-staff has categorically and consistently refused to salute her in public.[***] Benazir is, however, politically helpless, and, being sandwiched between the military and the Islamist, she can ill-afford to either alienate the army or annoy the Islamist. Her political viability, under these circumstances, clearly depends upon her ability to mobilise the masses in her favour - thereby giving herself greater political clout to confront the military or the Islamist, if the situation so requires.

The chances that Benazir will, indeed, be able to forge closer links with the teeming masses, however, appear somewhat slim. On the contrary, the risks that, with the passage of time, the masses will turn against her seem quite high. The military continues to siphon off a sizeable amount of the national budget, and Benazir has so far maintained a

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[***]Reported in the CBC Journal, 8 March 1989.

hands-off policy in regards to the defence budget and refrained from proposing possible cuts. In fact, in recent statements, she has justified Pakistan's sizeable defence expenditures on the grounds of the nation's need for adequate safeguards against India. Although the military may be too powerful a "political" entity for Benazir to take on and challenge, and her decision to avoid meddling with the military budget might, indeed, avoid precipitating a military coup in the short run, the danger which she will eventually have to reckon with will be the growing alienation of her only group of supporters, viz. the masses - due to an excessive siphoning of funds to the military and a consequent decline in the economic well-being of the populace at large. This, in essence, would make her increasingly vulnerable to the Islamists' ability to mobilise the masses against her and would also permit the military to once again step into the political arena on the pretext of putting the country "on an even keel."

G. Political Rule in Pakistan: Concluding Comments

My review of the trends in the nature of political rule in Pakistan, as outlined in this chapter, indicates an oscillating pattern in the path of political development in Pakistan. Furthermore, it is amply clear that although Pakistan has, more often than not, been subjected to military rule and authoritarian type regimes, it has also experienced spells of democracy, the holding of free and

fair elections, and political slogans supportive of people's rule. Such a political hotch-potch can be accounted for in terms of the "indigenisation" of the Islamic political culture - as occurred in the Pakistani context, and the cross-currents which are present in this culture. From the doctrinaire level, cultural inputs tilt the Muslim mind towards obeying without question legitimate authority, perceiving the environment in "ingroup-outgroup" terms and providing a place of political prominence for the military. All these cultural attributes were identified in my theoretical framework as being indicative of a polity prone to authoritarianism and military rule, and a pattern of political culture similar to this became manifest again in the context of Muslim society in the subcontinent. Thus, the Islamic political culture in South Asia retained a primarily authoritarian-military ethos, and, in addition, became somewhat tempered due to a protracted exposure to certain cultural mores indigenous to the Indian subcontinent and to the period of British rule in the region. These cultural inputs originating from the local South Asian context added on to, but did not alter entirely, the original message of doctrinaire Islam. As a consequence of this evolution pattern of the Islamic political culture, Pakistani Muslims are not prone to instinctively militate against military rule and authoritarian forms of government, and yet are inclined to manifest some interest in democracy and the concept of civil and political rights. It is this ambivalent

nature of the Muslim mind in South Asia which has contributed to make political trends in Pakistan different from the unilinear path of authoritarianism and military rule observed in much of the Muslim world in the Middle East, and has even permitted, in contemporary times, a woman to become the head of the government in an Islamic state. It has also necessitated political leaders to employ hyphenated political slogans such as "Islamic democracy," "Islamic socialism," etc. in order to adequately cater for the diverse nature of demands which originate from the political culture.

In addition to the above, political rule in Pakistan, as my review in this chapter suggests, was much influenced by the nature of relationship between the Islamists, secularists and the military. In tangible terms, this translated itself into a game of political football, in which Islam served the function of the ball itself, and attainment of field advantage over one's competitors/opponents depended invariably upon how effectively one could maintain control of the ball. Ayub's failure to conform to the operating rules of the game of political football - Islamic style - compelled him to pay a heavy political price. In the period following the Ayub era, the Pakistani leader Bhutto, despite his professed preference for socialism, made major concessions to the Islamists in order to ensure that he did not unwittingly lose control of the "ball." The Zia regime, following

Bhutto's ouster, went a step further by permitting the Islamists to enter into a partnership with the military in the game of political football in Pakistan. In this manner, the secularists were cornered and put in a position of severe political disadvantage, and, as an outcome of this rather effective political strategy, the military managed to not only sustain itself politically for over a decade under Zia's leadership, but was also able to attain a fair degree of popularity amongst the religiously oriented elements in Pakistani society.

Instances of periodic cooperation between the military and the Islamists, or for that matter between the military and the secularists, as evidenced occasionally in Pakistan, did not, however, alter in any significant way the air of distrust which has generally pervaded the political atmosphere in Pakistan and made cooperation and meaningful negotiations between the Islamists, the military and the secularists somewhat difficult to sustain over protracted periods of time. Under circumstances such as these, Pakistan has continued to hurtle from one political crisis to another, and political change has, more often than not, been precipitated by political crises and sharp shifts in the balance of power between the above mentioned participants in the game of politics.

The political situation in Pakistan, characterised by abrupt breaks, sharp shifts and infighting amongst politicians, also served to provide the military with a

pretext to intervene and justify its predominance in the political arena. Statements made by Ayub and Zia, in establishing the political hegemony of the military,[***] emphasized the doctrine of necessity. More clearly stated, military rulers in Pakistan, in justifying coups and military takeovers, have argued that necessity makes lawful such actions which, under normal circumstances, would have been considered unlawful. In this manner, the ousting of popularly elected governments, and the replacement of authoritarian-type civilian administrations by authoritarian-military regimes was not only justified, but also accorded a respectable image. Further, the welfare of the people - as the supreme purpose of the state and its laws - was portrayed as being best served under military rule.[***]

A finding regarding the nature of politics and political rule in Pakistan which warrants mention is the question of the political plight of the Islamists at the polls. My review of the post-1947 events indicated that Pakistanis, in expressing their preferences at free and fair elections, as conducted in 1970 and again in 1988, have, on both occasions, opted in favour of the secularist-oriented People's Party, and have refrained from supporting the Islamists. The indigenisation of the Islamic political culture and the consequent introduction in South Asia of

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[***]I have referred to the nature of justification provided by Ayub and Zia earlier in this chapter.
[***]Syed, op.cit., p.138.

secular types of inputs due to the period of British rule in the region, may be posited as a plausible explanation (albeit partial)[2''] for the nature of voter preference, as identified above.[2''] It is important, however, to recognise that a failure by the political leadership in Pakistan to accommodate adequately for the Islamic component of the political culture of Pakistan and portray a popular image of being supportive of Islamic principles, has inevitably been tantamcunt to committing political suicide. In this sense, Islam, notwithstanding the impact of the Indian environment upon the Muslim psyche, has continued to influence, in varying degrees and divergent forms, both political events and also the nature of political rule in Pakistan.

[2'']Since voting behaviour is influenced, not only by political culture considerations, but also by a multitude of different factors (the state of the economy, the campaign strategies of the political contendors, organisational abilities of the political parties, to name a few), it is, in the opinion of the author, inadvisable to base one's conclusions regarding the importance of Islam to the political process in Pakistan purely on election results.

[2'']Such a view is expressed by S.M.M. Qureshi in his paper "The Islamic-Secular Dichotomy in the Political Development of Pakistan: A Political Culture Case Study" (Paper presented at the 41st. Annual Conference of the American Association for Asian Studies, Washington, DC, March 1989).

V. Conclusion

The objective of this study was to analyse the nature of political rule in Pakistan by viewing it through the prism of political culture. My framework for conducting this study on the nature of rule in Pakistan relied upon a two-step approach to outlining the principal attributes of the Islamic political culture in Pakistan, and in this manner, an effort was made to account for the processes of continuity and change which occurred temporally and spatially. Social, historical and ideational factors were taken into consideration, and an attempt was made to explore the manner in which the predisposition of the Pakistani Muslim was influenced, on the one hand, by his religious beliefs, and, on the other hand, by the historical experiences and social context peculiar to the subcontinent.

In employing the data obtained from doctrinaire Islam and from level 2 of this study as explanatory variables, a clearly defined framework was provided. Further, axioms pertaining to political culture and authoritarian-military rule were outlined in detail, and were thenceforth used for the purpose of investigating the linkages between Islamic political culture and the nature of rule in Pakistan. Such an approach was adopted in order to ensure that the conclusions derived from the data were theoretically sound. The risk of indulging in intellectual guesswork and

intuitive reasoning was also avoided in this manner.

The linkages which were established between the political culture attributes and the nature of rule in Pakistan were primarily of a correlational nature. Never in the study of socio-political phenomena can a causal relationship be established. The methods which were employed in this study, and the framework which was adopted, neither set out nor attained any such overambitious goal. The findings of this study nonetheless provided a perspective on how the cultural norms and religious beliefs extant in Muslim society in Pakistan coloured the perceptions and orientations of the masses, and also influenced the nature of rule.

A. Major Findings

My findings pertaining to the Islamic political culture in the context of Pakistani society confirm the premise that culture represents a concept which adapts and changes temporally and spatially. Thus, the process of transplantation of Islam away from Arabia and in the South Asian context fostered a desire for democracy amongst Pakistani Muslims[3'''] - despite the primarily authoritarian nature of doctrinaire Islam. The allegiant subject mentality, the "ingroup-outgroup" outlook, the preeminence of the military in the political process and the near complete fusion of the two realms (viz. the military and the

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[3'''] This was discussed in detail in chapter 3.

political), as was common to the Muslim community under Muhammad and during the Rashidun period, also became somewhat modified in the context of twentieth century Pakistan. Further, an eclectic world-view, based on Islamic beliefs, notions of democracy and secularist orientations, manifested itself as part of the Muslim mind in South Asia on account of the "westoxication" process which occurred during the period of British colonial rule, and due to the exposure of the Muslim mind in South Asia to cultural factors and historical experiences which were indigenous to India.

The implications of all this reflected itself in the pendulum-like oscillation that Pakistan experienced between "democracy" (which, as observed in my findings, bore a greater resemblance to authoritarian-civilian rule) and authoritarian-military rule. Such a pattern in the nature of political rule in Pakistan was clearly manifest in the findings presented in Chapter 4, and indicates that while the authoritarian-military overtones of Islam have not been able to suppress completely the democratic urges prevalent in the political culture of Pakistani Muslims, the desire for democracy has not as yet been able to find a permanent mooring.

Another important finding which merits specific mention pertains to the manner in which Pakistan has, ever so often, in just over four decades of its existence as a sovereign state, presented a perplexing image of a country which was

surging forward, standing still and moving backward - all at the same time. Thus, for example, a popularly elected leader such as Zulfikar Bhutto, once elected, tilted towards authoritarian-type policies - based on coercion and intimidation. Similarly, Zia's regime, having assumed power by staging a military coup, subsequently considered it "advisable" to maintain an image of democracy by conducting elections - however contrived and rigged they may have been. Thus, within the pendulum-like oscillation that Pakistan experienced since the attainment of statehood in 1947, the pattern was again quite confused and somewhat unclear. It was in this context, that the term "hotch potch", as referred to in chapter 4, appropriately characterised not only the nature of rule in Pakistan, but also reflected the cultural moorings underlying it.

While the focus of this study was upon Pakistan, the findings are useful for understanding the nature of political rule in Muslim societies around the world. Since the doctrinaire level provides the genetic link between Pakistan and the rest of the Muslim world, the norms and values emerging from this level of analysis have relevance beyond the boundaries of Pakistan. Further, my observations regarding the manner in which the "hotch potch" nature of Islamic political culture in South Asia influenced political rule in Pakistan could serve as a useful guide for analysing political patterns and trends in other Muslim countries such as Pakistan, which exist outside the heartland of Islam.

B. Pakistan: Some Issues for the Future

The question regarding what lies ahead in Pakistan's future troubles many Pakistan watchers and political analysts who are aware of the past patterns in the politics of Pakistan. Regrettably, however, prominent politicians in Pakistan have often portrayed an overly optimistic picture - which lacks considerations of objective reality. Bhutto for instance, at the peak of his political movement against the Ayub regime, confidently commented that "Pakistan will never again see a dictator like Ayub Khan just as Germany will not see another Hitler and Italy will not see another Mussolini."[2'°] My review of the nature of political rule in Pakistan, as outlined in chapter 4, attests to the fact that Bhutto himself administered the affairs of state in an authoritarian manner - thereby undermining, by his own leadership style, the validity of his earlier statement. Subsequently, Ziaul Huq's military coup completely negated Bhutto's "prophecy."

Some discussion on Pakistan's political future - in the wake of Benazir's recent electoral victory - was undertaken in chapter 4, and, in this context, issues such as Pakistan's economic bill of health were superimposed over considerations of political culture in order to make a forecast on Pakistan's political trajectory in the years ahead. It was suggested in my analysis that the rather

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2'°H. Jalal, K. Hasan, eds. Awakening the People: A Collection of Articles, Statements and Speeches by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (Politics of the People: Volume 2; 1966-1969) (Rawalpindi: Pakistan Publications, n.d.), p.232.

tenuous peace extant between the Islamists, military and the secularists in contemporary times would possibly erode under circumstances in which the masses felt the economic crunch of an increasingly burgeoning defence budget.

Forecasts regarding the long run future of Pakistan and the issues which will strongly influence the course of political events in this predominantly Muslim country can be derived, albeit indirectly, from the comments made in Chapter 4 regarding Benazir's political prospects and problems as Prime Minister. More clearly stated, political harmony and peace in Pakistan can only be attained in a climate which manifests a certain degree of consensus on broad issues of political objectives and goals. The prime political actors identified in chapter 4, viz. the Islamists, secularists and the military, have not as yet been able to agree on such issues. In the meantime, bitter conflict over Pakistan's raison d'être has made crisis management, and not development, the major task for the political leadership in Pakistan. Such a situation can only be expected to continue till such time as Pakistanis are able and willing to, on the one hand, confront the issues originating from the realm of political culture in a head-on manner and, on the other hand, deal with them decisively. In the past, the political leadership in Pakistan has, more often than not, soft-peddled on these problems, and attempted to either ignore the issue at hand or alternatively appease for political advantage - rather than

reckon and resolve. Delaying tactics and evasionary measures such as these can never solve the problem which, though difficult, is not an impossible one. In the case of Turkey, for example, Kamal Ataturk's aggressive promotion of the idea that Turkey should not remain restricted by the political path chalked out by the Muslim pioneers of seventh century Arabia facilitated the abolishment of the facade of the universal caliphate, and ensured that Turkey did not miss the train travelling on the tracks of development and modernisation. A policy of appeasing the Islamist sentiments for the sake of gaining political advantage for oneself or for one's political party, as has been characteristic of the political leadership in Pakistan, can only be expected to prolong the past pattern of political instability and continuing conflict. This would, in all likelihood, enhance the "relevance" of the military in the political process. More succinctly put, authoritarianism, and the traditional pattern whereby the military has functioned as the master and not the servant of the people,[2''] will, in all probability, continue until such time as Pakistanis are not unwilling to forego the icing of Islam on the political cake of Pakistan and go for the very substance which constitutes the cake, and decide on its ingredients. Such a

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[2'']This was notwithstanding Jinnah's admonishment to Colonel Akbar Khan (later of Rawalpindi Conspiracy fame), in particular, and to the army, in general, that the armed forces are the "servants of the people" and that they do not make national policy, but only carry out the tasks entrusted to them by the civilian leadership. See M.A. Khan, Islam, Politics and the State: The Pakistan Experience (London: Zed Books, 1955), p.263.

straight-faced and direct approach in dealing with Pakistan's woes will need to take into account, in addition to religio-cultural matters, also concerns such as economic development, redistribution of wealth, education, etc., and will be possible only under a political leadership which is willing, if required, to stake its future on functional and utilitarian policies aimed at ensuring the future viability of Pakistan as a modern and prosperous state.

In outlining the issues which have relevance to Pakistan's political future, it is noteworthy to mention that certain signs, as noted in contemporary Pakistani society, do provide some shimmering hope for Pakistan in the decades ahead. The electoral victory of Benazir Bhutto itself suggests that Pakistani Muslims are, in fact, able and willing to view their religious beliefs in a manner that does not necessarily impede the emergence of new ideas and approaches.[2'2] Further, the very fact that the authoritarian-type civilian rulers and also the military dictators in Pakistan, in an effort to legitimise their authority, found it necessary to exhibit a willingness to hold popular elections is a good sign, and suggests that the Quranic principle of shura and the tradition of baya extant at the doctrinaire level, in conjunction with the impact of "westoxication" (as occurred under the British), has, indeed, left a lasting imprint upon the political scene in

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[2'2]My comment is intended to indicate that although, as mentioned in chapter 4, doctrinaire Islam prohibits a female to function as the head of a Muslim state, this did not prevent Benazir's electoral victory.

Pakistan. And, akin to the submerged section of an iceberg which, though not noticeable, still constitutes an integral part of the ice mass, notions of democracy originating from the period of British colonial rule in the subcontinent, and also baya and shura, with their Islamic/Arab origins, continue to comprise a part of the Islamic political culture in the subcontinent - and influence thereby the nature of political rule in Pakistan.

In the above paragraph, I had compared, in a figurative sense, the submerged section of an iceberg to the political culture of a given polity. The speed and direction in which an iceberg drifts depends, amongst other factors, upon the speed and direction of the ocean currents. In a similar manner, a polity, though influenced by its political culture, moves nonetheless in a direction and at a pace which is determined so often by the nature of political leadership. My analysis of the post-1947 events in Pakistan attests to this and indicates that, in the years ahead, Pakistan will, depending upon the nature of leadership initiative, tilt towards democracy or alternatively retain and possibly reinforce its primarily authoritarian-military ethos.

In chapter 1, I had mentioned how political culture, as a tool of analysis, principally defines the parameters of political action. It was also noted in my discussion on doctrinaire Islam, as outlined in chapter 2, that these parameters do, in fact, provide some scope for democracy.

Added to this, the eclectic outlook amongst certain groups of Pakistanis also provides grounds for some optimism. In terms of other objective facts, as noted in contemporary Pakistan, the essentials of democracy, viz. the principle of majority rule, the willingness of the minority to accept the decision of the majority after a general election, political pluralism and finally, the existence of a mobile body of political opinion,[2'3] seem to keep resurfacing in the political scene - despite the oft-repeated attempts by authoritarian-type rulers and military dictators to repress them, and the flaws and failings which may be noted in the manner in which these principles operate in the Pakistani context.

The future of democracy and Islam in Pakistan depends thus not on the political culture of Pakistan alone, but rather on how the precepts of Islam are reconciled by the political leaders with the principles of democracy and other "this-worldly" types of concerns such as "Roti, Kapra Aur Makan." The transition from colonialism to political independence in 1947 was sudden and abrupt, and, in the past, the political leadership in Pakistan, though paying lip service to both Islam and democracy, did justice to neither. While the past could be an indicator to the future, it does not necessarily have to be so. The acid test will clearly be the test of time, but in all probability, the

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[2'3]A. Ahmad, "Islam and Democracy in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent," in Religion and Change in Contemporary Asia, ed. R.F. Spencer (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1971), p.126

evolving nature of relationship between the military, Islamist and the secularist, and the shifting balance of power between them, will continue to determine the political direction Pakistan will take in the future. My political crystal ball - based primarily on political culture premises - precludes any definitive answer in this regard. In this sense, the analysis of Pakistan's current woes and its political future, as presented in this study, is more of a prolegomena, rather than the final word. It is, however, a truism that time does not wait, and, in recognition of this, it can be concluded that while other developing countries of the Far East, South East Asia and elsewhere are rapidly graduating from the ranks of low income nations and are fast entering the world of modern technology and science, Pakistan can ill afford to continue to be wrapped up and bogged down by endless debates regarding its raison d'être and the desired role of religion in politics.

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Appendix A

Attention/Nature of Attention Given to Particular Themes in the Quran

	SURA AYAT
God's Attributes	y
Faith in One God	y
Fear of God	y
God's Mercy	y
God's Omnipotence	y
God's Omniscience	y
God - Final/Fair Arbiter	y
God - Sovereign of All	y
God's Reward	y
God's Punishment	y
God - Benevolent, Kind and Merciful	y
God - Harsh and Severe	y
God's Guidance	y
God - Sustenance Source	y
Man as God's Slave	y
Muhammad	y
"This World"	y
"Other World"	y
"Functional" Matters	y
Predestination	y
Obedience vis-à-vis God's orders	A N D
Disobedience vis-à-vis God's orders	A N D
Idol Worship/Attributing Partners to God	A N D
Jihad/Military in Politics	A N D
Use of Violence	A N D

y=yes A=Approval N=Neutral D=Disapproval